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Abstract Mereological nihilism is the philosophical position that there are no items
that have parts. If there are no items with parts then the only items that exist are
partless fundamental particles, such as the true atoms (also called philosophical
atoms) theorized to exist by some ancient philosophers, some contemporary physi-
cists, and some contemporary philosophers. With several novel arguments I show
that mereological nihilism is the correct theory of reality. I will also discuss strong
similarities that mereological nihilism has with empirical results in quantum physics.
And I will discuss how mereological nihilism vindicates a few other theories, such as
a very specific theory of philosophical atomism, which I will call quantum abstract
atomism. I will show that mereological nihilism also is an interpretation of quantum
mechanics that avoids the problems of other interpretations, such as the widely
known, metaphysically generated, quantum paradoxes of quantum physics, which
ironically are typically accepted as facts about reality. I will also show why it is very
surprising that mereological nihilism is not a widely held theory, and not the premier
theory in philosophy.
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physics Æ Interpretations of quantum mechanics: material constitution Æ
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1 Introduction
Mereological nihilism is the theory that the only things that exist are the atomic
(partless) quantum particles. In other words, only partless fundamental particles
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exist (electrons, quarks, etc.), they do not compose any composite objects, and thus
empirical reality does not exist. Traditionally, and more specifically, mereological
nihilism is the philosophical position that objects that have parts do not exist.1 If an
item C is believed to exist due to the belief that it is composed of two parts, a and b,
C does not exist; it is a figment of the conceptual imagination, a mental fabrication.
(Also, if a, for example, is believed to exist due to the belief that it is made of parts p
and q, then a also does not exist.)
In this article, I will show that there is compelling scientific evidence, and robust
philosophical reasoning, which shows that mereological nihilism is the correct
theory of reality. If it is, then the only objects that exist are quantum objects that
do not have parts, such as electrons, quarks, and any other partless quantum
objects. Hereafter, I will call these ‘‘quantum atoms,’’ ‘‘quantum philosophical
atoms,’’ or ‘‘quantum abstract atoms,’’ for reasons I will clarify. As I will discuss in
this introductory section, the data of experimental quantum physics reveals that
the partless quantum abstract atoms are point-sized (sizeless), unstructured,
non-material, surfaceless, non-interacting, irreducible, and perhaps indistinguish-
able quantum objects (true philosophical atoms) that have an incredibly short-lived
and/or nearly instantaneous existence. Philosophical reasoning will also be given
later in this article to show that philosophical argumentation about the quantum
realm is in agreement these experimental findings. These experimental findings of
quantum physics show that quantum objects are not the sorts of items that can
constitute macroscopic objects—or any objects whatsoever: material constitution is
an illusion, and thus everyday ordinary empirical-material reality is some sort of a
dream.
In this article, in discussing quantum philosophical atoms, I will use the description
of them given in the previous paragraph since that is the way that quantum physicists
have discovered the quantum philosophical atoms to be. This description will be
clarified in detail in this section, and it is a description of the quantum philosophical
atoms that is the strictly empirical, non-metaphysical account of quantum mechanics. In
this article, I will explain how the word ‘‘empirical’’ will be used, and how there is
consequently no conflict with how I argue for both of the following positions: quantum
mechanics is empirical, mereological nihilism show the empirical does not exist.2
Quantum physics is an empirical science, but oddly, many quantum physicists
have combined it with a metaphysical philosophy that involves all sorts of unob-
servable, non-empirical, non-scientific, non-experiential, and nonsensical items (e.g.
collapsing probability waves, existent past times, smeared point-particles, wave-
particle duality, where waves are unobservables, etc.). As I will discuss, these
1 Mereological nihilism is also called compositional nihilism (Rosen and Dorr 2002)) or elimina-
tivism (Merricks 2001). Some philosophers also consider mereological nihilism and monadism to be
identical positions. This would be the case if ‘‘monadism’’ is defined as Hoffman and Rosenkrantz do
in the following passage: ‘‘...monadism attacks the commonsense view on the ground that only true
atoms or indivisibles exist... Monadism has the radical implication that there are no compound
material objects, either living or non-living.’’ (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997, 77)
2 What will be shown is that there is more than one way to use the word ‘‘empirical.’’ There is the
ordinary macroscopic empirical reality, which is a dream, and there is the quantum empirical reality,
which is real. ‘‘Empirical’’ is usually used to refer to something to do with the macroscopic objects of
immediate ordinary experience. I will however discuss, as others have, that the word ‘‘empirical’’
must have several meanings in addition to that one. And I will find that the ordinary empirical reality
cannot exist, and only another sort of empirical experiencing that is associated with quantum science
can be considered empirical experience that actually represents real items.
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metaphysical items can be shown to be impossible entities (i.e., non-existent entities)
that have nothing to do with the strictly empirical quantum findings (i.e. the strictly
scientific findings) of quantum physics. I will show that, for that reason, the meta-
physical items only introduce unneeded and unjustified unintelligibility and con-
tradiction into the quantum mechanics, and can even prohibit further investigation
and/or understanding of quantum reality.
Most of the currently accepted interpretations of the data of quantum mechanics
involve the idea that quantum reality involves paradox, but I will show that the
mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics is non-paradoxical. I do
this by showing that quantum reality is best describable as a mereological nihilist
reality, and since mereological nihilism is non-paradoxical, then quantum reality is
also non-paradoxical. In other words, the mereological nihilist account of reality is
non-metaphysical and consistent, whereas the other interpretations of quantum
physics (such as Copenhagen) are paradoxical and are diametrically opposed to
the mereological nihilist interpretation. I will point out that this makes the non-
metaphysical mereological nihilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics more
appealing than the other existing and popular interpretations of quantum reality,
which involve extramental and extrasensory items. I will also point out how it is
actually the ordinary macroscopic empirical realm of reality—which is only a con-
ceptual realm—that is riddled with paradox and antinomy (e.g., the problem of
change).
I will show that quantum physicists have often mistakenly asserted that quantum
reality cannot be atomistic, and I will show that quantum reality is composed of point
atoms. I will show that if quantum physics is merely purged of its metaphysical
elements, and if ‘‘atomism’’ ceases to inappropriately be used to only denote ancient
Greek atomism (since that is just one of the many atomism traditions), then an
empirically based quantum atomism is verified which does not involve metaphysical
elements nor paradox. I will show that because physicists have erroneously consid-
ered atomism to be only of one variety (Greek Democritean atomism), and because
physicists have so often needlessly strayed from the strictly empirical findings of
quantum mechanics in order to incorporate extrasensory, non-scientific, metaphys-
ical theorization, it is for those two reasons that physicists have oddly not espoused
empirical and logical theory of quantum atomism.
I will show that, in accord with the empirical data, the quantum point-atoms do
not accumulate, connect, attach, touch, mix, adhere, gel, behave, or interrelate in any
way to compose composite objects. Ubiquitously, it is demanded by scientists and
philosophers that quantum reality partially or fully gives rise to macroscopic reality.
But no theory exists to give us even the faintest hint of how it does.3 Quantum reality
and macroscopic ordinary empirical reality utterly contradict one another, where the
3 Some physicists may disagree with this, maintaining that, for example, metaphysical electron
probability clouds give an explanation of how point-sized electrons give rise to smooth macro-like
shapes in quantum reality, wherein these shaped items can just bunch up to accumulate into a
universe. I however attack this in Sect. 6 below, finding that there cannot be any such metaphysical
clouds and wavefunctions. The clouds are generated on computer screens, and do not represent the
real nature of the indirectly observable electron, which whenever observed is only a point. Rather,
the clouds are generated from many unconnected observations put together. Other than that, there
are clear conceptual difficulties with maintaining that a point object can compose an extended
surface, which, as mentioned in the next footnote, will also be attacked; and there are obvious
problems with maintaining that an electron can be an extended object with a shape.
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construction of empirical reality out of quantum flashes of energy is analogous to
maintaining that 0 þ 0 þ 0 . . . could add up to one of the positive integers
½1; 2; 3; 4; . . ..4 It is only due to the non-empirical and metaphysical concepts that
physicists and philosophers have filled quantum physics with, and due to misguided
trust in ordinary empirical experience, that allow philosophers and physicists to
unconvincingly attempt to assert that quantum reality composes a macroscopic
reality. For these reasons, and for reasons I will discuss in detail in Sect. 6, mere-
ological nihilism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that is an antidote to the
largely metaphysical interpretations we have been offered by physicists.5
This introduction is divided into several subsections where I will discuss
introductory concepts to do with experimental quantum physics, and which are
essential to understanding the quantum theory of mereological nihilism. In Sect. 2
of this article I introduce mereological nihilism in more detail, and my specific
novel arguments that show that material constitution is impossible and that
mereological nihilism is the best interpretation of quantum physics, are given in
Sects. 3 and 4.
1.1 Basic issues in conceptual quantum physics
The rudimentary conceptual features of experimental quantum physics are not
widely developed, nor widely agreed upon, by the quantum physicists. The goal of
this article is to advance the conceptual understanding of quantum physics by
showing that mereological nihilism appears to be the only possible interpretation of
quantum mechanics that matches the empirical data, and thus the atomism of
mereological nihilism offers the best conceptual understanding of quantum reality.
In this first subsection I will discuss a few of the basic issues of conceptual quantum
physics. Then in the rest of the introductory section I will introduce the mereological
nihilist model of quantum physics.
1.1.1 Quantum particles are unstructured and sizeless/point-sized
The data of quantum physics show that quantum objects appear to be points
(sizeless). (I will show in Sect. 4 of this article that philosophical reasoning also
shows that there can only be point-particles in quantum reality.) Consider the pas-
sage about electrons from the physicist Watson from his recent book on quarks:
4 Many philosophers will argue here that this is not an absurdity, since something like this was
proven by Gru¨nbaum (1952), when he proved that a continuum of points can compose an extended
line. But I will show in Sect. 4.6 that his solution is incorrect, that extensions composed of points are
impossible, and Zeno’s Measure Paradox is no paradox at all.
5 It will become apparent in Sect. 4 that mereological nihilism can only be anti-metaphysical. This
will be become clear in that section, but it might be worthwhile to introduce these ideas here.
According to mereological nihilism, it can be shown that no items contact or connect. This would
include, for example, properties linking to particulars, relations relating relata, and so forth. If
properties cannot link to particulars, then they are free-floating. This is to say that there are no
properties that are instantiated, and thus reality cannot involve property instantiation. Thus,
describing reality with property talk (e.g., x has F, where F is a property) is impossible according to
the mereological nihilist account. But virtually all contemporary metaphysics depends on property
instantiation (see Grupp 2006a) and/or relational properties (see Grupp 2005b), and thus if mere-
ological nihilism undercuts those, then there is no non-contradictory metaphysics. If what I have just
written here is correct, then there is a clear connection between mereological nihilism and blob
theory (which is the theory that n-adic properties do not exist).
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‘‘Electrons are accepted as truly fundamental particles, indivisible and having no
measurable size, so far as anybody knows.’’6 Watson goes on later to talk about other
quantum particles as being points, such as neutrinos.7 There are a few reasons why
this is the case, and one is that many quantum objects appear to not have any parts.
It is however not entirely clear from what physicists have shown us that electrons,
neutrinos, and other partless quantum objects are points just because nobody has
found any parts that they might have. I will however present a new argument in Sect.
4.2 that shows why any quantum philosophical atom can only be a point (i.e. any
partless quantum object can only be a point).
Physicists often call partless quantum objects unstructured objects. An object is
unstructured if it does not have parts or size, just as an electron or neutrino is
apparently unstructured. This is the common way physicists refer to the quantum
particles that do not have parts or size, as show in the following passage by the
famous physicist Gordon Kane:
Why... do we [physicists] think that electrons and quarks are the true ‘Greek
atoms’...? [I]nvestigators have tried by many means to determine whether
electrons, quarks... and gluons show any evidence of structure, and they have
not found any. These experiments probed perhaps 10,000 times further than it
took to see structure in the past, but electrons and quarks continue to behave
as point-like objects with no parts. (Kane 2000, 21)
1.1.2 Quantum particles are indistinguishable and ‘‘not separate’’ from one another
Indistinguishability between quantum objects (in particular the quantum atoms,
since they are the only quantum objects that exist) means there are often no dif-
ferences that can be pointed out between particles that are at different places.8 In
other words, quantum philosophical atoms are indistinguishable particles that are not
coinciding (not overlapping): quantum atoms share all the same perceived proper-
ties, and thus from what is observed about them through quantum instrumentation,
those observations do not provide data that allows quantum researchers to clearly
distinguish quantum abstract atoms from one another.9 Along the same lines, the
evidence for mereological nihilism also leads to the thesis that quantum philo-
sophical atoms are indistinguishable: mereological nihilism is the theory that reality
does not involve any parts and wholes, and if it does not, then only one thing exists.
For that reason, two principle points can be made about mereological nihilism and
the particles observed in quantum experiential physics:
6 Watson (2004, 5).
7 Ibid., p. 7.
8 I will point out below why what might be believed to be differences of location do not constitute
genuine differences between quantum particles.
9 I use the phrase ‘‘perceived properties’’ deliberately here, since properties of quantum particles do
not appear to be actual properties of the particles themselves, but rather they appear to be events
caused in the consciousness of the observer. On this account, a property of a quantum object, such as
charge, is an idea rather than a real mind-dependent property. I will show below why mereological
nihilism leads to the thesis that all properties are of this nature—they are concepts, not real entities
out in the world separate from consciousness.
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1. The particles that exist can only be philosophical atoms (for example, electrons
exist, and protons do not), and
2. The particles that exist must be indistinguishable.
Empirically based quantum physics does not necessarily lead to the position that
all quantum atoms are indistinguishable, but it comes quite close to such a position
for a number of reasons. The famous physicists, Brown and Davies, write: ‘‘All
members of a given particle species are identical; there is on way to distinguish, say,
one electron from another.’’10 This passage appears to be in violation with mere-
ological nihilism since it implies that reality can involve distinctions—in this case,
distinctions between electrons and quarks, for example (but not between electrons
and electrons, or quarks and quarks). But it is likely that such supposed distinctions
between the electrons and the quarks, for example, will be wiped out with further
research in the future in physics and philosophy. I discuss several reasons for this in
later sections, but it is worth making a few points here about this issue.
Quantum non-separability (also called quantum non-locality) involves the dis-
covery that analysis and manipulation of a particle here affects a particle somewhere
else (perhaps even trillions of miles away) instantly, since the two particles are in
some sense not separate. Quantum non-separability was first confirmed in the lab by
the French physicist Alain Aspect, and it shows how particles that seem to be distinct
since they appear to be at different locations, in fact are not distinct. Quantum non-
separability was resisted for decades by physicists, but with repeatable laboratory
confirmation it has moved toward becoming a mainstream quantum thesis.11
Quantum non-separability gives more reason to conjecture that physics will continue
to move from the idea that particles are separate and distinct, to the idea where
particles are found to be indistinguishable and not separate. Non-local and entangled
(non-separate) quantum atoms are not individualistic form one to the next. The
discovery that quantum atoms are non-local indicates that they exhibit inseparability
(or non-locality, which is also called quantum wholeness, or quantum entanglement),
and it may be the case that all particles exhibit quantum inseparability.12 This
quantum finding does away with the strict individuality of all particles.
1.1.3 Quantum particles are unconnected
Quantum abstract atoms do not stand in any relations to one another, and they are
unconnected and unattached to one another. Contrary to popular belief, forces and
quantum fields are not continuous (unbroken) connections between quantum
objects. These issues will be discussed and clarified upon to a great extent in this
article, since they are the essence of mereological nihilism.
There are many reasons why the erroneous idea that there are relations and
continuous connections between quantum atoms have arisen. For example, meta-
physicians might suggest that if quantum particles are entangled and exhibit quan-
tum inseparability, it may seem to follow that they are connected or interrelated, in
10 Davies and Brown (1992, 21).
11 Even with the empirical confirmation, discussion of quantum non-separability is for some reason
resisted or rejected by some relativity theorists.
12 Nadeau and Kafatos (1999, 4).
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some sense, and it may seem that reference to these indistinguishable quantum
philosophical atoms also involves the reference to metaphysical connections or
relations—namely the relations indistinguishable and not collocated, that stand
between the quantum particles. Another way to put the issue is as follows: if
particle A that is here, and particle B that is there, where A and B are one light
year apart, it might seem that they exist in a relationship to one another, which
could be called, at a distance of one light year apart. As just eluded to, I will show
with multiple arguments, and with the quantum scientific data, in sections below
that there are no relations or connections of any sort between any objects,13 what
are ordinarily believed to be extramental connections or relations between objects
are merely mental-imaginary concepts, and no such metaphysical items exist
whatsoever outside of consciousness. The reasoning in that section will show that
relations can only be concepts, and merely the products of the ways that humans
organize their experiences about empirical reality. I have argued this point else-
where14 where I have shown that reality is utterly relationless and connectionless.
Here is a passage of mine from another article where I showed that a reality
involving metaphysical relations is merely a construction of consciousness, not a
discovery of what reality is like:
Perhaps humans, in experiencing physical objects, have certain experiences of
the objects, such as seeing p1 at x, and seeing p2 at y, and in comparing them
mentally, invent concepts, such as that there are real, mind-independent rela-
tions in nature (such as many of the relations I have discussed in this paper:
taller than, brotherhood, distance, and so on) between entities, where we
imagine a real connection between them, and we do not recognize that we
might only behold just the non-collocated spatial objects. In other words, it is
arguable that what is experienced are two objects, p1 and p2, and the mind adds
on, from concepts to do with spatial issues (such as size and location), ideas of
relations or relatedness between spatially separated objects. It may be the case
that a perceiver experiences objects p1 at x and p2 at y, but only in the mind is
there any sort of connection between them. For these reasons, the sentence, ‘‘the
elephant is taller than the lion’’, need not be false, for it corresponds to three
specific entities: the statement describes three experiences: (i) the experience of a
lion, (ii) the experience of a elephant, and (iii) the experience of comparing the
of (i) and (ii), where, unlike the experiences of (i) and (ii), the item denoted by
‘‘taller than’’ is a concept that does not represent anything outside of that
experience. (Each of (i)–(iii) are experiences a perceiver has, but (iii), unlike
(i) and (ii), is an experience of something not in the world outside the mind.15
Notice that reasoning such as this would be reasoning against other philosophies that
are often considered similar to mereological nihilism, such as Quinnean nominalism,
or the supposed nihilism of Trenton Merricks—both of which involve relations
between objects (the relation set membership for the former, and the relation
arrangement for the latter).
13 I also argued this point in Grupp (2005b, d, 2006a, b), but the arguments I present in this article
are quite different than those, and there is no redundancy between those articles and this one.
14 Such as Grupp (2005b).
15 Grupp (2005b, 121–122).
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1.1.4 The only quantum particles that exist are philosophical atoms
Atomism traditionally has been very often oriented toward nihilism, as was the case
in ancient Greece and ancient India, and often involved the rejection of the idea that
there are metaphysical connections or relations between philosophical atoms.
Atomism is a philosophy that goes back to the ancient philosophers, and some
accounts of it—especially some accounts of the Buddhism of pre-classical
India—appear to be surprisingly consistent with contemporary experimental quan-
tum physics, and with the mereological interpretation of quantum physics that I will
present in this article.
Instead of using the term ‘‘philosophical atoms,’’ now the terms ‘‘simples,’’
‘‘physical simples,’’ ‘‘mereological simples,’’ or ‘‘material simples’’ are being
extensively used. (In this introduction I will discuss why I do not use any of the terms
just listed, and why I will instead use quantum abstract atoms to denote the partless
fundamental particles.) I am not aware of any article that specifically points out why
there has been this change from using the term ‘‘atoms’’ to ‘‘simples’’, but it seems
we can find out what it’s all about if we look at the philosophy of simples in the
recent literature and compare it to atomism in the history of philosophy. It seems
that the difference is that, unlike the philosophy of simples, the older theory,
atomism, is more in accord with mereological nihilism. Schaffer writes that ‘‘the
atomist claims that there are no macro-entities at all but only fundamental entities in
various arrangements.’’16,17 But the philosophy of simples involves both basic
building blocks and (at least some) wholes, and thus involves either a semi-nihilistic
reality (i.e., only some of the wholes that humans ordinarily perceive actually exist)
or an anti-nihilistic reality (i.e., there are as many wholes as humans ordinarily
believe there are). In this article, for these reasons, I will use the term ‘‘atom’’, and I
will not use ‘‘simple’’. Interestingly, the quasi-nihilism of philosophers such as
Merricks and van Inwagen (both use ‘‘simples,’’ and it seems van Inwagen got the
whole trend of using ‘‘simples’’ going) are not thoroughgoing mereological nihilisms,
since each of their nihilisms involve some composites, and since each of their
nihilisms are not attempts to deny common sense and ordinary language. In this
article, which can be considered a pure and quantum nihilism, no objects but partless
quantum items are admitted, and an explicit of goal of this article is the rejection of
ordinary language, where except in very rare circumstances, ordinary language can
only be representative of illusions that the mind generates, not to reality itself.
The only medium I can use for communicating and describing mereological
nihilism is language. For that reason, if I am to write an article on mereological
nihilism, I have to write it from the non-nihilistic perspective since language is not
nihilistic. Even though language is not found to be applicable to what really exists, as
the reasoning of this article shows, if efforts are made to use language to discuss
the partless atoms, then language can, in that case, come close to denoting real items,
rather than illusory mental concepts. This does involve trickiness, however. For
16 Schaffer (2003, 498).
17 As I discuss elsewhere in this article, it is not entirely clear why a particle arrangement is not able
to give rise to a composite entity: why isn’t a topological network a mereological whole? Only if it
can be shown, as I did elsewhere (Grupp 2005b, 2006a), that reality cannot involve any relations of
arrangement is there no possibility of a composite entity, thus vindicating mereological nihilism as
the correct theory.
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example, even though quantum philosophical atoms can only be indistinguishable in
quantum mereological nihilism, in this article I however can do little more than
discuss indistinguishable atoms as if they are distinct, such as when I write, for
example, ‘‘atom A1 and atom A2 do not coincide.’’ This sentence makes it appear
that A1 and A2 are not indistinguishable, when in fact they are. This is an example of
the difficultly of using ordinary language—which is composite-object-oriented, not a
quantum oriented language—to discuss mereological nihilism.
1.1.5 Quantum particles are immaterial
I will discuss at great length in Sect. 2 of this article why quantum philosophical
atoms are immaterial, rather than physical or material. There has been a lot of
discussion among philosophers about non-physical or immaterial items. For exam-
ple, holes have been suggested to be immaterial, since they are ‘‘made of nothing.’’
This is just one of the many formulations that metaphysicians have given when
discussing non-physical or immaterial items. In this article I will not focus on any of
those metaphysical discussions, and I will only consider the concept of immateriality
from one angle: an entity is immaterial if it does not have any of the features that an
ordinary macroscopic object has. For example, if a macroscopic object is believed to
have extension and be located in space, then an immaterial object is spatially
unextended and spatially unlocated.
If quantum particles are immaterial, then that would indicate that all of reality is
immaterial, since, as the quantum mereological nihilist argues, only immaterial
particle-atoms exist. As quantum physicists have probed deeper and deeper into
matter, they have discovered that matter does not exist, since literally nothing
materialistic exists in quantum reality. The history of quantum physics can be looked
at as, to some degree, quantum physicists attempting to describe to other people
(who are not quantum scientists) a reality they cannot understand since their minds
are attuned to the illusory and the materialistic, whereas the quantum reality is
immaterialistic. Regarding this move toward the immaterialization of ‘‘matter’’ at
the quantum level, Zimmerman writes: ‘‘The 19th and 20th centuries... witnessed the
gradual ‘dematerialization of matter’.’’18 George J. Stack also discusses this ‘‘dem-
aterilzation’’ in a passage I give next. Stack’s passage is quite significant since it is
from the ‘‘Materialism’’ entry of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.19
A passage about the immaterialism of quantum reality in such a widely read
Encyclopedia is apparent evidence for how mainstream the idea is that there is no
‘‘matter’’ at the quantum level.
The twentieth-century conception of matter as composed of electrons, protons
and other subatomic particles has spawned a rich speculative literature that
effectively undermines previous forms of materialism. What the late US phi-
losopher of science, Norwood Hanson, called the ’dematerialization’ of matter,
raises questions concerning what ’materialism’ means in terms of the theories
of microphysics. Many of the arguments that sustained earlier forms of
materialism (including the assumption of causality as universal in nature) have
been put in question.
18 Zimmerman (1996a, 166–167).
19 Edward Craig (ed.). 1998, New York: Routledge.
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1.1.6 Quantum particles do not touch each other or interact with one another
Even though philosophers and physicists often casually refer to ‘‘particle interac-
tion’’ when they discuss what goes on in quantum reality (as if that means touching
or contacting between quantum particles occurs), philosophers and physicists how-
ever have long maintained that interaction between particles cannot occur by con-
tact or touching between particles. (This is one of the many ways that physicists and
philosophers of physics have misled the public when they have attempted to explain
the details of the immaterial quantum domain to ordinary people, who are oriented
to think in terms of the macroscopic.) For example, consider the passage from Kline
and Matheson that is from an article called ‘‘The Logical Impossibility of Collision’’:
Absolutely no one still believes that every physical interaction consists of
material bodies bumping into each other. Those who have tried to work out a
completely mechanistic physics have been unable to explain common phe-
nomena like liquidity, gravitation and magnetism.20
They go on to explain that particles interact via interrelating, or by mediating fields
or forces. But I will show in this article that relations, fields, and forces do not exist,
and I will show that the data from experimental quantum physics has never sup-
ported the idea that they do. I will also discuss many reasons why touching and
contact between quantum particles is impossible.
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, in their book Substance, also discuss this issue, and
how it might lead to skepticism about the existence of parts and wholes (i.e., as
evidence for mereological nihilism):
Skepticism about the intelligibility of the relations which are commonly
thought to unify or organize the parts of material objects... might be thought to
provide... argument in favor of monadism.21 Such skepticism or claims of
ignorance might be fueled by developments in modern science, developments
which are themselves well confirmed by experimental data. For example, the
laws of physics imply that in all but extremely exceptional circumstances, no
two physical objects touch (strictly speaking) because of the presence of
repulsive forces between fundamental particles.22
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz do not indicate which ‘‘exceptional circumstances’’ they
are referring to when particles touch. I will show below through textual evidence
from physicists, and through philosophical reasoning, that quantum particles never
touch, and thus the claim in the last sentence of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz is
incorrect.
1.1.7 Real quantum particles are philosophical atoms
It is widely held by physicists that quantum particles are not true philosophical
atoms. In this article I will show that physicists have not given evidence for why this
20 Kline and Matheson (1987, 509). See Sect. 4 below for more discussion on this issue. van Inwagen
discusses this (1990, 34).
21 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz are using ‘‘monadism’’ here as synonymous with ‘‘mereological
nihilism,’’ see p. 77 of their 1997.
22 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 78).
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is the case, and I will show that such a position is incorrect. The word ‘‘atom’’, as
I am using it here, does not refer to the atoms that scientists discuss (which are
believed to be composed of one or more electrons and a nucleus), but rather to the
philosophy of atomism: the philosophical position that what reality is, is no more
than innumerable true atoms (partless atoms). Simons writes:
An atom is an individual with no proper parts, it is accordingly indivisible
either in fact or in theory, as befits the etymology of its name. Atoms in this
strict sense are not to be confused with atoms in the sense of physics and
chemistry, which may have numerous proper parts and are far from indivisible,
even in fact. Here the etymology of the name has lost touch with progress in
physics; ‘atom’ is no longer a functional but a rigid term for certain natural
kinds. Whether there really are mereological atoms is an unresolved question,
and it is at present difficult to see what could resolve it.23
Many philosophers and physicists use the words ‘‘atom’’ or ‘‘atomism’’ as if they
only refer to one theory: ancient Greek atomism (which carried over to later
thinkers, such as Newton). This incorrect perspective has led many physicists to
mistakenly believe that quantum reality cannot be an atomistic reality: physicists
have imagined that atomist theories are only Greek/Democritean theories, and since
quantum reality is not Greek/Democritean then quantum reality is not atomistic
either.24 Greek/Democritean atomism involves the idea that philosophical atoms are
like little irreducible solid objects, as if they are very similar to macroscopic objects
except only much smaller—which is an idea diametrically opposed to quantum
findings. In other words, the Greek/Democritean theory of atomism that goes back
over 2,000 years to some of the ancient Greek philosophers is entirely outdated by
the quantum discoveries that I will discuss in this article. I will show that the history
of philosophy is in stark disagreement with the idea that there is only the Greek/
Democritean variety of atomism, as quantum physicists for some reason typically
assume; atomism has had many varieties other than only the ancient Greek version.
The primary non-Greek atomistic theory I will discuss is found in some versions of
pre-classical Indian Buddhist atomism, which is in astonishingly close agreement
with the quantum nihilistic atomism described in this article.
In discussing ancient Greek atomism, a few philosophers have attempted to
maintain that a philosophical atom somehow can have parts, in some sense, such as
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, in a passage where they discuss voluminous material
atoms (the so-called Democritean atoms, which have no similar characteristics to the
quantum abstract atoms I argue for in this article):
...atoms are voluminous and (hence) spatially extended... First, by an atom we
mean a material substance which has volume and which is necessarily indi-
visible. Second, because an atom is voluminous, it has parts. Thus what we
maintain is that the parts of an atom are not substances.25
23 Simons (1987, 16).
24 This is just one reason that physicists have referred to their quantum physics as non-atomistic.
They have added into their quantum physics all sorts of metaphysical items, as mentioned above,
such as probability waves, which can be shown to be erroneous ideas, and the implanting of these
metaphysical items into the interpretations of the quantum data are also reasons why physicists have
espoused anti-atomism.
25 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 51).
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I find this passage to be confusing, if not paradoxical. How can an atom be a sub-
stance made of non-substances? How can an atom be made of anything else? How
can a philosophical atom have parts? It seems that Hoffman and Rosenkrantz
merely present an ad hoc thesis by referring to the extended philosophical atom as a
substance, and to refer to its ‘‘parts’’ as non-substances. The parts must also be
extended, so why would they not also be substances, in the way that Hoffman and
Rosenkrantz are using the word ‘‘substance’’? Hoffman’s and Rosenkrantz’s account
is in opposition to some, if not the majority, of the traditional accounts of atomism
and ways of using the word ‘‘atomism’’ though history, wherein that traditional
usage an atom is held to be partless and indivisible. Hoffman’s and Rosenkrantz’s ad
hoc account appears to be an attempt to describe Democritean (extended) atoms in
a way that covers-up the inconsistent ideas surrounding them (e.g., an atom has size,
extension, but no parts26). Their passage shows how I will not use the word ‘‘atom’’
(or other synonymous terms: ‘‘philosophical atom,’’ ‘‘quantum atom,’’ or ‘‘quantum
abstract atom’’) in this article. I use the word ‘‘atom’’ to only refer to partless items
that do not have a spatial size, and I will attack Hoffman and Rosenkrantz’s
conception of the Democritean atom—in addition to all other accounts of the
Democritean atom—in Sect. 4 below.
Quantum mereological nihilism can only be considered a non-Greek, non-
Democritean theory of philosophical atomism: an empirically based, scientifically
aligned, anti-metaphysical, anti-realist atomism, where the quantum philosophical
atoms are immaterial, non-solid, partless, inseparable (non-local), flashing points of
immaterial energy (all these concepts will be discussed in detail in later sections).
A shorter description of such particle might be, for example, ‘‘point particle,’’
‘‘unstructured particle,’’ or, for example, ‘‘point charge’’ (these are all terms used by
physicist, and point charge is the term physicists use to describe the electron). Since
the dawn of the quantum revolution, it has become commonplace to find quantum
physicists rejecting the idea that any quantum objects are philosophical atoms:
‘‘Quantum mechanics seems to contradict atomism.’’27 But it is hard to imagine how
the unstructured (partless) point particles that physicists have discovered, such as
electrons, quarks, etc., are not true philosophical atoms. (I specifically show with a
novel argument in Sect. 4 that there cannot be point-sized objects that have parts.)
There is no evidence that these items have parts, and there is no evidence that they
have size, so how can’t it be the case that the leading thesis for what these are, are
true atoms? We can’t cut electrons due to the fact that they are points and thus have
no surface that we can plunge a knife into. If an electron, for example, did have
parts, those parts would also be points, and thus would be, it seems, identical to the
whole.
1.1.8 Quantum particles are momentary and do not exhibit much motion
The physicist, Ford, discusses the unfathomably temporary (momentary) existence
of quantum atoms:
For a particle,... a hundredth of a second is an eternity... A gluon (the
‘‘glue’’ particle within a nucleus) lasts about that long between its creation and
26 This is one of many inconsistencies I will point out in this article.
27 Gibbins (1987, 2). Gibbins does not support this with evidence after making this assertion.
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annihilation. A pion (a particle created in nuclear collisions) that moves a whole
foot has traveled nearly a million billion times the diameter of a proton and has
taken a lengthy 10–9 second to do it. Particles that live long enough to leave
tracks in a detector have lifetimes of 10–10 to 10–6 s. The neutron is a strange
special case. With an average lifetime of fifteen minutes, it is the Methuselah of
the particle world.28
Also, consider another passage from the physicist Paul Davies.
Until recently it was believed that electrons, protons, photons, and neutrinos
are absolutely stable, i.e., that they have an infinite lifetime. The neutron can
remain stable when trapped in a nucleus, but a free neutron decays in about
15 min. All other known particles are highly unstable, their lifetimes varying
from microseconds down to 10-23 s. If these times seem incomprehensibly
short, remember that a particle traveling at near the speed of light (which most
accelerator products do) can cover 300 m in a microsecond. Particles that
decay do so by the action of quantum processes, and so there is always an
element of unpredictability.29
(Neutrons do not exist according to the mereological nihilist. The quarks that are
believed to make up the bound neutron are never actually observed through the
quantum machinery in the particle lab; they are only observed when they are free
particles, wherein which they are momentary. The bound neutron is perceived, via
the quantum machinery, to exist for minutes, rather than microseconds or shorter,
and from that it is typically inferred that the quarks that allegedly compose a neutron
are not momentary. This is, however, a metaphysical claim, since the quarks that
allegedly compose the bound neutron are non-observables in these circumstances,
and thus cannot be inferred to be non-momentary. Composite objects of any sort are
perceived to be non-momentary, and quantum atoms are perceived through the
quantum apparatuses in the lab to be momentary. Therefore, it is not surprising that
neutrons are believed to be existent items that are non-momentary. But just as we
cannot know anything about the nature of the quantum domain from analysis of
composite bodies—such as a universe, a house, a bug, a chromosome, or a virus—we
cannot infer from a non-momentary neutron that it is made of quarks that are
non-momentary. For these reasons, I will not entertain the idea in this article that
the quarks that are thought to be the constituents of bound neutrons are
non-momentary, since no observations exist to support this conclusion.)
Quantum atoms are so short-lived that they cannot exhibit significant motion in
their lifetimes. A macroscopic object, such as a pen, may travel with me from Purdue
to UCLA and back, and then continue to travel with me all over West Lafayette
wherever I go, perhaps for years. But quantum atoms are, conversely, unable to
move in any such way, and comparably they are hardly moveable at all. Quantum
atoms are momentary and do not exhibit much motion, which is quite the opposite of
any sorts of objects of the macroscopic empirical level of perception. Even a cloud
that is perceived to form and evaporate in 5 min is perceived to exist through an
infinitude of duration as compared to any quantum atom. Combining these experi-
mental findings about the momentariness of quantum objects with what has been
28 Ford (2004, 15–16).
29 Davies (1984, 82).
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described in the previous subsections above, it appears that perhaps the best way to
describe a quantum atom would be to refer to it as a momentary flash of immaterial
energy. The physicist Nick Herbert writes:
In the ... world of the quantum, a particle can vanish without a trace (quantum
annihilation), or come into existence out of nowhere (quantum creation), move
from location A to location B without being in between (quantum tunneling),
or instantly flip from one state of being to another (quantum jumping).30
All quantum measurements when scrutinized at their finest level of resolution
consists of tiny particlelike events called ‘‘quanta’’, or ‘‘quantum jumps’’—-
flashes of light on a phosphor screen, for instance; or a bubble, spark, or click in
a particle detector; the blackening of a silver grain in a photographic emulsion;
or the sudden excitation of a light-sensitive molecule in your eye. The world
when looked at closely appears to be made of little dots, much like color
photos in a magazine. The first law of quantum theory is that these quantum
jumps occur completely at random—no theory, quantum or otherwise, can
predict where or when the next light-induced flash will occur in your retina.31
The overall picture of quantum particles that has been given so far in this section is
one where they are observed to be flashes of energy that are nearly durationless.
Particles do not exhibit a continuous existence, and for these reasons, particles do
not exhibit the sorts of properties that material items do.
1.1.9 What about string theory?
Many physicists that are called string theorists attempt to argue with sophisticated
mathematics that reality is not composed of point-like quantum atoms, but rather of
1-dimensional vibrating strings of energy or 2-dimensional vibrating sheets of
energy. The appeal to this theory is enormous, as string theory may give rise to one
of the greatest revolutions in science. But in this subsection, I will briefly show why I
do not see how I can avoid the conclusion that string theory is in need of one
modification: the fundamental items in string theory can only be points, not the
aforementioned strings or sheets. My reasoning in sections 3 and 4 of this article
show that 1- and 2-dimensional items cannot exist. But in addition to those reasons
in Sects. 3 and 4, there is another significant problem for the 1- and 2-dimensional
items of string theory that I can point out here, and which I will do in this subsection.
Due to the incredible popularity of string theory, and the obvious opposition it has
with the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum physics, it seems worthwhile
to point out at this early in this article why string theorists may have a few problems
to address that mereological nihilism avoids.
Before the 1900s the particles at the basic level of reality were thought to be
either point-particles or Democritean (voluminous) atoms. But with the onset of
quantum mechanics there arose a third option: string theory. We are told by string
theorists that there is nothing more fundamental than these strings (which to my
knowledge indicates that they are apparently basic building blocks), as Matthieu and
the physicist Thuan write:
30 Herbert (1989, 160).
31 Ibid.
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At the moment we don’t know how to unify the twentieth century’s two great
physical theories—quantum mechanics and relativity. The former describes
the... [very] small, and account for the behavior of atoms and light when gravity
isn’t dominant. The latter describes the... [very] large, and allows us to
understand the universe and its structures at a cosmic scale, where the two
nuclear forces and the electromagnetic force are not predominant...
Some physicists, who are working on the theory of superstrings,... say that...
elementary particles are created by the vibration of tiny ‘‘strings’’ of energy
that are Planck length long. Because nothing can be smaller than these strings,
the problem of what happens to space on scales smaller than Planck length
disappears. Space simply can’t have a smaller dimension. This theory seems to
have the potential of unifying quantum physics and relativity. But right now it’s
wrapped in a thick mathematical veil and hasn’t been proved experimentally.32
(Emphasis added.)
Strings, roughly speaking, are vibrating basic building blocks that (somehow) are
theorized to amalgamate and split (apparently when they exist they are basic: the
initial string, and the post-split strings, are all basic items). Regardless of what
physicists assert, we can apparently find that strings are not fundamental, as I will
do next. We are told that the sheets and strings vibrate. And even though string
theorists apparently tend to reject the concepts of time and space,33 to my
knowledge the vibration of the strings and sheets indicates that in some sense they
involve persistence: they persist through time. (I only say this because vibration
seems to only be a ‘‘process’’ that can occur through time where there is an object
that persists while vibrating.) This vibration through time is where the problem I
wish to point out comes in. If strings and sheets are considered fundamental, and if
their fundamentalness means they are partless, it can be pointed out there is an
apparent absurdity involved with the idea that there can be partless items that
vibrate through time. So, assuming that I have the account of the string theorists
correct, I will proceed.
If, while a string is vibrating, it does so in some sort of wavelike manner, there
could be a problem if the waving occurs with more than one wave crest. I don’t see
how the conclusion can be avoided that such a vibrational string cannot have at least
two segments moving in opposite directions, such as when in the act of vibrating, the
top half of a string that is vertical with respect to an observer moves to the left, and
the bottom half moves to the right. It appears to me that the only way this can occur
is if the energy string (and the same would hold for an energy sheet) has parts that
compose it, so that the bottom and top, for example, of the string can move in
opposite directions. For these reasons, and for reasons pointed out in Sects. 3 and 4, I
do not consider string theory in this article, as it appears that the superstrings the
string theorists discuss are not partless building blocks, which would be a problem if
the strings are supposed to be truly fundamental, as the passage above from
Matthieu and Xuan indicated: the parthood of the strings would apparently indicate
that there is something more fundamental than the strings
32 Matthieu and Thuan (2001, 27–28).
33 See Greene (2004).
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1.2 Quantum abstract atomism
Now that I have outlined some of the basic conceptual issues surrounding the
experimental data of quantum mechanics, I will use the rest of this introductory
section to discuss the philosophy of mereological nihilism.
If mereological nihilism is correct, quantum philosophical atoms do not make up
any sort of composite entity, such as a tree, a mind, a human body, a molecule, or a
universe. The quantum philosophical atoms never converge, act,34 contact, or con-
nect in any way in which they give rise to a mereological whole that is made of the
philosophical atoms.35,36,37 Mereological nihilism is an attack on all philosophies of
mereology and material constitution. ‘‘[T]he term ‘mereology’ [refers to]... any
formal theory of part-whole and associated concepts.... ... ‘[M]ereology’... literally
[means] ‘science or theory of parts’...’’38 It is one of the three areas of philosophy and
conceptual physics that attempts to explain material constitution (also referred to as
material composition), where topology and mereotopology are the other two—and
all of which I show are impossible.39
As pointed out in Sect. 1.1, the philosophy of mereological nihilism is also a
philosophy of quantum philosophical atomism. In this article I will refer to the
philosophical atoms of mereological nihilist reality as quantum abstract atoms. These
are the aforementioned partless, momentary point-sized, non-material particles of
physics that physicists have discovered: electrons, quarks, gluons, etc. Usually these
partless particles, that I am calling quantum abstract atoms, are just referred to as
subatomic particles, or point particles, which are terms scientists and philosophers
34 I use ‘‘act’’ specifically because another nihilist (but which I describe in this article as a quasi-
nihilist), van Inwagen uses the concept of activity in his somewhat nihilistic analysis: it is by some
activity of partless subatomic particles that they give rise to a composite item (if, that is, particles can
give rise to composites).
35 Some readers may wonder why reality cannot be atomless, where there are parts ‘‘all the way
down.’’ This position is against mereological nihilism, since mereological nihilism rejects for any
parts whatsoever. According to the philosophy of atomlessness, any material object or topological
region can be described as an infinite regress of parts: a spatially extended object can be divided into
halves, each half can be further divided into quarters, each quarter into eighths, ad infinitum. The
atomless object is never divided down to atoms and involves no atoms (and it is interesting how often
philosophers miss this point, for example: Sider (1993, 287).) and each part is extended. (See Pyle
1995, 2–6 for a very lucid explanation of these details to do with atomlessness). But if mereological
nihilism is correct, I will specifically point out in a section below why atomlessness is an incorrect
theory, since atomlessness involves composition and mereology, which I argue in this article does not
exist.
36 In this article I limit my discussion to partless quantum objects, and I do not discuss other possibly
partless objects, such as platonia or Armstrongian universals (if Armstrongian universals or platonia
are partless, and if Armstrongian universals or platonia even exist [See Grupp articles 2003–2006 for
arguments against the existence of platonia, mind-independent n-adic properties, and against any
metaphysical objects whatsoever]).
37 The reader can probably tell at this point in the article that by ‘‘part’’ I am referring to ‘‘proper
part.’’ Proper parts are not identical to the whole, and thus are less than the whole (Simons 1987, 11).
An improper proper is one where it is a part identical to the whole (x is a part of itself). Mereological
nihilism, then, is the position that there are no objects that have proper parts.
38 Simons (1987, 5).
39 The reasoning below in Sects. 3 and 4 shows that any other theory of constitution that may be
invented in addition to the three just listed are impossible, since the arguments in Sects. 3 and 4
below show that the quantum atoms must exist (i.e., any reality can only be composed of them), and
necessarily they cannot interact in any way with one another.
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typically use to refer to all items of the quantum world, whether partless or
composite (this is true for all quantum items except the scientists’ atom, which is
conceptualization of a non-existent composite item allegedly composed of electrons
and a nucleus, and is dissimilar to the historically old concept of a philosophical
atom). Protons (which have a diameter and are allegedly mereological wholes) and
quarks (which have no diameter and are partless) each involve the inverse properties
of each other in many significant ways. For that reason, I am not sure why it could be
considered a good idea to fit them both under the same label, ‘‘particle,’’ or
‘‘subatomic particle,’’ given their rather extreme disparateness. Due to the impor-
tance of the quantum atoms (as opposed to the quantum composites that are alleged
to exist), due to the specific idiosyncratic properties of the quantum atoms, and due
to the ways that quantum atoms differ from any compose items (such as the former
being real and the latter being non-existent), it appears that a renaming of the
partless quantum objects could prove useful for philosophical analysis. After the
quantum revolution, no name was adopted to specifically denote the idiosyncratic
details of the partless fundamental particles, and to also denote them as immaterial
points of momentary energy. ‘‘Atom’’ appears applicable since the partless quantum
objects are atomic (in one of the original meanings of the word ‘‘atom’’ (partless
object)). (I explain the various reasons why there is reason for quantum mere-
ological nihilists to espouse the word ‘‘atom’’ at many places in this article.)
Mereological nihilism is a quantum mechanical philosophy, since the fundamental
level of reality, which is empirically shown to be obviously quantum (i.e., non-
classical, involving randomness, non-mechanistic, non-local, non-material). For that
reason, what is needed in a renaming is a retreat from the Greek connotations, and
antiquated classical and mechanistic connotations of the word ‘‘atom,’’ to the
empirical atomism of modern quantum physics. The most appropriate word I can
think of to denote the unusualness of the non-mechanistic quantum atoms is the
word ‘‘abstract,’’ since that word could be considered broad enough to denote many
aspects of the non-logical (i.e., non-mechanistic), non-solid, simple (partless), non-
local (non-separable), immaterial, and momentary (instantaneous) quantum flashes
of energy.40 That is reason for my employing the name quantum abstract atoms,
which is meant to denote only such items, and for other reasons I will give
throughout this article (and which I have elaborated on elsewhere41), this name
seems most appropriate. This renaming is meant (i) to bring atomism out of being
thought of as primarily a mechanistic, medieval or ancient theory where atoms are
imagined to behave in the ways that ordinary empirical objects do but only on a
much smaller scale, and (ii) to emphasize that mereological nihilist atomism appears
to be the best description of the experimental empirical findings in quantum physics.
1.3 Philosophers and the quantum revolution
I will show that the experimental data of quantum physics (as distinct from the
interpretation(s) of the data of quantum physics) strongly supports mereological
nihilism. (In this article, I will only discuss one of the interpretations offered to us by
physicists—the positivistic version of the Copenhagen Interpretation—which I do in
40 I adopt the phrases ‘‘flashing energy’’ from a passage by the famous physicist, Herbert (1989, 160),
and from the famous Buddhist philosopher Stcherbatsky (1962, 19).
41 Grupp (2005a), section 5.1.
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6.1 below, due to the fact that it comes to a few of the same conclusions about
fundamental reality that mereological nihilism does.) The vast majority of philoso-
phers do not properly acknowledge the implications that quantum physics has to
philosophy, and how quantum physics draws into serious question the correctness of
ordinary empirical experience. They have not given sufficient consideration to the
seriousness of the conflict between the objects of empirical experience and the
quantum objects that are supposed to compose those empirical objects that are given
in empirical experience. There has been a revolution in science, called the quantum
revolution, that the majority of contemporary philosophers in the Western tradition
appear to have distanced themselves from. Philosophers have instead all-too-often
chosen to align themselves with ancient and pre-scientific metaphysical theories of
reality (such as Aristotelian substance theory), and with mereological and meta-
physical viewpoints of reality that involve rather obvious and stark problems,
antinomies, and paradoxes (such as identity through time and change,42 Zeno’s
Measure Paradox, the paradox of material constitution, just to give merely a few
examples). Put in different words, rather than an aligning with the quantum revo-
lution, it appears that a significant percentage of philosophers instead resort to
describing reality in terms of non-scientific, extrasensory, metaphysical items and
ideas in their description of reality: platonic entities, possible worlds, four-dimen-
sional world-lines, thin or thick particulars, space, souls, God, mind-independent n-
adic properties, etc. As for philosophers who are metaphysicians, they ask us to
believe that there are items such as these, all of which no one has ever perceived, and
which they would tell us nobody ever will (but which are needed to make realist
metaphysical philosophy coherent), and they recommend to us that we not be overly
worried about the data of quantum physics, nor about the immense conflict its
empirical findings have with their metaphysical realism. The thesis of mereological
nihilism involves a rejection of all metaphysical and non-empirical items, and an
alliance with the empirical findings of quantum physics. Quantum physics is perhaps
the simplest and most straightforward science (it is ‘‘perhaps the most successful
theory in the history of science’’43). In overlooking or ignoring quantum physics, far
too many philosophers often fail to take note of how well-developed the experi-
42 In Grupp (2005a) I discussed how the problem of change is still as much of an unsolved problem
as ever for Western philosophers, who nevertheless debate it endlessly with no sign of a solution in
sight. (See Loux 2001, especially p. 321.) The problem of change—how can object A remain itself if it
changes—has prohibits change from involving endurance or perdurance. The problem, however, is
treated in Western philosophy as if it is not really so much of a problem (if the problem was taken
seriously, the endurance and perdurance debate would not be options to debate). Consequently,
there is no coherent account of change since the problem of change is apparently an unsolvable
paradox. Rather, if philosophers want to describe change only do so in the following way: demand
that we see that the problem of change is not so much of a problem at all, and imagine that there are
enduring or perduring objects. Consider this passage from Zimmerman, where he is writing about
David Lewis’s complaints about presentism, and notice how the terms ‘‘incredible,’’ ‘‘obvious,’’ and
‘‘obviously’’ are used:
But, by Lewis’s lights, presentism is too incredible to be believed...Presentism ‘‘rejects endurance;
because it rejects persistence altogether’’;... And yes, says Lewis, the presentist denies these
obvious facts... Lewis takes it that the following thesis of ‘‘Persistence through Change’’ is obvi-
ously true: ...There are (at least) two different times; one at which I am bent, another at which I am
straight. (Zimmerman 1998, 213)
43 This is the first line of Faye (2002). Also consider Greene’s comment about this: ‘‘Eight decades of
experiments have shown that the predictions of quantum mechanics are confirmed to spectacular
precision.’’ (2004, 90)
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mental data of quantum physics is, and by doing this, I cannot see how to avoid the
conjecture that many philosophers are in some sense trying to find the ether.
Philosophers largely continue to discuss fundamental reality in classical (mecha-
nistic, pre-quantum) terms, often with 17th century, scientifically outdated classical
concepts (I will give examples in later sections)—and even though classical inter-
pretations of the quantum domain cannot provide a single prediction regarding the
quantum abstract atoms, whereas non-classical quantum descriptions are astonish-
ingly precise in the predictive power they provide. (This makes it all the more
surprising that philosophers are often even disdainful of quantum physics.44) It may
be surprising to many philosophers that ordinary empirical objects are theorized by
mereological nihilists to be illusions, but, as I will discuss in detail, mereological
nihilism is not any sort of assumptive or careless thesis, since it is the macroscopic
ordinary empirical domain (which is only mental conceptualization) that involves
absurdity, and also since when humans probe fully into matter, we find that empirical
objects are composed of these quantum abstract atoms. When humans fully dissect
any of the material objects they conceptualize from moment-to-moment, they only
find their concepts to be nonsensical (images of what is not real), where they can
only be non-existent concepts (i.e. illusions), that necessarily reduce into unstruc-
tured points. Therefore, the conclusions of the mereological nihilist are the inverse
of the standard position: philosophers ubiquitously assert that macroscopic reality
exists and is coherent (but I will show that it is really antinomic, paradoxical, and
non-existent) and quantum reality is paradoxical but somehow composes macro-
reality (but I will show that quantum reality is non-paradoxical and cannot compose
anything).
There may be many reasons why philosophers often do not pay sufficient atten-
tion to the quantum data (for example, I have never seen philosophers, other than
maybe a few dozen philosophers of physics, discuss the Aspect experiment, quantum
entanglement, and so on). Perhaps one reason is that a significant percentage of
philosophers do not know enough of the physics involved in the quantum theory,45
and they consequently have not seen with their own minds the empirical power of
the theories. This could lead philosophers to not sufficiently understand why
quantum physicists have come to the empirical descriptions about reality that they
have. Or, perhaps many philosophers often will only hear about or pay attention to
some of the philosophical theories and interpretations of a few of the high-profile
quantum physicists (rather than the raw experiential data produced overall
throughout the vast discipline of quantum physics) but where the ‘‘philosophical
theorization’’ is shoddy, and thereby philosophers justifiably turn away from
44 The only philosophers I have seen go against this trend, and which are taking part in the quantum
revolution, are some philosophers of physics, such as those who focus on philosophical issues in
quantum mechanics. A good example is Lockwood: ‘‘The scientific picture that emerged in the 17th
century has, I believe, been effectively shattered by Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Shro¨dinger and
Dirac. And philosophy needs, however belatedly, to come to terms with this scientific revolution.’’
(Lockwood 1989, 8)
45 It is worth noting that I also do not have the training that a professional physicist has. In this
article, I will heavily cite physicists and philosophers of physics due to the fact that I am not a trained
physicist, and due to the fact that many of the philosophers who read this article will not be either. It
should also be noted that some of the physics books I am quoting from are not overly technical books
but rather are books with more general information about quantum mechanics. But all the passages
from physics books that I cite are only from some of the most prestigious physics professors in the
world.
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quantum theory due to the amateurishness of the few high-profile philosophical
theories (e.g., wave-particle duality).46 Or perhaps many philosophers will hear
about the so-called paradoxes of quantum mechanics, such as wave-particle duality,
and since allowing reality to contain objects that involve contradiction goes strictly
against their philosophical training, philosophers may therefore turn away from
quantum physics, and instead of accepting paradox and contradiction in reality the
philosphers may espouse the belief that physicists merely have run up against
apparent paradox because they do not yet have a good enough understanding of the
quantum world. Another reason that philosophers ignore quantum physics might be
because a few famous quantum physicists have (quite amateurishly) been mud-
slinging vocalizations of their utter contempt toward philosophers. Some famous
quantum physicists have literally been observed to frequently berate philosophers as
being thoughtless buffoons, and, for example, as being inappropriate in their merely
attempting to question quantum physicists on things like the so-called paradoxes of
quantum mechanics. Perhaps the best example of this was Nobel Prize quantum
physicist Richard Feynman, who is famous for many of his frequent extremely
derogatory, but unsubstantial (i.e. non-inferentially based), remarks against philos-
ophers (even incorporating them into his undergraduate lectures), for their merely
attempting to carry out investigations of language and thought, and for their having
justifiable questions about the philosophy of paradox. Even Einstein, who was
known to be very much indebted to philosophers, took jabs at them.47
Bringing philosophy and quantum physics into collaboration can only occur if
quantum physics is not considered to be a set of disparate interpretations that a few
high-profile quantum physicists have (unfortunately) given the world, but is
considered to be empirical, based primarily on confirmation via experiment. For
purely empirical purposes, the interpretations of the data are largely irrelevant. It is
the experimental findings in quantum physics that I will focus on in this article when
I discuss issues to do with quantum physics. And I will find that quantum experi-
mentation is one of the reasons to conclude that mereological nihilism is the correct
theory.
1.4 Empirical versus quantum
The only real objects that the experimental findings of quantum reality reveal to
exist are particle-like point-objects. An item such as the scientists’ atom, which is
alleged to be a composite with a nucleus and one or more electrons, will be shown to
not be a real entity by the evidence of this article. The experimental findings show
that the ordinary empirical experience that humans ordinarily have involves serious
error. Nevertheless, in the literature, philosophers in all areas of philosophy
(including philosophy of physics) typically discuss ordinary macroscopic empirical
experience as if there is no reason whatsoever to be suspicious about it. In writing
46 A great example is the Shro¨dinger’s cat problem (which apparently was done away with by the
discovery of decoherence, according to Omne´s (1999a, ix)). Many of the questionable interpretations
are beginning to be rejected more by physicists (Stenger 2000, 14–15). It is important to note that
many physicists take issue with some of the ways that the interpretations of quantum physics have
proliferated. Omne´s, for example, refers to some of them as ‘‘wild speculations’’ and as ‘‘a dangerous
trend, as much for the public at large as for philosophers, who may have difficulty finding their way,
especially since some reputable physicists are among the [speculators],’’ (Omne´s 1999b, 147).
47 Einstein (1950, 2).
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about mereological nihilism, one of the main objectives I have in this article is to
show what a mistake it is to believe that ordinary macroscopic empirical reality is
real and exists in the way that humans experience it.
Quantum physics is empirical, but is of a different, more refined, scientific order
of empirical experience that macroscopic experience is. Quantum empirical data is
not of the same order of empirical experience as the everyday, unrefined, macro-
scopic empirical level, which is so prone to error and deception. Here are a few
examples of the common error and deception that ordinary empirical experience
involves: continuous pitches of sound, smooth glass surfaces, mirages, twinkling
stars, movies (successions of still frames interpreted as involving motion), leaves
appearing to have continuous green color that is devoid of interstices, long rectan-
gular airplane propellers that change into a nearly invisible disk when they are
turned on, straight light rays that look curved when shined through falling eleva-
tors,48 solid rocks, train tracks meeting at the horizon, colorless-empty interstellar
night skies that however appear black, military planes that look like UFOs, blue
skies—and that is just the beginning. In each of these examples, the macro-oriented
empirical mind perceives items that do not exist. The ordinary macroscopic empirical
level of reality that humans ordinarily perceived is riddled with dubiety. Mere-
ological nihilism is not about the rejection of the empirical, it is about the rejection
of all empirical items except quantum atoms, as I will elaborate on in this subsection.
Mereological nihilism involves an assault on ordinary empirical experience, and
the objects believed to exist according to that experience.49 I will discuss in detail
how quantum reality and ordinary empirical realty are the inverse of one another.
Ordinary empirical reality is dominated by the so-called classical concepts, which are
concepts that describe material items as existing in time, having a definite position,
entering into causal relations with other objects, having a surface extension, and so
on. A particularly lucid passage from Faye helps to understand the ideas behind, and
the history of, classical concepts:
Not unlike Kant, Bohr thought that we could have objective knowledge only in
case we can distinguish between the experiential subject and the experienced
object. It is a precondition for the knowledge of a phenomenon as being
something distinct from the sensorial subject, that we can refer to it as an
object without involving the subject’s experience of the object. In order to
separate the object from the subject itself, the experiential subject must be able
to distinguish between the form and the content of his or her experiences. This
is possible only if the subject uses causal and spatial-temporal concepts for
describing the sensorial content, placing phenomena in causal connection in
space and time, since it is the causal space-time description of our perceptions
that constitutes the criterion of reality for them. Bohr therefore believed that
48 This is a famous example from Einstein’s falling elevators examples. See Sklar (1977), 69.
49 I use the word ‘‘assault’’ to make the point of how important it is to quantum mereological
nihilism that faith in ordinary macroscopic sense information be attacked and challenged. In this
article I will point out many problems to do with physics and philosophy, but we will see that perhaps
nearly all of which stem from one simple issue: oddly, philosophers and physicists have tended to not
consider the possibility that the way they ordinarily experience reality is radically incorrect, and that
there is a difference from reality as it is ordinarily empirically perceived to the way reality really is. In
my dealings with philosophers and physicists, I typically perceive in them an extreme resistance to
these ideas—ubiquitously they appear to not open up to the obvious evidence that ordinary
empirical experience involves significant flaws and needs to be seriously questioned.
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what gives us the possibility of talking about an object and an objectively
existing reality is the application of those necessary concepts, and that the
physical equivalents of ‘‘space,’’ ‘‘time,’’ ‘‘causation,’’ and ‘‘continuity’’ were
the concepts ‘‘position,’’ ‘‘time,’’ ‘‘momentum,’’ and ‘‘energy,’’ which he re-
ferred to as the classical concepts. He also believed that the above basic con-
cepts exist already as preconditions of unambiguous and meaningful
communication, built in as rules of our ordinary language. So, in Bohr’s
opinion the conditions for an objective description of nature given by the
concepts of classical physics were merely a refinement of the preconditions of
human knowledge.50
The concepts for quantum reality, as I will discuss, involve a rejection of all of the
classical concepts. In other words, what holds for the classical level is the inverse of
what holds for the quantum level: the quantum level is non-classical. On the opening
page of the Preface of his 1987 book on quantum logic, Gibbins writes:
Quantum mechanics is most easily interpreted antirealistically, that is, as a
theory which, though it works, does not describe the way the world is.
Therefore, philosophers go out of their way to interpret it realistically. Realism
in the philosophy of quantum mechanics means the idea that quantum systems
are really like classical particles. Everything points against it.51
Also consider an interesting passage from the famous physicists, Davies and Brown:
The discoveries of the electron and of radioactivity, the success of Planck’s
quantum hypothesis and the inception of Einstein’s theory of relativity swept
away the entire basis of Newtonian-Maxwellian physics. Newton’s laws of
motion and his commonsense assumptions about space and time were aban-
doned. Even Democritus’ atomic hypothesis had to be replaced by a more
subtle and complex view of the microworld in which atoms could no longer be
regarded as indestructible particles with a well-defined position and motion. It
became apparent that the foundations of classical physics had collapsed.
By about 1930 their place had been taken by new theoretical schemes: quantum
mechanics, the general theory of relativity and a more elaborate model of the
atom.52
Before the quantum revolution, the classical concepts were also believed to describe
the partless fundamental particles. That ended with the discovery that the basic level
of reality is governed by quantum (non-classical) concepts. Therein came the
following unsolved inconsistency: how do the quantum atoms (allegedly) compose
empirical reality when nothing about the quantum abstract atoms appears to allow
for them to do so. A principle tenet of quantum mereological nihilism is the idea that
the quantum abstract atoms cannot compose empirical reality (and they cannot
compose anything at all). This inconsistency only arises when one believes that the
quantum abstract atoms are supposed to compose the empirical level. Asserting that
they do is analogous to the assertion that a human society can be made out of cats,
50 Faye (2002), end of Sect. 2.
51 Gibbins (1987, ix).
52 Davies and Brown (1988, 4).
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that ice can be made of fire, or an ocean can be made of dirt. In each of these cases,
the constituents cannot lead to the constituted; the constituents hold incompatible
properties with what’s needed to construct the constituted.
Quantum mereological nihilism is obviously a philosophy that is at odds with
the ordinary material world that humans (believe they) experience in their daily
lives.53 For reasons I will discuss, this is a strength of mereological nihilism. I
mean the word ‘‘material’’ in the previous sentence and throughout this article to
denote the objects in reality that humans ordinarily believe exist in the world
outside of them, and which is empirically perceivable ‘‘stuff’’ that allegedly exists
in space (has a spatial location), has a spatial extension (i.e., has a surface and/or
a color), and endures (or perdures) through time without flashing in and out of
existence (without quickly coming-to-be and passing-away). These characteristics
of matter written in the previous sentence all lead to the famous antinomies and
problems of paradox and vagueness that are all-to-well-known in philosophy.
They are not characteristics of the particles of quantum physics, since the par-
ticles have no location,54 have no enduring existence (they have no significant
duration), no structure, they do not touch, they exhibit little or no movement,
and they do not have spatial extension (they are not observed to have surface,
and thus no color, and quantum abstract atoms cannot be directly empirically
observed at all, as I discuss below) But the current landscape of philosophy is
replete with realists (naı¨ve realists and direct realists, metaphysical realists,
semi-realists, etc.) who invent theories of reality—in direct opposition to the
mereological nihilist—based primarily on faith in the existence of the material
world that humans believe they experience. I will use the terms ‘‘realism’’ or
‘‘realists’’ in this article to refer to any of the theories of realism, and to refer to
any philosophers (or scientists) who unquestioningly accept the information of
53 Just to avoid any possible confusion that could arise, I want to point out that I am going to use the
word ‘‘experience’’ throughout this to be synonymous with ‘‘consciousness.’’ Consider how Galen
Strawson uses the word ‘‘experience’’:
I want to establish a certain broad use of the word ‘experience’. In talking about mental goings-on,
I will rarely use the words ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’. Instead I will talk of experience: of
experience in general, of experiencers, particular experiences, experiential states, experiential
episodes, experiential phenomena—human, Martian, dolphin, canine, and so on. I will use the
term ‘experience’ to cover everything that philosophers usually have in mind when they talk of
consciousness or conscious experience, taking it that ‘‘the stream of consciousness’’ could equally
well be called ‘‘the stream of experience’’ and that the expression ‘conscious experience’ is, strictly
speaking, pleonastic. (Strawson 1994, 2–3.)
54 The casual reader may believe that I am making this assertion due to quantum uncertainty,
according to which location is not clearly defined for particles. But this is not what I mean by
asserting that a quantum abstract atom is locationless. What I do have in mind, rather, is
that atoms are locationless because space does not exist, and it doesn’t because it is an item that
(allegedly) has parts. In Grupp (2005b) I showed that space does not exist. I come to the same
conclusion in this article but with very different arguments. The philosophy of spacelessness I
have in mind (mereological nihilist spacelessness) is loosely similar to the widely discussed rel-
ationalist position since both mereological nihilism and relationalism involve the non-existence of
space; but, as I will explain, mereological nihilist spacelessness has stark differences with rela-
tionalism (such as that relations do not exist in mereological nihlism). Space is an invisible
(metaphysical, extrasensory) item that, I will show, only leads to unneeded conceptual difficulties,
such as quantum uncertainty. (I will show in a later section that the concept of quantum
uncertainty is misguided since without space and locatedness there is no location, x, in the
uncertainty equation, DxDp = (Planck’s Constant)/2.) In this equation, x is merely a concept.
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their ordinary empirical experience to be approximately correct or completely
correct.55
The true scientist will often choose to reject some of the empirical experiences she
has as being false. For example, the acoustical scientist will have daily ordinary
empirical experience of continuous pitches of sound that appear to her as smooth
and unbroken, but she will likely nevertheless reject them, and consider them
illusory, since her training as a scientist shows her that pitches are discontinuous,
regardless of what her ordinary empirical experience reports to her. Similar rea-
soning could be given for light, which is associated with another one of the most
common ordinary empirical experiences (sight experiences). Sight and sound dom-
inate ordinary human empirical experience with what illusorily appears to be chunks
of smooth, unbroken, continuous streams of information. But what I am calling a
realist is any person who is prone to merely accept obviously questionable empirical
experiences (e.g., ‘‘continuous’’ light, sound) as being reliable (correct) accounts of
reality. Given the current wild popularity of the theories of realism, it can be
predicted that in the current zeitgeist in philosophy, mereological nihilism will likely
be rejected without argumentation due to the realists’ preference for, and the desire
for, realism—but where this is only an issue of preference rather than inference.
Mereological nihilism involves the position that not only are all such realist
philosophies to be rejected, but also that all scientific theories and scientific items
(items scientists perceive in order to do their scientific work) are to be abandoned if
they are not scientific accounts of real items (of quantum abstract atoms).56,57 Only
science and philosophy that involves quantum abstract atoms is admitted. The
quantum abstract atoms are, however, not directly empirical, but rather can be
considered to be indirectly empirical. What I mean by indirectly empirical is given in
an example: If I am in the glade and I see the footprints of a panther in the mud,
though there are no panthers around, I surmise that one was recently. I do not see a
panther; it is an unobservable. But I nevertheless have an experience that lets me
know a panther was present. In other words, I have indirect empirical evidence for
the existence of a panther. This is how physicists know about quantum abstract
55 Theories of realism in philosophy tend to be highly metaphysical (as I will discuss), and are very
often aligned with what is called metaphysical realism. In the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
(Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 562–63, Butchvarov describes what is meant by
‘‘metaphysical realism’’:
Metaphysical realism, in the widest sense, [is] the view that (a) there are real objects (usually the
view is concerned with spatiotemporal objects), (b) they exist independently of our experience or
our knowledge of them, and (c) they have properties that enter into relations independently of the
concepts which we understand them or of the language with which we describe them. Anti-realism
is any view that rejects one or more of these theses, though if (a) is rejected the rejection of (b) and
(c) follows trivially...
Also, for an excellent description of what is meant by ‘‘realism,’’ see Dreyfus (1997, 54).
56 This sentence shows how much affinity mereological nihilism with ancient Buddhism, since this
sentence in some ways reveals core issues involved in traditional Buddhist ethics.
57 This sentence only is meant to indicate that there should be an abandonment of all non-quantum
science when one is not tied to, not subservient to, the ordinary empirical material level of
experience. If one is trying to understand ordinary empirical reality, the history of science shows that
it is the best way to do that is via scientific means. But if one aptly understands the dubiety of the
material-empirical realm, then one has little choice but to endorse a rejection of it. Quantum reality
is the inverse of this material realm, and dubiety of matter should lead to trust only in the quantum.
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atoms: they do not see them directly, but they see their ‘‘footprints’’ on the computer
monitor.58 Since no metaphysical item is indirectly empirical in this way, then
quantum abstract atoms cannot be classified as metaphysical objects even though
they are invisible. Throughout this article I will refer to the quantum abstract atoms
as being I-empirical, for reasons just given.
1.5 The futility of anti-reductionism
Anti-reductionists put forth the presumption that somehow there are ways to
theorize about these two levels—the quantum and the macroscopic, which have
properties that contradict one another—where it can be shown that quantum items
must compose the empirical macroscopic bodies. This is the anti-reductionist posi-
tion, which is describable in the way I will explain next. Empirical object E might be
composed of more than one quantum system: E can be made up of quantum state
Q1, but if those quantum particles were replaced by all new particles and/or a new
quantum state Q2, E would appear to the ordinary empirical experiencer as the same
object E through both states Q1 and Q2, and therefore E is not reducible to the
quantum states. Consider the following diagram:
This is much like the problem of the ship of Theseus: parts of E are coming and
going, but E (allegedly) persists, and remains identical through time. The argumen-
tation I give in Sects. 3 and 4 shows that E, in the example given above, cannot exist.
The belief that there is ‘‘independence’’ that E (allegedly) has from Q1, Q2, or any
quantum abstract atoms that (allegedly) compose it, is easy to understand if we
consider, for example, a lion, L, that is believed to be composed of quantum abstract
atoms. L might often appear to the ordinary empirical observer as being the very
Quantum
state Q1 at 
time t1
Quantum
state Q2 at 
time t2
E E
Q1  Q2, but E = E. 
58 How it is that a scientist can have knowledge of a particle (real item) via a computer or machine
(composite and macroscopic item, and thus not a real item) is discussed in an footnote below in Sect.
2.4.
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same object from moment to moment. But quantum physicists show us that the
particles that make up L are going through tremendous activity (flashing in and out
of existence, or if they are moving, they are moving near the speed of light, etc.) all
while the ordinary empirical observer observes L empirically to not change much, if
at all—and thus L appears to persist through time. Anti-reductionists might take
their ordinary empirical experience of the alleged persistence of L to be verification
that L persists, regardless of what quantum abstract atoms are ‘‘doing’’ from
moment to moment. Anti-reductionists might take this to show that the quantum
level is independent of the quantum systems that (allegedly) compose it. Also, if E is
believed to exist and is constituted by more than one quantum state, is nevertheless
unclear how this alleged ‘‘multiple-realizability’’ implies that E is not reducible to its
particles. I am apparently not alone on wondering how this is the case. Jones writes:
One of the difficulties with discussions of MR [the multiple realizability
argument] is that few writers have ever tried to spell out precisely what it
amounts to. ‘‘Indeed, as far as I know,’’ writes Lawrence Shapiro, ‘‘no
philosopher has ever tried to complete the sentence, ‘N and M are distinct
realizations of T when and only when—’’ (2000, 636). I find a similar lack of
precision in philosophers’ discussions of how the existence of MR is sup-
posed to show that physical reduction is impossible.59
To sum up the problem that anti-reductionism involves, consider that if E is not
identical to the ultimate parts (quantum parts), and in some sense transcends any
parts (it may be believed to have), but is a whole object not reducible to the ultimate
parts, then E, if not parts, is in some sense partless. This indicates that E has parts
but can only be partless, which is a contradiction. These issues will be elaborated on
extensively in Sect. 4.
Lastly, there are more serious problems for the anti-reductionist. How can a
metaphysical relation of part-whole connect parts and the whole? The single
relation must connect a partless object (whole) to parts, and thus it must do some
rather interesting things, such as connect up to an extended single item (the
whole), and to a multiplicity of items (the parts). How does a metaphysical
relation do this without itself having parts? How can a metaphysical relation
connect to distinct items without itself having distinctions ‘‘within’’ it? If the
metaphysical part-whole relation has parts, then serious questions arise as to how
the relation can itself be a mereological whole. The metaphysical part-whole
relation would have to have a part that, for example, connects to part #1 of the
whole, and since part #1 is not where part #2 is, then the relation would have to
have a separate non-coinciding part of it that connects to part #2 of the whole. In
other words, the two parts are not coinciding, and thus if it the relation links up
to each of them in order to connect them to the whole then the relation has non-
coinciding aspects of it. (Again, I will show why there are no wholes with per-
fectly coinciding parts in Sect. 4.) But if that is the case, then this relation that
itself has parts also is in need of a mereological relation, call it R2, that connects
part #1 and part #2 of R1. But these non-coinciding parts, #1 and #2, require that
R2 have distinct non-coinciding regions where it links #1 and #2, and thus R2 is a
composite that is in need of a mereological relation, R3. This sets up an infinite
regress, and there is never a step in the regress that the task of relating parts is
59 Jones (2004, 623).
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completed since there will always be non-coinciding relation-parts to be inter-
connected.
The problems all just pointed out could be avoided by maintaining that the
metaphysical part-whole relation is partless, but I just showed above that to connect
distinct relata, the relation would have to itself involve some distinctions. There
seem to be too many problems with the part-to-whole relation for the anti-reduc-
tionist to avoid. And matters are only compounded for the anti-reductionist when
the additional reasoning I give in Sect. 4, where I show that all metaphysical relations
whatsoever do not exist, is considered.
From what has been written here, it seems that anti-reductionism fails to offer any
sort of means by which we can assert that non-reducible wholes can be composed of
quantum abstract atoms. This reasoning in this subsection about the problems with
the mereological relation between non-coinciding parts of any alleged composite
item is in fact an argument against the existence of mereological relations, and thus
an argument against composition (since composition can only be given in germs of
non-coinciding items—see Sect. 4) distinct from, and in addition to, the numerous
arguments I give in Sects. 3 and 4.
1.6 The basics of quantum mereological nihilism
The heart of my arguments for mereological nihilism consist in showing through
several novel arguments that no quantum abstract atoms can touch, contact, connect,
or relate to one another (this is given in Sects. 3 and 4). If they cannot, I will show that
there is no way that particles can accumulate to give rise to composites, and material
constitution is impossible. If there are no parts and wholes, then there are only
quantum atoms that cannot touch, contact, relate, or connect, and cannot compose
an object made of parts.60 Mereological nihilism leads to the position that what
actually exists (quantum abstract atoms), what reality is, is both immaterial and I-
empirical.61 To maintain that is to reject the existence of the surfaces and colors that
humans typically believe exit externally to them. Humans experience empirical
reality only via surfaces and colors. According to mereological nihilism the surfaces
and colors (believed to exist) in external reality are mere concepts in the mind.62
Consider the following diagram:
60 Notice that the claims just made in this paragraph begin with the presumption that there are
particles in the first place, rather than there being an infinitely divisible reality that ultimately
contains no particles. In Sect. 4, however, I will show why reality cannot be infinitely divisible, and
thus must involve quantum abstract atoms.
61 The only tradition I know of that maintains that the quantum atoms can be directly empirical
(unmediated objects of consciousness), are some Buddhist traditions. The word for this empirical
experience is ‘‘nirvana.’’
62 Stroll, on page 15 of Stroll 1988, discusses how ‘‘some philosophers have held that it is a necessary
condition of something’s being an object (or what they sometimes call a ‘‘physical object’’ or
‘‘material object,’’ of which a marble would be a prime example) that is have a surface.’’ While this is
certainly not one of the primary ways that philosophers and physicists have come to define material
objects, it is worth noting since it illustrates how what philosophers and physicists often describe as
being material has the opposite properties of the quantum abstract atoms. For example, if surface
possession was a defining quality of an object for the object to count as a material object, then an
electron, for example, would be an immaterial object. This sort of reasoning will be very significant in
the discussion in Sects. 2.4, and 5.4 below regarding what I call the philosophy of immaterialism,
according to which, reality is composed only of immaterial items, no material entities exist. I will
show how quantum mereological nihilism leads to this position.
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The left side shows how humans ordinarily experience reality, and the right is
more in accord with the way that quantum physicists have found reality to be. On the
left is a picture of a solid object with a locally smooth surface (an object with no
visible interstices); and the right picture does not involve solidity or a surface. (Some
readers may imagine that the particles in the picture on the right look like a gas-
state. But note that the picture on the right is meant to be a picture of the most
fundamental items—electrons, gluons, etc.—known to exist, and thus the picture on
the right is not at all identical to the chemical phenomenon that is ordinarily referred
to with the term ‘‘gas-state,’’ such as when scientists are discussing gasses like air or
helium.)
When the typical human looks at a cup on a table in their ordinary empirical state,
the cup seems unmoving, solid, and it appears to be persisting through time, but if I
peer into the cup to merely see what it is composed of, I would find that the
constituents of the cup are not solid, not unmoving, and they do not persist, such as
when I am indirectly experiencing, for example, the ‘‘electron [which] is a speck of
negative electricity that zips around...’’63 If an ordinary empirically oriented
conceptualizer (which is a word I will use to describe the generator of empirical-
material surface and color images in consciousness) has experiences of a cup
breaking apart repeatedly (as when peering into the cup—the cup surfaces—to see
what they are compose of), where her conceptualization reveals smaller and smaller
surface and color bits in her surface and color experiences, she will eventually arrive
at the obliteration of surface and color experience—she will arrive at I-empirical
quantum abstract atom experience. When having the succession of surface and color
experiences with respect to the cup, she will have glass shard surface and color
experiences, which will be replaced by molecule surface and color experiences,
which be replaced by I-empirical quantum experiences (if she has some means of I-
empirically apprehending the invisible items). This series of experiences will occur
for any empirical conceptualizer that breaks apart surfaces in their ordinary
empirical conceptual experiencing: the surfaces and colors will be obliterated—just
as when the physicist happens to peer ‘‘beyond’’ the surfaces and colors. The right
side of the diagram is the converse of the left: which is the reason for the „ between
them in the diagram. The quantum stuff that makes up reality is not stable (it only
exists in flashes, for exceedingly tiny or instantaneous durations, meaning that it is
This is more in accord with reality at the quantum 
nihilist domain: a seeming infinitude of things, each
without parts, and each with no surface, color, 
solidity and there is no smoothness, and no location.
π
This is how things are observed via ordinary
empirical experience: there appears whole 
(unbroken) items that appear to be 
individual single items, apprehended by the 
mind as a surface with a color, with solidity 
and smoothness, and a definite location. 
63 Ford (2004, 2).
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durationless or it does not endure for more than a tiny duration), and it does not
have structure or spatial magnitude (it is not observed to have surface, and thus it
does not have color).
1.7 The only coherent theory is banished in western philosophy
Even though mereological nihilism is strictly aligned with the data of quantum
physics, and even though some of the most famous philosophers may have been
mereological nihilists or have held positions very similar to mereological nihilism
(Democritus, Dharmakırti, Hobbes, Quine, Sellars, perhaps Kant, etc.), surprisingly,
mereological nihilism is currently a minority position, and even more surprisingly, it
is, for some reason, often labeled ‘‘extreme,’’ or ‘‘radical’’ (textual evidence of this
will be given in sections below). There are many reasons why it is very startling that
mereological nihilism is not considered the premier theory in contemporary phi-
losophy. This is surprising, as mentioned, due to mereological nihilism’s agreement
with quantum physics (which is thoroughly explained later), but also due to the
enormous fallibility and unreliability of the ordinary empirical-material domain, and
due to the antinomies and paradoxes that have always plagued non-nihilistic
philosophy (discussed in Sect. 2.2). One would imagine that, in light of much of the
data from experimental quantum physics, mereological nihilism would be instead
gaining popularity, rather than dropping into the status of being one of the least
popular philosophical theories in Western philosophy. (This is not the case in some
non-Western philosophy. In writing about the pre-classical Indian Buddhists, Stch-
erbatsky writes: ‘‘For the Buddhists the parts alone are real, the whole is a fic-
tion.’’64). Only a few contemporary philosophers, such as Trenton Merricks,65
Jeffrey Grupp,66 Cian Dorr and Gideon Rosen,67 and Peter van Inwagen68 have
argued for nihilistic or at least somewhat nihilistic positions in their philosophy. I will
show through textual evidence that the vast majority of Western philosophers are
unjustifiably and unreasonably disdainful of mereological nihilism, even though, as I
will discuss, there is not one noteworthy argument against it that has been given.69
64 Stcherbatsky (1962, 86).
65 Merricks (2001).
66 2005a, b, c, d, 2006a, b.
67 Rosen and Dorr (2002).
68 Van Inwagen (1990).
69 It is not even a secret that there are no arguments against mereological nihilism, which make it
very suspicious that there is such pervasive rejection of the theory among Western philosophers. (If
there is no evidence against mereological nihilism, then what is the reason for the rejection of it?
Non-evidence?) For example, Donald Smith, in a forthcoming paper in Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly titled ‘‘The Vagueness Argument for Mereological Universalism,’’ writes at the very end
of his introduction section that ‘‘Throughout, I assume the falsity of mereological nihilism, the thesis
that necessarily, there are no composite objects.’’ (Emphasis added.) Notice that he writes that he
‘‘assumes’’ the falsity of mereological nihilism, which is an admission by a non-nihilist that there is no
clear reason at all as to why mereological nihilism is incorrect. Also, in his article, Smith merely
rejects mereological nihilism for no clear reason. This is the standard way philosophers handle
mereological nihilism, as I will show. The widespread rejection of mereological nihilism—which, I
will show, is even often filled with statements involving nothing more than non-evidential content
involving mere derision and ad hominem—rather than inference and counterevidence—could per-
haps lead one to imagine that there is a non-philosophical, non-evidence-based motivation for this
widespread rejection.
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Some anti-nihilists have alleged that mereological nihilism is false since it is not in
agreement with the exceedingly misleading reality humans apprehend in their or-
dinary empirical experience, but I will show that this is not a noteworthy attack
against mereological nihilism. I will show why there are very good reasons for
outright rejection of all empirical experience, except the I-empirical experience of
quantum objects through scientific means. Most attacks against mereological
nihilism involve no more than non-arguments and/or ad hominem claims that can be
easily shown to be informal fallacies (begging the question, red herring, etc.) as I will
explicitly show by example.
Some of the reasons for this outright rejection of the ordinary empirical experience
of materiality that I just mentioned are actually well-known by philosophers (and
some physicists), but are, however, typically ignored and/or derided, for some reason,
by philosophers (and even by many physicists). For example, if one tries to describe
the most ordinary features of the objects of empirical reality, such as the motion or
change of any empirical object, or the identity of an object through change or through
motion and time, one finds that they cannot do so without insurmountable paradoxes,
absurdities, and antinomies coming into play. These absurdities, paradoxes and
antinomies have been widely discussed (but ironically also pervasively downplayed),
and have been pointed out by some of the most famous philosophers (Kant, Zeno,
Nagarjuna, etc.). These well-known paradoxes, in addition to the impossibility of
material constitution that I will show quantum atomism involves, reveal that there is
something very erroneous about our ordinary understanding of empirical reality. I will
show that the philosophical and scientific evidence for mereological nihilism that I
present in Sect. 4 shows that empirical reality is impossible, and thus should be
rejected. Mereological nihilism solves the widely known antinomies and paradoxes of
philosophy, and, interestingly, also removes the widely discussed quantum paradoxes
in quantum physics. It is as if mereological nihilism is the only non-antinomous, non-
paradoxical theory in philosophy and science, but it is the least widely accepted theory.
This indicates an alarming collective error apparently being committed by the
academic community, on the order of past collective errors such as believing in ether
or disdaining the EPR thought experiment. These are reasons why it is surprising that
the mereological nihilist solution to the problems of physics and philosophy has been
ignored by contemporary scientists and philosophers—ignored by the same scientists
who in fact have discovered strong evidence for mereological nihilism. Physicists have
discovered a mereological nihilist reality in quantum physics through their I-empirical
data, but rather than acknowledging that, many have instead tended to add the
aforementioned impalpable and supernatural metaphysical concepts into their
research—splicing I-empirical discovery with metaphysical fabrication—and only by
that means, as we will see, have they arrived as paradox.
In addition to its scientific alignment, and its antinomy-less status, it is perhaps
most surprising that mereological nihilism is a banished theory in Western philos-
ophy when we consider that it is no secret that there is no consistent theory of
mereology and material composition that is currently available. The mereological
nihilist of course maintains that we can only expect this, and expect that no consistent
theory of mereology and material composition will be available since those are the
wrong theories, according to her. But this is not recognized, and instead, the current
state of philosophy is one where mereological nihilism is nearly banished from
Western philosophy, and material constitution (which is littered with the antinomies
and paradoxes, and which relies on metaphysics and the rejection of basic science,
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and which is ‘‘unacceptable’’, in Markosian’s words70) is accepted. (I will give textual
evidence showing that this unacceptableness of the metaphysical mereological and
compositional theories is commonly accepted and discussed in the literature among
philosophers.) I call mereology and compositional theories metaphysical theories, as
if they are in all cases, because I do not know of any compositional and mereological
theories that do not rely on usage of relations, emergentism, or in general any of the
other metaphysical, extrasensory, non-scientific tools of the realists and metaphysical
realists.
What this appears to amount to is this: the academic community of American
philosophers involves a majority of philosophers who endorse problem-filled,
undeveloped, non-empirical, antiquity-based metaphysical ‘‘theories’’ of material
constitution that have virtually no explanatory value (in terms of empirical experi-
ence and thus in terms of explaining anything about one’s experiences of
the empirical universe), and instead they reject and/or ignore the strictly non-
metaphysical, utterly progressive and modern, empirical (I-empirical) scientific
results that are perhaps of the most developed and remarkable experimental
outcomes in all of science. If this is what so many philosophers are doing, how is this
any different from, for example, turning our backs on relativity theory in order to go
back and try to find the ether? Or how is that any different than if physicists
everywhere chose to turn their backs on the theory of the Big Bang singularity in
order to study the intelligent design theory? Or if biologists were to reject evolution
in order to accept abiogenesis or the Garden of Eden story? Or if astrophysicists
rejected the expanding universe theory for the steady-state universe theory?
It would seem that philosophers would be flocking to mereological nihilism, but
instead it is a fringe thesis, and philosophers who study composition nevertheless
typically assume or demand that there is composition and/or mereology—which, by
comparison, appears to be an anti-scientific, and perhaps to some degree tends toward
being an anti-philosophical quest for ether, intelligent design, abiogenesis, the Garden
of Eden, and a steady-state universe. Rather than it being the case that the well-known
problems with composition and mereology provide evidence for the non-existence of
mereology and composition, philosophers instead commonly assume mereology and
composition to exist and the problems with them to merely be evidence that mere-
ology and composition are mere puzzles that will be figured out in the future. Consider
a passage from Michael Rae, at the very beginning of his anthology on material
constitution, and where he discusses composition as a mere puzzle that need not be too
troublesome, rather than as an impossibility (as I will show it is in Sects. 3 and 4):
Imagine calling on a friend to collect a debt and receiving, instead..., the
following... argument:
...a human being is just a collection of particles... [and] if you add particles to or
subtract particles form a collection of particles, you get a new collection. ... I
am [now] a different collection of particles form the one that contracted the
debt... Thus,... I am a different human being form the one who contracted the
debt. Therefore, I do not owe you any money.
Obviously this line of reasoning is flawed... But how it is flawed?... The answer
is not immediately clear.
70 Markosian (1998b, 214–215).
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What the debtor has raised is a puzzle about material constitution... This
phenomenon is puzzling because it is not at all clear what the relationship is
between the relevant a and b [Rae is using the letters a and b to symbolize the
words ‘‘whole’’ and ‘‘parts’’]...
Puzzles like this are among the oldest, most widely discussed puzzles in the
history of philosophy. They have appeared in the writings of Epicharmus,
Aristotle, Chrysippus, Abelard, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, and Hobbes, to name
just a few.71 (My emphasis)
Notice how Rae maintains that ‘‘obviously this line of reasoning is flawed,’’ but
then two sentences after that he maintains that the reason it is obviously flawed ‘‘is
not immediately clear.’’ For that reason, I am not sure why Rae maintains that it is
obvious that the reasoning is flawed when he states two sentences after this that—to
paraphrase—it is not obvious.
Then Rae acknowledges that ‘‘it is not at all clear what the relationship is between
relevant [parts and whole].’’ If the part-whole relation is not well understood, this
seems to indicate that mereological and compositional nihilism is an (obvious)
alternative to material constitution, which is a theory with ancient metaphysical
roots rather than modern scientific foundations, and which relies on a metaphysical
relationship that is not even known to be non-paradoxical (and thus not even useful).
But Rae does not mention mereological nihilism as being an alternative theory that
is ready to fill the philosophical void that compositional and mereological philosophy
creates—which implies that, for Rae, mereological nihilism is for some undisclosed
reason, not an option.
Rae’s passage illustrates how contemporary philosophers are aware of the problems
of composition, but they nevertheless reject these problems (i.e., they do not take them
seriously), thus believing and asserting that there is composition, even though they have
no clear account for it, and even though theories of composition lead to paradox and
contradiction. By analogy, the situation is much like when Einstein discovered the Big
Bang by discovering that his equations showed strong evidence that the universe is
expanding, but surprisingly he rejected the idea of an expanding universe because he
was prejudiced by the assumption and the belief that humans live in a steady state
universe, which he had literally no evidence for. Later he called this the biggest blunder
of his career, and what he discovered is now known as dark energy, which is the recently
empirically verified process of cosmic expansion of the universe.
1.8 Article overview
One of the primary objectives I have in this article is, in Sects. 3 and 4, to put forth
a number of novel arguments, but specifically the following two: (i) a novel
71 Rae (1997, xv–xvi). This passage is at the beginning of Rae’s anthology on material composition.
In that anthology he maintains there are essays that (allegedly) solve some or all of the problems of
material constitution (xvi). Mereological nihilism is aimed at undercutting any such (alleged) solu-
tions by showing that the relations needed for material constitution needed are in fact impossible,
and thus no supposed solution(s) to the problem(s) of material composition and constitution can get
started.
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argument for the impossibility of composite objects, and (ii) a novel argument for
the impossibility of Democritean atoms (which are extended quantum atoms [ex-
plained below]). But it will be shown in Sect. 4 that (ii) is just an additional means
of showing that there are no composite objects, distinct from the way that (i) shows
there are no composite objects. (ii) also has to do with showing why there are no
objects that can connect or touch any other objects, and thus no objects can
accumulate into any composite object, as if to act as a part of a mereological whole.
There are two ways composition is described by physicists, philosophers, and
anybody else: parts contact (touch, attach, link, abut, adhere, etc.) to one another
and thereby accumulate into composites, and parts connect (relate, interrelate, etc.)
to one another and thereby accumulate into composites. With the former, parts
directly interface, but they need not with the latter. With the aforementioned
arguments in Sects. 3 and 4, I will show why these accounts are impossible, and
instead why they only lead us to the conclusion that there are no composite objects.
If there is no connecting or contacting at the quantum scale, then there is no
contacting or connecting in macroscopic reality either, and this indicates
that material constitution, which requires contacting and/or connecting of items, is
impossible (and anti-reductionism cannot save the non-nihilists from this conclusion).
In Sects. 2, 6, and 7, I discuss several ways that I-empirical quantum physics
provides evidence for mereological nihilism. I will point out that mereological
nihilism may actually provide a clearer way, and a non-metaphysical way, to
understand the data and experimental results of quantum physics than those we
have been given by physicists. I will also discuss in detail in what ways that the many
interpretations of the experimental data of physics are metaphysical, how the
argumentation for mereological nihilism not only attacks compositional and
mereological philosophies but also attacks the metaphysical constructions of the
quantum physicists in their famous interpretation models of quantum mechanics
(for example, the extended metaphysical/invisible waves believed to exist as an
aspect of the wave-particle duality equation cannot exist given the reasoning against
the existence of extended objects that I will present in Sects. 3 and 4), and what the
quantum atomistic reality is like in light of the philosophy of mereological nihilism
(this largely consists of giving an account of the I-empirical results of quantum
studies). In Sects. 7 and 8 I will discuss the attacks against mereological nihilism that
non-nihilistic philosophers (and physicists) have presented. We will see at various
points in this article that the only substantial attack actually given against
mereological nihilism is that mereological nihilism is in disagreement with ordinary
empirical experience, and we will see why this is in fact not a good attack against
mereological nihilism. In Sect. 7, I discuss the obvious point that if mereological
nihilism is correct theory, then mereological nihilism shows that ordinary human
perception is utterly flawed. This may be considered a problem by the vast majority
of philosophers, who, of course, do not reject most or all information of empirical
experience and empirical knowledge, but mereological nihilism appears to be in
agreement with quantum mechanical theories—the theories that describe the
smallest building blocks scientists have discovered—so there is reason to reject
ordinary empirical evidence. I will show throughout this article, and often in explicit
detail, why ordinary empirical experience is inaccurate and needs to be rejected. I
will also discuss what I see as the only two possible theories of consciousness if
mereological nihilism is a correct theory: Colin McGinn’s cognitive closure, or a
specific variety of quantum consciousness. Both of these theories of consciousness
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involve an extreme form of conceptualism,72 and both of these theories are unsat-
isfactory, as I will explain. In Sect. 2, I next discuss several important preliminary
issues that need to be covered before a proper analysis of mereological nihilism can
be given. Although it is nearly impossible to give a terse summary of this article in
this introduction, the following passage from the University of Michigan physicist,
Gordon Kane, can however serve to give some basis to the thesis of mereological
nihilism:
The picture of the electromagnetic force that emerges is that electrons, and any
particles that have electric charge, interact by exchanging photons. The pho-
tons can carry energy between electrons; two electrons can scatter off one
another by exchanging a photon; and an electron and a proton bind by
exchanging many photons, which provide an attractive force that keeps the
electron and proton connected in a stable object, a hydrogen atom. All the
forces work in a similar way.73
This passage shows how quantum reality does not involve interrelated, intercon-
nected, or contacting quantum abstract atoms—there are no continuous (unbroken)
fields, forces, relations, or topological connections between quantum atoms, and
interaction is not clearly known to involve contact between particles (but is rather
through exchange of particle and other non-contacting, non-relating means, as I will
discuss). Kane’s use of the word ‘‘connected’’ in the penultimate sentence of his
passage can be seen from the sentences before to be referring to unconnected,
unattached, non-contacting quantum abstract atoms. If this is the case, and if
eliminativism (anti-antireductionism, anti-emergentism) can be shown to be correct,
as I will in Sects. 3 and 4, then reality does not involve anything but unattached,
unconnected quantum abstract atoms.
I am sure that critics of mereological nihilism and of this article will accuse me of
absurdity since I argue for mereological nihilism with words like ‘‘section,’’ as I did
in the last sentence of the last paragraph, and which is just one of many examples of
how I am obviously using part-whole talk in this article. But if I am to write an article
72 By conceptualism I mean that empirical experiences (representations) are mental fabrications,
and all the experiences of colorfulness and extension humans have with their ordinary empirical
experience about the external world are illusions, since they are based on erroneous construction of
mental representations.
Conceptualism is typically defined as being halfway between nominalism and realism, where
universals exist but only as mental contents, and they have no external (mind-independent) or
substantial reality. Concepts have an ideal value, and they do not have a real value (non-ideal or
mind-independent value). Since the term ‘‘conceptualism’’ is not used too often in philosophy
anymore since the theory has not been in vogue, I will give passages from two other philosophers
who discuss the theory. Doing this will help to ensure readers of what I am discussing when I use the
word ‘‘conceptualism.’’ First, Quentin Smith writes:
Conceptualism with respect to propositions is the theory that it is necessarily the case that
propositions are effects of mental causes. It is necessarily true that for any x, if x is a proposition,
then x is an effect of some prepositional attitude. It may be said that the conceiving of a propo-
sition (which may be taken as an element common to all prepositional attitude(s) is what sustains
the proposition in existence, such that the proposition exists by virtue of this conceiving. (Smith
1984, 38–39)
And Jeffrey Brower writes: ‘‘Conceptualism is the view that there isn’t anything in extramental
reality corresponding to any of our relational concepts.’’ (2002, 230).
73 Kane (2000, 18).
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on mereological nihilism and on the nihilism of quantum abstract atomism, the only
language available for me to use to communicate the philosophy to other people is a
part-whole, non-quantum-oriented language, which is based on ordinary empirical
experience and on practical usage, not on philosophical and scientific precision.
Minds that experience in the ordinary empirical mode tend to see beaches rather
than grains of sand, shirts rather than strands of cotton, lawns rather than individual
blades of grass, skin rather than skin cells, and surfaces and colors rather than
quantum abstract atoms. I will explain at other places in this article that this is a
selective mode of experiencing based on eliminating chaos and being overwhelmed
by ordinary empirical experience, and not on philosophical precision.74 Ordinary
empirical experience apparently and inadvertently tends to often forget that selec-
tiveness in perceiving is going on, and, for example, it may be forgotten that when
looking at a skin that the skin is cells. The mistake is typically made where it is
believed that the primary things that exist are those that are experienced via the
selective perceiving (skin rather than cells, beaches rather than individual sand
grains). I do not see how to avoid the conclusion that language is based not on
scientific and philosophical precision, but rather on the imprecision due to its being
oriented toward ordinary empirical experiences and to the customs of ordinary
empirical experience. The Inuit have dozens of words for snow, whereas in English
we have one. The Amish do not use the word ‘‘Zen’’ nor have a concept like the Tao.
The Advaita Vedantins do not use the phrase ‘‘zero-point energy’’ and the astro-
physicists do not use the concept of Brahman. These are a few of countless examples
that could be given that seem to point to the (apparently obvious) fact that language
is utilitarian—as philosophers before me have famously pointed out. We only need
disciplines like science in order to help correct for the crudeness of ordinary
empirical experience. If ordinary empirical experience was sharp and precise, why
would there be a need for scientific thinking, and logical argumentation? I am
therefore forced to use the ordinary empirically based, surface- and color-based,
mereology-based language (in my case, English) in order that others will understand
and in order to communicate the philosophy of mereological nihilism. This is of
course what quantum physicists also do, but where they have often ‘‘humanized’’
(Kane) the discourse more than I will (and their doing so has led to serious confusion,
even among themselves, as I will explain, and as I will try to avoid in this article.)
74 I am using the word ‘‘chaos’’ here in the same way that William James tended to use it, such as in
the following passage (which is a passage that is only about DIV2 reality) that helps us to understand
the way that ordinary empirical experience is so limited in scope:
The world’s contents are given to each of us in an order so foreign to our subjective interests that
we can hardly by an effort of the imagination picture to ourselves what it is like. We have to break
that order altogether—and by picking out from it the items which concern us, and connecting them
with others far away, which we say ‘‘belong’’ with them, we are able to make our definite threads
of sequence and tendency; ... and to enjoy simplicity and harmony in place of what was chaos. Is
not the sum of your actual experience taken at this moment and impartiality added together an
utter chaos? The strains of my voice, the lights and shades inside the room and out, the murmur of
the wind, the ticking of the clock, the various organic feelings you may happen individually to
posses, do these make a whole at all? Is it not the only condition of your mental sanity in the midst
of them that most of them are should become non-existent for you, and that a few others...
rational... The real world [DIV2 world] as it is given objective at this moment is the sum total of all
its being and events now. But can we think of such a sum? Can we realize for an instant what a
cross-section of all existence at a definite point of time would be? (James 1992, 545–546).
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2 Problems with the empirical and the ramifications of mereological nihilism
Before going on to my specific arguments against mereology, mereotopology,
topology, and any theory of material constitution, in this section I will begin to shed
light on what the ramifications are of a quantum mereological nihilism being the
correct theory of reality, and I will more specifically clarify why ordinary empirical-
material reality (but not I-empirical reality) is paradoxical. I will specifically show
how philosophers ubiquitously ignore and suppress the evidence that shows that
ordinary empirical-material reality does not exist, and that quantum mereological
nihilism is the correct theory. Also, I will discuss how there are different types of
mereological nihilists, and how some of them may not be pure and thoroughgoing
nihilists who maintain that only quantum philosophical atoms exist.
2.1 Widespread doubts about mereology
Philosophers commonly believe that parts and wholes exist, and that this is so
obvious that there need not be any concern about the question of whether or not
there are any in the first place: the existence of parts and wholes is so common-
sensical that no debate over whether or not parts and wholes exist is needed. For
example, in their book on substance, consider how Hoffman and Rosenkrantz
discuss the relation of part to whole, as if it is a main intuitive aspect of reality:
‘‘According to a key commonsense intuition, there is a relation that unites parts
which compose a compound physical object.’’75 In this way, philosophers (especially
those who are not specialists in mereology, the philosophy of composition and
material constitution, or mereological nihilism) often freely refer to parts and wholes
when doing their philosophical work, as if there is no question that there are things
that are parts, and that there are things that are wholes. But specialists in mereology,
75 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 73).
In their book, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz base the existence of part-whole relations solely on
this demand that they are commonsensical. Even when addressing important attacks by mere-
ological nihilists they nevertheless only fall back on this one claim of commonsense as a supposed
counter attack.
Many philosophers who discuss mereology and composition (or, compounds, as Hoffman and
Rosenckrantz refer to them) maintain that mereological relations perhaps involve some problems
but (paradoxically) they are still commonsensical (for example, see Simons 1987, 10–11, where he
maintains that part-whole relations are utterly commonsensical, even though his entire book Parts
is based on the discussion of serious problems with these relations.) Hoffman and Rosenkrantz
base all their discussion on mereological relations from the alleged commonsense nature of them,
seemingly believing that’s enough for their existence—despite their problems—and thus enough to
not entertain mereological nihilism. For example, on pp. 181–182 of 1997 they object to van
Inwagen’s non-mereological metaphysics by merely passing over van Inwagen’s pointing out of
problems to do with mereological relations, instead letting their trust in their commonsensicality
guide them. Also, on page 79 they maintain that they are willing to usurp some results of science
which are ‘‘well confirmed’’ (78) and which point toward mereological nihilism in order to ‘‘defend
the commonsense view [of composition]’’ (79). This is a good example of philosophers deliberately
rejecting scientific findings (and even simple logical findings)—and even admitting that they carry
out such a rejection—in favor of commonsense (where ‘‘commonsense’’ is a very crude and
unrefined commonsense—i.e., it is a plebian DIV2-empiricism that is not honed by science). I will
discuss all these issues in detail in Sect. 8, where I will show other specific examples of philoso-
phers rejecting science and logic, and admitting that they are basing their philosophy only on a
plebian prephilosophical intuition and commonsense, as Hoffman and Rosenkrantz appear to be
doing here.
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mereotopology, topology, or the philosophy of material composition very commonly
admit and put emphasis on the serious problems involved with how any objects can
be composite. Consider what Simons writes at the very opening of his widely dis-
cussed book, Parts: ‘‘The principle theme of this book is that despite their formal
elegance, these [mereological] theories leave much to be desired as general theories
of part and whole.’’76 From what I can tell, contemporary philosophers who
specifically write about material constitution and mereology emphasize the utter
commonsensicality of the fact that there are parts and wholes (Simons does this on
pages 10–11 of Parts), but also put significant emphasis in their research on the
problems and inadequacies of the theories of composite objects. (Of the afore-
mentioned theories of material composition, mereology and topology seems to be
the most widely criticized regarding this issue, mereotopology the least.) It is as if
they want to say: ‘‘We can see or intuit it, but we can’t tell you how it works,’’ which
is the hallmark of ordinary empirical reality’s most basic issues: motion, time, space,
change, extension, material constitution, etc. Consider a passage from Markosian,
where he goes as far as to admit that none of the theories of material constitution are
sufficient:
Recently, a growing body of philosophical literature has concerned itself
with questions about the nature of composition... The main question [which
is called the SCQ] that has been raised about composition is roughly this:
Under what circumstances does something compose, or add up to, or form,
a single object? It turns out that it is surprisingly difficult to give a satis-
factory answer to this question that accords with standard, pre-philosoph-
ical intuitions about the universe’s composite objects... No one has yet
defended a view in response to the above question about composition that is
consistent with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe’s
composite objects.77 (My emphasis)
Markosian also writes that ‘‘... all of the... leading responses to SCQ are unaccept-
able.’’78
There has been enough difficulty to do with the theories of mereology that a new
theory, the aforementioned mereotopology theory, has been developed,79 and is the
result of mixing mereology and topology in order to replace mereological theories.
Casati and Varzi write:
How much of the spatial universe can be grasped and described by means of
purely mereological notions? We argue that one cannot go very far. In our view
(and this is a view we share with others...), a purely mereological outlook is too
76 Simons (1987, 5).
77 Markosian (1998b, 211). van Inwagen introduces the SCQ on page 20 of 1990.
78 Ibid., 214–215. Markosian writes this in trying to combat the existing theories of composition
(universalism, etc.), and he argues all theories ‘‘are unacceptable’’ so as to try to make way for his
new theory he presents in Markosian (1998b).
79 See Grupp (2005b, 91–93, 2005b, d, 2006b) for attacks on mereotopological theories.
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restrictive. At the very least, one needs to integrate it with concepts and
principles of a topological nature.80
In this article I will show, as I have with different arguments elsewhere, that
mereotopology cannot save or make coherent the philosophy of material constitu-
tion, as some philosophers allege it can. This is because mereotopology suffers from
the same flaw I will show that topology and mereology suffer from: topology,
mereology, and mereotopology all depend on invisible (not I-empirical) metaphys-
ical relations between items, and/or on there being contact between items, but I will
show all connections, touching, and contacting between items is impossible, and thus
mereotopology (just like mereology and topology) is impossible, regardless of what
one might believe reality is like based on their ordinary empirical information about
reality. I will argue in this article that the difficulty with mereology and composition,
and the reason why (in Markosian’s words) ‘‘[n]o one has defended a view...’’ of it is
because there cannot be any composition of any sort, and it is merely a product of the
concepts of the mind.
2.2 Antinomies and infinite divisibility
Ubiquitously, scientists and philosophers tell us that ordinary empirical reality is
coherent, and that if we find a problem in our analysis of it, then there is a problem
with our analysis, not with nature. The evidence of this article shows that this is
incorrect. It has been discussed for thousands of years by philosophers that if we
merely attempt to describe the very simplest issues about ordinary empirical real-
ity—motion, change, time, space, contacting or touching, extension, and so on—we
arrive at apparently insurmountable paradox and contradiction. This would imply
that what is known in philosophy as a reductio argument (if I accurately describe x,
but in doing so arrive at a contradiction, then I know that not-x is correct) could be
given to show the non-existence of ordinary empirical reality: if we describe the most
basic features of ordinary empirical reality, but arrive at contradiction, then ordinary
empirical reality does not exist. This is what occurs with ordinary empirical reality: if
we attempt to describe its most basic features, we arrive at contradiction, and its
inverse—not ordinary empirical reality—must be real, and the best candidate for
what ‘‘not empirical reality’’ could denote is the I-empirical quantum atomic reality.
Interestingly, this article demonstrates that current science (quantum mechanics)
also brings us to the came conclusion. Humans have a plethora of empirical
experiences, but those experiences contradict one another. For example, if I probe
into the smooth surface of a piece of paper in order to find out what the paper is
made of, I arrive at point-particles that are surfaceless—which is a contradiction,
since sizeless objects (points) cannot compose objects with size (surfaces). These
empirical experiences contradict, and we are forced to make a decision on which of
80 Casati and Varzi (1999, 4). They further add on page 10 that
...things are not as straightforward as this [it] might sound. Even if the spatial structure of an object
depends crucially on the relations among its parts, it does not follow that mereology... affords the
right way to investigate such relations... [A] purely mereological outlook may be utterly inade-
quately for the purpose of spatial representation, and it may be necessarily to integrate mereology
with concepts and principles of various other sorts... [W]e will argue that some such concepts and
principles are of a topological nature. The move from mereology to mereotopology... is a crucial
first step in the direction of a good theory of spatial representation.
123
282 Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386
the two opposed experiences is correct: the experiences of the extended empirical
paper, or the experiences of I-empirical point-particles. In this article I show that
only the I-empirical experiences of quantum abstract atoms involve non-contradic-
tion (and thus are the experiences of real objects), and ordinary empirical objects are
impossible (involve contradiction) and thus are not real. In other words, visible
objects, objects with a surface and a color, do not exist. (To show this point, I will
have to show that physicists are incorrect when they assert that quantum reality
involves quantum paradox. I do this in Sect. 6.)
An interesting outcome of mereological nihilism is that the paradoxes and
absurdities involving the ordinary empirical level are avoided: mereological nihilism
avoids the antinomies, absurdities, paradoxes, and problems that have been widely
acknowledged and discussed by philosophers. For the mereological nihilist, they are
not problems, paradoxes, and so on, but rather are expected outcomes of the attempt
to describe impossible items (composite items) that cannot exist, similar to the
difficulties that would arise if one attempted to describe a round square. When one
accepts that reality really is the way ordinary empirical experience indicates, disaster
however strikes when a mere attempt is made to describe the most basic issues about
that reality—such as how macroscopic objects move, how they change, how they
persist through time, what they are made of, and so on. The paradoxes and absur-
dities are the result of attempting to describe all of reality in a way that conforms to
this ordinary (unrefined) empirical experience. (In Sect. 8.1 below I will show how
ordinary empirical experience that is not scientifically oriented is ‘‘unrefined’’
experience, meaning that it is involves conflicts with scientific empirical informa-
tion.) There is a substantial list of rather implacable and widely known dilemmas
waiting for the philosopher who accepts as real the surfaces and colors of their
ordinary empirical experiencing, but there is no such list waiting for the mereological
nihilist philosopher, who avoids all these problems. Mere attempt at description of
any composite and/or ordinary empirical object leads to paradox that is revealed by
the deconstruction of the object that the description involves. (In other words,
analysis of any composite object, including space, time, and so on, shows that the
object does not make sense.) Only composite objects, which involve complexities,
can be deconstructed and shown to be absurd. But since non-composite objects
(quantum abstract atoms) do not involve complexities, they cannot be deconstructed
to reveal any paradoxes and absurdities. This is because only objects that involve
complexities (distinctions, contrasts, etc.) involve paradox and absurdity. The
simplest example is this one: for any composite object, it must be explained how it
can be made of other objects (the composite’s parts) that are not identical to it
(which is an absurdity, since it involves the idea that composite C is self-identical,
but is composed of other items which are not C). No such difficulties arise with non-
composites, which are unstructured, complexity-free quantum abstract atoms, which
cannot be deconstructed (and which are ultimately almost, but perhaps not quite,
ineffable). Mereological nihilist reality is utterly simple, and nearly all of its
descriptions are negative descriptions (objects do not have size, do not involve
change [see Sect. 4.5], do not have color, etc.).
It is widely known by philosophers that theories of matter (matter as was defined
above and as will be further discussed in 2.4) involve antimonies. Even though
philosophers typically pass over these, as if they don’t put an end to the ideas of time,
change, identity, motion, material constitution and so on, I see no reason why these
problems do not give reason to doubt the existence of ordinary empirical reality and
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its composite matter. Van Inwagen, in his somewhat nihilistic book, Material Beings,
also takes this as a reason to espouse mereological nihilism:
That there are deep and intractable metaphysical problems about material
objects—even paradigmatic ones—is evident from the antinomies and para-
doxes involving material objects. The best known of these are about artifacts,
the puzzle of the ship of theseus being the best known of all... In this book, I
shall present and defend a theory about the nature of material things that takes
seriously paradoxical features of their unity and persistence. If this theory is
correct, the nature of material things is radically unlike what most philosophers
suppose it to be... I shall try to show that the ‘‘deep and intractable’’ meta-
physical problems about the unity and persistence of material things have
simple and intellectually satisfying solutions if my proposals are correct.81
Philosophers very often accept and put their trust in empirical reality, unquestion-
ingly believing it really is how we believe we perceive it (such as having surfaces and
colors), and then with this dubious assumption, they carry out and construct their
philosophical theories and do their philosophical work—work which is based on, and
built up out of, paradox- and antinomy-riddled ordinary empirical reality. Quantum
mereological nihilism avoids this and thus one might imagine that mereological
nihilism would almost unquestionably be the philosophy of the day. But surprisingly,
rather than considering mereological nihilism as the welcome savior from a phi-
losophy of absurdity, almost always mereological nihilism is instead labeled absurd
or radical (where no argument follows as to why this it is), and no recognition follows
where it is revealed that mereological nihilism appears the coherent philosophy, and
the philosophies of orindary empirical reality (the philosophy of space, of time, of
ordinary objects, and so on) are actually the antinomy-, problem-, and paradox-
riddled philosophies. I will next consider an example of such ad hominem to do with
the philosophy of time (time is a composite object, consisting of at least the parts
past, present, and future) here to illustrate this. (So far I have been discussing
mereological nihilism about space and matter, but mereological nihilism about
time—which is called presentism82—also should be mentioned). The example has
to do with one of the most famous paradoxes or problems—the problem of the
self-identity of any apparently persisting object through time or change (which is
impossible since an object cannot remain itself (the same) if it changes). Rather than
mereological nihilism being considered the (perhaps obvious) solution to this
problem (a solution that would amount to a denial that there is time or change),
instead, and, surprisingly, it is merely demanded that such nihilism is ‘‘radical.’’
Consider the following passage from the widely read Stanford Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy:
81 Van Inwagen (1990, 17–18).
82 Presentism rejects persistence (Zimmerman 1998, 213), rejects past and future, and thus there is
just one irreducible unchanging point of presentness. But if it is unchanging and does not have any
past or future parts, then it does not involve persistence, endurance, change, or time flow. Thus,
presentism leads to the position that time does not exist. These ideas are discussed in much more
detail in Grupp (2005a, c), which both deal with mereological nihilism about time (no parts of time
means there is no time at all). In this article I focus much more on nihilism about space and matter
than I do on nihilism about time in this article since I exhaustingly covered nihilism about time in
other articles.
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Temporal-parts accounts of change seem OK, but can endurantists come up with
anything equally good or better? How can one and the same thing have different
properties at different times? One radical answer is presentism, the view that only
present objects, events and states exist: past and future do not exist. Presentism
seems to dissolve the problem of change: since only the overripe banana is
present, its unripe state does not exist, so there’s nothing to worry about... But
unless there are independent reasons for accepting presentism..., it seems like a
drastic response to the problem of change.83 (Emphasis added.)
Although this passage is short, nevertheless, twice in this passage, emphasized by the
italicized words, is the urging and the attempt to persuade that the presentist posi-
tion is radical and drastic. No argument is given however for why this is the case.
This is the standard way nihilism is dealt with: although it solves perhaps nearly all of
the many famous paradoxes and problems of philosophy thus (finally) making phi-
losophy consistent, and although it fully aligns philosophy with the most progressive
area of science (quantum mechanics), it is instead rejected without argument nor
evidence, but rather with unphilosophical ad hominem ‘‘reasoning.’’ Since there are
no clearly outlined claims made regarding why presentism is drastic and radical,
using these words takes the appearance of being an attack that is, as I mentioned, the
informal fallacy of ad hominem—much like when Camus’ Meursault was found
guilty of murder largely for sleeping through his mother’s funeral, rather than for
killing the Arab. And it is no secret among professional philosophers that mere-
ological nihilism avoids the antinomies and paradoxes of empirical reality. In a
recent article, Markosian attempts to refute nihilism (his attack is discussed else-
where in this article), but before doing that, he comments on the obvious strengths of
mereological nihilism, such as that it avoids the widely discussed absurdities and
paradoxes just mentioned about the empirical and composite objects. He writes:
‘‘Another virtue of Nihilism is that one who subscribes to it need not worry about
any of the traditional puzzles concerning the identity of composite objects.’’84
Certainly some readers will be puzzled as to the implication here that it is only the
empirical level of reality that involves paradox, not the quantum level. It is widely held
that the domain of the quantum is a domain of fantastical paradox. But most of these
alleged paradoxes have to do with physicists creating them for us, merely informing us,
rather than discoverying for us, that quantum reality involves impossible states of
affairs ‘‘that exist.’’ Countless paradoxes and mysteries emerge in science and
philosophy (e.g., why do galaxies appear to have much more matter than they exhibit
[this is the dark matter problem]), and there are many in physics. But for some reason
when the paradoxes involve a few issues to do with the fundametnal particles, we are
informed by physicists that they actually indicate real facts about reality as being non-
logical—rather than mere problems with interpretation of data, and rather than mere
need for further investigation into the mysteries of quantum reality. The equations
physcists used to discover and formulate quantum reality do not appear to be absurd, so
it is puzzling as to why the reality they lead us to is alleged to be. There are no
arguments for why we must accept the paradoxes, and certainly not all physicists
do. What exist are a few famous and, frankly, often even quite hostile physicists (such as
Feynman) who have literally outspokenly castigated anyone (especially philosophers)
83 Hawley (2004), section 3.
84 Markosian (1998b, 219).
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that does not merely accept that nature is describable as absurd at the fundamental
level. Indeed it may be paradoxical at that level, but that it is would need to be
proven, not asserted: lack of data does not reveal paradox, but rather only lack of
data. Dark matter will appear mysterious until we discovery what it is. The transfer
and passing along of traits by reproducing animals appeared irreducibly mysterious
until humans discovered genetics—now we have genetic engineering.
If one looks at the alleged paradoxes of quantum physics, we can see that they are
certainly not anything more than shoddy non-philosophical theory-building origi-
nating from merely a few very famous quantum physicists, as I will show in Sect. 6.
My use of the word ‘‘shoddy’’ may appear overblown, but these paradoxes are only
the result of (a few) physicists doing metaphysics. For example, it is now popular for
physicists to tell us that electrons are ‘‘waves’’ (probability waves) due to various
quantum mechanical findings. But no physicists has ever observed a wave in the way
we can observe a water wave (where we can see the extended wave waving up and
down, etc.). (The waves are only ‘‘observed’’ as highly contrived computer images.)
Physicists only witness point particles, and thus the waves are purely metaphysi-
cal—advocated by a few physicsts after Bohr to demand that nature is paradoxical,
rather than merely acknowledging that there is a mystery in their data that could be
figured out with further research. But since it is this non-scientific metaphysics that
leads to their conclusion that there are so-called probability waves, it seems fair to
label the theory-building as ‘‘shoddy:’’ either a product of poor metaphysical theory-
building by physicists (poor because of the aforementioned desire to specifically
make the theories paradoxes), as just described, or are a product of not looking at
the experimental data closely. Stenger writes:
Particles and fields have become intertwined in the usual expression of quan-
tum physics. Photons and electrons are said to exhibit properties of both
particles and fields, appearing localized and distributed, discrete and continu-
ous. This is usually called wave-particle duality. You will often hear that
something is a particle or a wave, depending on what you decide to measure. I
have said this many times myself in the classroom, parroting what I heard in
class and read in textbooks when I was a students. But in recent years. I have
recognized what a dangerously misleading and indeed incorrect statement this
is... In fact, no experiment provides data that speak against the fundamental
particulate nature of light. Whatever you decide to measure about light, if you
do so with sufficiently sensitive photoelectrons you will always detect some-
thing localized and discrete—a photon.85
2.3 Types of nihilists
There are a few varieties of mereological nihilism, and they differ by the ways in
which a mereological nihilist discusses consciousness and phenomenal states, and
human persons. I list three below, the first of which is the position of the contem-
porary nihilists other than myself:
I. Impure physicalistic mereological nihilism. This has also been called
quasi-mereological nihilism, and it is a position involving two primary features.
85 Stenger (2000, 110).
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Ia. Atoms are physical and they interact in some way (they contact or are inter-
connected), and
Ib. There are some objects—namely the minds or bodies of some living organ-
isms—that do have parts, and thus are mereological wholes that are admitted
into this impure mereological nihilism (hence the word ‘‘impure,’’ since there
are some composites), but for the most part, of the items that exist, it is the
minority of them that have parts. There are questions as to whether or not the
proponents of this position have specifically described how minds and/or bodies
can be composite items while other items cannot.86
II. Dualist mereological nihilism. This has similarities to position I except for the
following difference: minds are not reducible to atoms, and minds are ineffable
non-composites (which I will call McGinn minds). (There could be cases where
a nihilist endorses both I and II.) According to this position, it is unclear what
minds are made of, but it can be made clear that they are not reducible to
the quantum abstract atoms that are identical to the rest of reality. McGinn
minds can only be made of some undiscovered non-particulate, non-physical
‘‘mind-stuff.’’ There is no reason to argue that the mind is either partless or
composite. Simply put, this exotic ‘‘mind-stuff’’ would be entirely unknown
‘‘stuff,’’ which no theory could ever describe.
III. Quantum panpsychistic mereological nihilism (QPMN). This position could
also be called pure mereological nihilism. Non-nihilistically, both I and II above
involve making a distinction between quantum abstract atoms and personhood
(human bodies or states of consciousness), but QPMN does not. On this pure
mereological nihilist view, there is only one sort of ‘‘stuff,’’ which is the
indistinguishable quantum abstract atoms (which is the basis of a pure mere-
ological nilihilsm), and since consciousness also exists, then those structureless
quantum abstract atoms can only be identical to consciousness. This is an
panpsychistic theory, since it indicates that consciousness is everywhere
quantum abstract atoms are, which is to say that consciousness is reality.87
In this article I will not formulate an argument as to which of these is correct, but
I will discuss in Sect. 9 why III appears to be the best option. For pure mereological
nihilism that is non-metaphysical and that is scientifically founded, it seems that III is
the only option.
The problem with what is being discussed here is that this discussion involves the
philosophy of mind or consciousness, but it is unclear how the mind or consciousness
exists if mereological nihilism is correct, due to the fact that it is unclear how mind or
consciousness is identical to quantum atoms. This might seem to be a weakness of
this article (many philosophers have told me they believe it is), but that claim is flatly
false, for the following reason. This problem just described in this paragraph to do
86 For example, van Inwagen points out why we should reject composite objects, but does not
explain how a human body can be one.
87 Some readers might believe that it makes more sense to assert that according to the QPMN
position, that consciousness is identical to the universe. But as is shown in this article, universes do
not exist, unless they are considered to be denoted by the following statement: ‘‘unstructured
unconnected unattached particles.’’ But that does not seem to be the way that universes are typically
described, and instead, the ordinary conception of what a universe is, is a mereological whole—and
thus ‘‘universe’’ denotes nothing whatsoever, on the ordinary usage of the word. The information in
this footnote shows how mereological nihilism is similar to the theory called acosmism.
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with mereological nihilism is merely the same problem that is found in the other
areas of philosophy, and in the philosophies of mind or consciousness, which goes as
follows: How do fundamental items (that appear to be non-mental ‘‘stuff’’) support,
connect to, or give rise to our ‘‘Technicolor phenomenology,’’ as McGinn puts it?
Since this is a problem for all of philosophy, I will in no way imagine that it is only a
problem for mereological nihilism. It is safe to say that nobody has discovered what
the building blocks of phenomenological ‘‘mind-stuff’’ are, and if there are any, how
they give rise to phenomenological ‘‘stuff.’’ These are unsolved problems of phi-
losophy, and are no more of a problem for mereological nihilism than they are to
non-reductive materialism, idealism, and so forth.
As for type-I, the impure-mereological nihilists, one variety, endorsed by van
Inwagen, involves the position that there is one type of object that has parts, namely,
human persons (by which van Inwagen apparently means humans’ physical bodies).
In van Inwagen’s impure-nihilism there are no other objects with parts, and all other
objects that we believe to be composite—chairs, trees, etc.—therefore do not exist.
Rather, other than persons, which are composites, there are only partless funda-
mental particles. For example, van Inwagen and other impure physicalist mere-
ological nihilists, as we are calling them, maintain that our language and our sense
information is not totally mistaken since when we refer to things like chairs and
galaxies, we are referring to particles that are arranged in a certain way, and thus
when we say ‘‘chair’’, we are not referring to one item, but rather we are referring to
a collection or network of quantum particles in a specific ‘‘arrangement’’. Consider
this diagram, which illustrates impure physicalist mereological nihilism:
Below I will argue that impure physicalist mereological nihilism is an impossible
theory and should be rejected in favor of a pure mereological nihilism (a nihilism not
involving any parts or any interconnections of any sort, as the phrase ‘‘mereological
nihilism’’ most faultlessly denotes). I will come to this conclusion because I find that
there are no such relations of arrangement or relations of part-to-whole. Even if
there were such relations between atoms, it is unclear why they would not allow
atoms to give rise to mereological wholes, and thus type-I nihilists would not
be nihilists at all. The reason that interconnected atoms seem to give rise to
mereological wholes is because the touching and contacting between any two objects
π
This is how humans observe things
empirically: there appear in the 
consciousness of that observer items
with a color, solidity and smoothness. 
This is more in accord with how things really 
are at the most fundamental scale, according to 
the impure mereological nihilists: there is not 
one thing, but many interconnected
philosophical atoms which, we are told by 
impure physicalistic nihilists do not make up
single objects. Much of this article is devoted to
showing that there are no such
interconnections.  
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(such as an atom and a relation) involves a shared part between the items that touch
or contact.88 But if there is a shared part, then the objects that share the part (in this
case, a relation and an atom) form a fusion and it would no longer be the case that
they are entirely distinct items. Therefore, if mereological nihilism is a correct
theory, there are no interconnected atoms (or any interconnected items at all), which
we will find out is the case in Sect. 4. It is not clear how atoms could have parts to
share and thus it appears dubious to imagine that an extended atom can touch or
contact anything else, such as another atom, or such as ‘‘touching’’ (linking to)
another relation or an instantiation tie of a relation that bridges89 the atom and the
relation. This is one reason why atoms cannot touch one another, and I will point out
other reasons why atoms do not touch one another in Sect. 4.
2.4 DIV1 and DIV2: two ways of experiencing
Reality as it is ordinarily believed to be is viewed in terms of levels, or strata: the
chemical level is made up of the particles of physics, biological organisms are made
of chemicals, and so on. If, as Schaffer writes, ‘‘the central connotation of the ‘levels’
88 See Grupp (2003, 2004a, b) for details on why relations (polyadic properties) cannot be shared by
items since they cannot contact the items they allegedly interconnect. But ignoring the issues in those
articles, and discussing why networks of interrelated items can only involve shared parts (and thus
can only be mereological holes), consider that contact and touching between objects involves the
relation of collocation between surface points (which is a relation I show does not exist in Sect. 4).
Consider a passage from Chisholm:
Let us recall an ancient problem. ‘‘Consider two discrete physical bodies thought to be continuous
with each other; the east side of body A, say, is continuous with the west side of body B. How is
this possible? Either (i) the eastmost part of A is in the same place as is the westmost part of B or
(ii) no part of A occupies the same place as does any part of B. In the case of (i), we would have
two discrete things in the same place. But this is impossible. In the case of (ii), since A and B
occupy different places, there is a place between the place where A is and the place where B is. But
if there is a place between A and B, then A and B are not continuous.’’ (Chisholm 1989, 84)
Chisholm’s passage indicates that it appears to be the case that there cannot be contact, abutting, or
touching unless there are items that coincide. Collocation or coincidence also means that there is a
shared part between collocated objects: ‘‘Two individuals overlap mereologically if and only if they
have a part in common.’’ (Simons 1987, 11) Chisholm does not go on to give answers to this ‘‘ancient
problem’’. But Chisholm states that ‘‘it holds of things that are merely continuous with each other but
which are not continuous with each other (for example, two blocks pushed together). A similar
objection applies to the suggestion that, if two bodies are continuous with each other, then there is no
space between them. Barry Smith has written about Chisholm’s work in a passage that includes
discussion of point-sized items in the problem of their touching and contacting:
Imagine... two perfect spheres at rest and in contact with each other. What happens at the point
where they touch? Is there a last point p1 that belongs to the first sphere and a first point p2 that
belongs to the second? ... [C]learly not, for then we should have to admit an indefinite number of
further points between p1 and p2 and this would imply that the two spheres were not in contact
after all... [T]o admit that the point where the two spheres touch belongs to neither of the two
spheres seems to amount to the thesis that the two spheres do not touch at all. (Smith 1997,
535–536.)
In Sect. 4 I will show that contacting between any coinciding items (even point-sized ones) is
impossible, and I will show that all contact is impossible. In pure mereological nihilism, there are no
interrelated items, and no items that contact each other in any way.
89 Loux uses the word ‘‘bridge’’ to denote the special instantiation tie (also called the exemplifi-
cation tie) that ties a relation to its relata. See Loux (1998, 38–41).
123
Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386 289
metaphor is that of... a mereological structure, ordered by a part-whole relation,’’90
then the mereological and compositional nihilist can only conclude that there are no
levels to reality. As discussed above, quantum particles are not directly observable
(they cannot be observed directly from the ordinary empirical-material perspective).
For that reason, I will explain in this subsection that the divisions of reality can be
divided into two sorts: empirical-material, and quantum abstract atoms. I will call the
empirical-material division 2 (abbreviated DIV2) and I will call the quantum
abstract atoms division 1 (abbreviated DIV1). The following diagram illustrates
these ideas of DIV1 and DIV2:
These divisions correspond to types of experience one can have. One can have
either empirical experience of material things that have a surface and a color (DIV2
experience), or one can have I-empirical experience of the quantum atoms (DIV1
experience). DIV2 experience will occur through the apparatus of DIV1 experience,
as I will discuss, but nevertheless, the objects involved in either of the two sorts of
experience are the inverse of one another: one has surface and color, the other does
not, etc. DIV2 consists of anything larger than the scientific atom (which, as
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90 Schaffer (2003, 500).
123
290 Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386
mentioned above, is distinct from the philosophical atom). And DIV1 consists of the
quantum abstract atoms.91
Although DIV1 is typically considered to make up DIV2, according to the
arguments of this article, DIV1 is real and DIV2 is merely a conceptual construction
of consciousness. The characteristics of DIV2 objects and the rules that objects in
DIV2 operate according to are the inverse (opposite) of characteristics of DIV1
objects: if a DIV2 object has property P, then any DIV1 object has property ~ P.92,93
In the first words of his recent book, Omne´s, a physicist, writes:
If we must rethink today the links between philosophy and science, it is be-
cause we are in the aftermath of a fracture. The most fundamental sciences,
those dealing with space, time, and matter,... have broken out of the limits of
common sense and traditional philosophy.94
91 It is unclear whether or not the scientific atom is of DIV2 or DIV1. It is ‘‘observed’’ through
spectroscopy, and what is observed during the spectroscopy is a surface shape, viewable on the
computer screen. But this surface is generated by the computer based on where the sensor tip is
absorbed by the quantum atoms that allegedly make up the scientific atom. I will show below that
electrons, for example, are not probability clouds, contrary to popular belief, and electrons can only
be point particles (quantum atoms). So in spectroscopy, through absorption of the sensor’s micro-tip
by the scientists’ atom’s quantum atoms, the image of a surface is fabricated. For these reasons, the
scientists’ atom is not at all clearly a DIV2 extended item. But on the other hand, it is not a quantum
atom since it is a composite that is alleged to exist. For these reasons, I do not know where the
scientists’ atom belongs, in DIV1 or DIV2. But my guess is that it goes in DIV2, and can merely be
thought of as the illusion of a surface generated by quantum atoms.
92 I have found this an interesting and surprising characteristic of the differences between DIV1 and
DIV2. The rule seems to hold in all cases except two: properties that DIV2 items have are always the
negation of properties DIV1 items have except for the case of tiny motion and duration for particles.
The data of quantum experimentation appears to reveal that DIV1 objects (quantum atoms) may
have an extremely tiny duration.
93 Actually, quantum abstract atoms are more likely propertyless items (see Grupp 2006a).
Traditionally, this has not been specifically an issue to do with mereological nihilism, which has been
considered to only require partlessness and the ramifications of a partless reality. Propertylessness
has to do with a similar theory, blob theory (it is similar to blob theory since both theories involve a
reality that does not involve wholes, structure, space, time, diversity or differences, and so on, and in
a note above I discussed how the reasoning in Sect. 4 may reveal that mereological nihilism is
actually identical to blob theory). Blob theory, and perhaps also mereological nihilism, would
indicate that DIV1 is a propertyless realm, where accordingly DIV2 would consist of little more than
aimless and illusory (i.e. non-representational) concept-making (i.e. property-making) of con-
sciousness (assuming consciousness somehow exists in a mereological nihilist reality). I do not
describe the DIV1 – DIV2 differences in this article in terms being propertyless (DIV1) and having
properties (DIV2) for two reasons. (1) Discussing propertyless reality is impossible (that is, a blobby,
propertyless reality is ineffable), since any sentence describing that reality would appear to be a
description denoting properties it has (for example, here is a description of blob reality, it is non-
causal, immaterial, propertyless, etc., but the words ‘‘non-causal,’’ ‘‘immaterial,’’ ‘‘propertyless’’
appear to pick out properties of DIV1 objects). So it is better to describe things in more familiar
terms, with familiar language, just in order make the case for mereological nihilism and blob the-
ory—which can only be done by using DIV2 language—rather than also attempting the difficult task
of trying to make the case for the propertytlessness of the quantum abstract atoms. (2) Discussing the
DIV1 – DIV2 difference as having properties that are the inverse of one another, as I have indicated
I am doing in this article, basically achieves the same goals as if I were to attempt discuss reality in
the difficult propertyless versus. not-propertyless manner—in either way of description (propertyless
versus having properties, or having parts vs. not having parts), I am ultimately describing DIV1 to be
entirely unlike DIV2, where it shares no similarities with DIV2.
94 Omne´s (1999b, 3).
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Watson, another physicists, writes: ‘‘The subatomic world is a world where what
physicists call ‘classical rules,’ applicable to objects large enough to be held in the
palm of the hand, do not apply.’’95 Pointing out the difference between the empirical
and non-empirical nature of DIV2 versus DIV2, Omne´s writes:
There is so wide a chasm between classical and quantum physics that one still
marvels that it could be bridged. These two conceptions of the world are almost
opposite in every respect. Classical physics relies directly on a reality that one can
see and touch, and which one can act. It is basically causal, to the extreme of
determinism. On the other hand, quantum physics deals with a world in acces-
sible to our senses and our common sense, a world that can only be described by
abstract mathematics. The most commonplace objects have a shadow of wave
functions, simple quantities become matrices, operators, pure constructs of pure
mathematics. In place of the excessive certainty of determinism, one is facing
absolute randomness. Could there be a more drastic opposition?96
The famous physicist Brian Greene writes:
[Our] day-to-day experiences are classical experiences; with a high degree of
accuracy, they conform to the laws of physics set down by Newton more than
three centuries ago. But of all the discoveries in physics during the last hundred
years, quantum mechanics is far and away the most startling, since it under-
mines the whole conceptual schema of classical physics.97
And in another passage, consider what the physicist, Ford, writes:
...the physics of the past hundred years has taught us that common sense is a poor
guide in new realms of knowledge. No one could have predicted this outcome, but
no one should be surprised by it. Everyday experience shapes your opinions about
matter and motion and space and time. Common sense says that solid matter is
solid, that all accurate watches keep the same time, that the mass of material after a
collision is the same as it was before, and that nature is predictable: sufficiently
accurate input information yields reliable prediction of outcomes. But when sci-
ence moves outside the range of ordinary experience [when it moves outside of
DIV2]—into the subatomic world, for instance—things prove very different. Solid
matter is mostly empty space; time is relative; mass is gained or lost in a collision;
and no matter how complete the input information, the outcome is uncertain.98
2.4.1 No causation in DIV1
Physicists are very familiar with the way that DIV1 characteristics are the inverse of
DIV2 characteristics, but it is not as widely acknowledged by philosophers. In DIV1,
95 Watson (2004, 8). Watson’s example—‘‘large enough to be held in the palm of the hand’’—is
more astute than it may first appear. Notice he does not say that what fits into the palm of the hand is
visible or not. According to DIV2 logic, what can be held in the palm of your hand really is anything
larger than some smaller molecules.
96 Omne`s (1999a, 3).
97 Greene (2004, 177).
98 Ford (2004, 4–5). Stenger (2000, 44) also gives a lucid passage about this issue, where he maintains
that the DIV1 – DIV2 cutoff is around the level of the scientists’ atoms (which are composed of
nuclei and electrons) as opposed to the quantum abstract atoms.
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causation does not exist. In criticism of the invention of probabilities for describing
quantum phenomena, Omne´s writes:
Probabilities had appeared previously in the ‘‘old quantum theory’’ with the
quantum jumps of an electron going from an atomic trajectory to another one.
Einstein had also introduced probabilities in the emission of black-body radi-
ation. In both cases however, it had been thought that probabilities were
needed for the same reasons as in classical physics, simply because all of the
laws were not yet known. Now, however, with a full-fledged theory of quantum
mechanics, absolute randomness was plainly there.99
And Herbert writes:
The essence of quantum randomness is simply this: identical physical situations
give rise to different outcomes. Once you get down to the quantum random-
ness level, no further explanation is possible. You can’t get any deeper because
physics stops here.100
Some philosophers maintain that DIV1 involves so-called ‘‘probabilistic causation’’ at
the quantum level, and it seems that this cannot be denied, given the statistical nature
of quantum particle behavior. But this probabilistic ‘‘causation’’ does not change the
fact that there is pure unpredictability of the location of, for example, an electron in its
‘‘cloud-zone,’’ as Herbert’s passage discusses. I find it more appropriate to call this
non-causation rather than probabilistic causation, since ‘‘probabilistic causation’’
seems to imply that there is some predictability in the electron’s region, when in fact
there is none whatsoever—it may be more likely that we will find the particle here
rather than there, but ultimately it is not an issue that can be predicted. How can pure
unpredictability involve the rhythm of causation in any way? Since it seems it cannot, it
seems that the phrase ‘‘non-causation’’ is much more appropriate when discussing
particle measurement than probabilistic causation. This can be further clarified by a
passage from Matthieu and the physics professor Trinh Xuan Thuan from a passage in
their book on Buddhism and physics:
Up through the nineteenth century, classical science argued that objects had an
intrinsic existence governed by well-determined laws of cause and effect. But
quantum mechanics, which was developed at the beginning of the twentieth
century, seriously undermined the idea that the basic ingredients of matter
have such a definite existence, and also raised doubts about whether the world
was governed by strict rules of cause and effect. The Buddhist idea of empti-
ness [the insignificant duration of quantum abstract atoms] seems to be in
harmony with the quantum view of reality.101
2.4.2 DIV1 cannot compose DIV2
DIV2 involves objects that have structure and shape because they have spatial
extendedness and a surface and color, but in DIV1 this is not the case, and objects
involve none of these. DIV2 involves space and time, but in DIV1 space and time do
99 Omne´s (1999a, 43).
100 Herbert (1985, 118).
101 Matthieu and Thuan (2001, 13).
123
Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386 293
not exist.102 In DIV2 a human witnesses what appear to be composite items that
have surface and color are observed (e.g., due to its surface and colors, a chromo-
some molecule is observed in the microscope, and a galaxy through a telescope can
be observed due to its surface and color), but in DIV1 composite items are not
found.
There seem to be paradoxes that can be found if one asks how DIV1 can make up
DIV2, since that would mean that a spaceless, timeless, unextended, non-causal,
structureless, colorless reality that only contains point-objects makes up a spatial,
temporal, causal, structured, colorful reality that contains extended objects. Overall,
physicists and philosophers make the assumption that quantum abstract atoms make
up DIV2 reality; but how this occurs is virtually unknown, and discussion of this is
virtually ignored.103 What is important for the purposes of this article is that if DIV2
contains mereological composites, and DIV1 does not, then DIV1 items are real, and
DIV2 items are conceptual-mental items (they are unreal items). In DIV2 experi-
encing, the experiencer has no idea that what she/he is experiencing is an illusion,
and that the language she is using does not denote anything but her/his own mind-
bound concepts. The reasoning of this article shows that there is no DIV2 world that
quantum abstract atoms give rise to in the first place, and thus it will remain one of
the primary unsolved mysteries of science until it is acknowledged that it is an
unsolved mystery because there cannot be any composing of the empirical world out
of quantum abstract atoms.
2.4.3 How can a structureless quantum atom be detected by a computer that does not
exist? The I-empirical apprehended through the empirical
Above I have more than once referred to the process used by scientists to detect
quantum atoms I-empirically by using quantum instrumentation. What is involved in
this process is the following: from the non-existent (conceptual) DIV2 dream-realm,
scientists discover the real entities (quantum atoms) of DIV1. This involves using
material machines and computers to detect immaterial unstructured particles.
According to mereological nihilism, those material machines and computers do not
exist: they are products of conceptualizers (minds that generate an empirical reality).
In other words, quantum abstract atoms are detected via items that do not exist
outside of consciousness. Is this is a conundrum for mereological nihilism? I will
explore this issue in this subsection.
102 At the most fundamental quantum domain of reality that physicists discuss, and which they call
the Planck scale, these physicists, scientists inform us that reality is ‘‘timeless’’ and ‘‘spaceless,’’ in
the words of Brian Greene, a leading string theorist (Greene 1999, 379).
103 A good example of the avoidance of this discussion is found in Kane (2000), chapter 2 (especially
around pp. 19–22), where Kane mentions how quantum atoms (he even uses this word, ‘‘atom’’)
‘‘build up rocks, cells, and all of the world around us.’’ (20) But no description of just how this occurs
is found—no description of how the quantum atoms can compose material surfaces and colors is
given. Kane’s example here is just one of seemingly countless examples of how this issue is avoided.
My guess is that the discussion is ubiquitously avoided since there are no theories that specifically
describe how this occurs. The mereological nihilist, of course might say that there are no theories
since it is an absurdity to believe that quantum atoms can build up a reality of composite or empirical
items. Gru¨nbaum (1952) attempted to describe how extensions composed of points—which would be
a huge step forward in solving this problem—but the alleged solution depends entirely on invisible
topological metaphysical relations. I attack his theory in Sect. 4.
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Partless quantum objects are known through indirect empirical means. Quantum
atoms are experienced through the DIV2-experineces of dots on computer screens
or wall screens that are generated by quantum instrumentation through spectroscopy
and other quantum detection processes. In other words, scientists have empirical
(DIV2) experiences of images of quantum atoms, and these empirical experiences
are therefore illusions of I-empirical items. Dots, splotches and splats on various
sorts of screens are all DIV2 objects, and thus all dot experiences are DIV2 ordinary
empirical objects. But if, according to mereological nihilism, all DIV2 vision
experiences are illusions (fabrications of conceptualizers), how do we know that
these dot experiences are not also to be rejected, just as the mereological nihilist
rejects any other DIV2 object? In other words, real DIV1 objects are invisible, but
can be known through visible (DIV2-experiences and conscious events) by non-
existent DIV2-empirical dots and data. Is there a problem with the idea that the
computer which conveys this information does not exist, but the quantum atom
which is discovered with the non-existent computer does?
I will next with show that this is not a problematical issue for quantum mere-
ological nihilism. If one merely inquires into the properties of the surfaces and colors
that are given in empirical experience, one finds that the surfaces and colors are
absurd, and cannot exist. It is like looking very carefully into the details of a mirage:
looking carefully only reveals that the mirage does not exist. I will describe how the
very act of carrying out critical analysis of any DIV2 surface and color experiences
leads to a disintegration of the surfaces and colors into structureless quantum atoms.
In other words, the empirical-material DIV2 perspective collapses on itself due to its
inherent wrongness, and the product of that collapse, what comes out of that
collapse, is quantum atoms.
Consider a wood table. From the perspective of ordinary empirical-material
consciousness, I can cut it into halves. I can cut the halves into quarters, the quarters
into eights, and so on until the items I am cutting are no longer empirical with my
unaided eyes. The items of nature do not slice in the way that mathematical objects
do. For example, in my high school geometry class, I could dissect a sphere any way
I wanted. There were few, if any, restrictions. This is not how the items of DIV2
empirical-material nature dissect. If I cut apart a table, much of my cutting will
consist of merely separating wood fibers and/or the plant cells that the wood consists
of in DIV2 reality. This is different than the sphere in my geometry class, which
could slice in any way I chose, and not in a way that was determined by the structure
of the tiny constituents of the geometrical shape, as is the case with the pieces of the
table. Further, if I wanted to cut in half the wood fibers or plant cells, that process
would largely consist of separating the molecules that compose the fibers and cells.
When I get down the scientists’ atom, I make a split from an item which is perceived
in DIV2 reality as having parts and an extension (such as the diameter of a scientists’
atom via spectroscopy). I am quite limited in how I can split the scientist’s atom,
since there are only a few items to choose from in order to do with splitting, unlike
the geometric object. Starting from the wood table, I have dissected down to the
scientists’ atom, but splitting the scientists’ atom is a different sort of splitting than
the previous processes of splitting, such as from table to table-halves, or plant cells to
molecules. Splitting the scientists’ atom is the last split, since that splitting process
leads to items that are partless and not able to be further split, namely quarks and
electrons. As mentioned, I am going to show in a section below that items that do not
have parts can only be point-sized. For that reason, splitting the scientists’ atom can
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only be the splitting from DIV2 to DIV1: from items with surface and color, to items
that are unstructured and surfaceless. The quantum physicist will empirically witness
DIV2 splotches and dots on wall-screens and computer screens representing these
partless DIV1 items, but those representations are inaccurate since they are DIV2
extended items (e.g., a tiny patch of light appearing to be a millimeter across on the
computer monitor) that represent DIV1 unextended items. Since partless items can
only be points, the quantum scientist will know that the splotches and dots on
wall-screens and computer screens are not completely accurate: they represent
quantum atoms, but the representations have to be interpreted as approximations,
since they are meant to represent points, but do not appear as points when they
appear as splotches and dots on wall-screens and computer screens. For reasons just
given, ordinary empirical-material experience can only reveal the existence of
quantum point-atoms. In other words, if one merely inquires into the constitution of
the items of their ordinary empirical-material experience, they can only arrive at the
mereological nihilist thesis: the surfaces and colors of empirical-material reality can
only be shown to be in diametric opposition to its constituents, wherein one must
further ascertain which domain of reality is real, the surfaces and colors, or the point-
atoms. This article shows that the latter are real, and the former the fabrications of
conceptualizers.
2.4.4 DIV1 and DIV2 are the inverse of one another
The following table shows a summary of some of the details involved with the
polarity between DIV1 and DIV2:
DIV1 DIV2
Real Imaginary and conceptual
Invisible (not available to ordinary empirical experience) Empirical
Non-causal Causal
Does not involve surfaces and colors Involves only surfaces and colors
Objects are sizeless Objects have size
Immaterial Material
Quantum objects Non-quantum objects
Do not persist Persist
Coherent Paradox and antinomy
Simple Complex
It is important to remember that many of the ideas in this article are not necessarily
new, and other than the arguments against composite objects in this article (in Sects. 3
and 4 and in some of the footnotes), many of the ideas presented are not original. It is
only that this sort of philosophy is oddly out of favor in contemporary philosophy, and
it is supplanted by the realist-empirical (ordinary empirical) theories, which para-
doxically can only be given in terms of non-empirical and antinomous metaphysics. To
illustrate the long tradition of the sort of philosophy being articulated in this article,
consider a passage from Kant, where he is writing about Leibniz, and which illustrates
Kantian transcendental idealism, which is, as I understand it, very closely aligned to
the type-II dualist mereological nihilism (Sect. 2.3 above) of this article:
...space is in no way a property that attaches in itself to any thing at all
outside our senses. It is, rather, only the subjective form of our sensibility,
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under which objects of the outer senses, with whose constitution in itself
we are not acquainted, appear to us, and we then call this appearance
matter... The metaphysician was then free to composed space out of points,
and matter out of simple parts, and thus (in his opinion) to bring clarity
into this concept. The ground for this aberrations lies in a poorly under-
stood monadology, [a theory] which has nothing at all to do with
the explanation of natural appearances, but is rather an intrinsically cor-
rect platonic concept of the world devised by Leibniz, insofar as it is
considered, not at all as objects of the senses, but as thing in itself, and is
merely an object of the understanding, which, however, does indeed
underlie the appearances of the senses. Now the composite of things in
themselves must certainly consist of the simple, for the parts must here be
given prior to all composition. But the composite in the appearance does
not consist of the simple, because in the appearance, which can never be
given otherwise than as composed (extended), the parts can only be given
through division, and thus not prior to the composite, but only in it.
Therefore, Leibniz’s idea,... so far as I comprehend it, was not to explicate
space through the order of simple beings next to one another, but was
rather to set this order alongside space as corresponding to it, but as
belonging to a merely intelligible world (unknown to us [i.e., it is not
empirical and does not have a surface and/or color]). Thus, he asserts
nothing but what has been shown elsewhere: namely, that space, together
with the matter of which it is the form, does not contain the world of
things in themselves, but only their appearances, and is itself only the form
of our outer sensible intuition.104
Although amid the modern philosophical environment it is not common to find
anti-realist theorization of this sort, through the history of philosophy this trend
has been very prevalent, often even being the dominant philosophy of entire
cultures and eras. There are many examples, but a primary one I am emphasizing
in this article is the pre-Classical Indian Buddhist tradition, due to the fact that it
is so similar to the scientific philosophy of quantum abstract atomism. While the
point of this article is to discuss quantum philosophy and the evidence for
mereological nihilism, and not the commonalities mereological nihilism has with
subtraditions in Buddhism, it is perhaps worth noting that I don’t think I can hide
the obvious fact that there are deep similarities between mereological nihilism
and some aspects of the Buddhism of India. This is most apparent in the analysis
of the quantum abstract atoms, conceptualism, immaterialism (discussed below),
and the philosophy of DIV2 unreality that has been discussed in this subsection.
Consider this passage from Feldman in a recent article on the Buddhist, Vas-
ubandhu:
The inference from illusion appears at the beginning of the Vims´atik a here
Vasubandhu states:
This is consciousness only, because there is the appearance of non-existent
things, just as a person with cataracts sees non-existent hairs, moons, et cetera...
104 Kant (2004, 44–45).
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[This] is... a positive inference, designed to establish conclusively that external
objects do not exist... It follows from the appearance of these seemingly external
objects that they are merely appearances in the mind.105
And lastly, in considering philosophies that have similarities to mereological nihilism
due to the rejection of ordinary empirical reality (and other similarities), there are
few more relevant traditions than the one I am primarily concerned with in this
article than, of course, modern physics. Consider the following passage from one of
the world’s most famous physicists, in a passage about time, who so clearly points out
the level-headedness in rejecting, rather than accepting, the reality of ordinary
empirical experience in favor of scientific information:
Certainly... the feeling that time flows is deeply ingrained in our experience and
thoroughly pervades our thinking and language. So much so, that we have lapsed,
and will continue to lapse, into habitual, colloquial descriptions that refer to
flowing time. But don’t confuse language with reality. Human language is far
better at capturing human experience than at expressing deep physical laws.106
2.5 All DIV2 experiences are experiences of surface and color
that are constructions of consciousness
In the last part of this subjection, I will defend why above I made the claim that all
empirical conscious constructions that are (believed to be) about an external reality
are experiences only of surfaces and colors. I will consider that every experience a
human has about alleged ‘‘mind-independent’’ empirical reality is only an experience
of a surface and/or a color. Other philosophers have also described external
empirical experience this way, as if at least predominantly involving experiences of
surfaces and colors. Strawson writes:
You look out a window, and you see an armoured personnel carrier rusting
under a tree on the far side of a river. In such a case, you take in a spatially
distributed array of color patches... [T]he character of your experience is
fundamentally determined by your sense of position relative to other objects,
your immediate and automatic judgments of size, three-dimensional space, and
distance, and your equally immediate experience-conditioning deployment of
special concepts, like the concept of tree and water.107
I have not found an exception to this idea that all empirical experience constructions
of the supposed external world are experiences of surface and/or color (an ‘‘array of
color patches’’). A piece of glass is a surface that might not have a color, depending
105 Feldman (2005, 529).
106 Greene (2004, 142). Greene is writing this at the end of a discussion about the illusion of time-
flow in Einsteinian relativity, which mereological nihilism attacks. The point of giving this passage is
merely to show how commonplace it is in the domain of physics to reject and/or seriously question
ordinary empirical experience. It is interesting, however, to note how Greene does not mention that
time is metaphysical (outside of experience), as I discuss in 5.2—as if he is not aware of that issue (it
seems must humans are unaware that their experience of time is an illusory one). The findings in this
article (and of Grupp 2005a) attack both the idea that there can be something like time as a feeling
(of time-flow), and the time as a scientific item (such as with relativity theory).
107 Strawson (1994, 3–4).
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on the circumstances of the glass (how clean it is, etc.). Heat and sound are
empirically experienced by humans, but they are also instances of the DIV2-
experience of surfaces. With respect to sound, as far as the DIV2-experinecer can
know, it consists of the air-surface hitting the eardrum and which supposedly gives
rise to the experience of sound. This is surface experience: ear-drum is contacting
disturbed (sound-producing) air-surface in DIV2 reality. Experience of heat also is
the DIV2-experience of an air surface with certain properties contacting the surface
of the body.
In this article I am considering surfaces and colors as they are experienced. When
a person sees a cloud, they do so because witness a white surface and color patch in
the sky in their DIV2 experiencing. If it happens to be the case that they believe that
the cloud does not involve a surface, even thought the whiteness and surfaceness
is obviously witnessed in DIV2-experience, it is typically because the DIV2-
experiencer has been told it is not a solid item, such as if a science teacher told them
that the cloud is composed of vapor. But regardless of what they have or have not
been told, if they are going to have cloud-experience they will only experience the
cloud as a surface and/or a color, such as the white surface seen when looking at the
cloud in the sky. The DIV2 conscious constructions persons typically refer to as the
experiences produced by the five senses are all described in terms of surfaces and
colors. Smell is describable in terms of air surface hitting the inner nose surface.
Hearing is describable in terms of an eardrum hitting a disturbed (i.e. noise-pro-
ducing) air surface. Taste is describable in terms of the surface of food hitting the
surface of the tongue. Tactile experience is describable in terms of the interplay of
surfaces: skin surface to surface of a physical object. Sight experience is describable
in terms of the experience of colors and surfaces (light reflecting off of a surface). A
strong wind blowing on an autumn day pushes against our chest, and we say we feel
the air. It appears to be a necessity of any description of DIV2 experience of external
reality that such a description be given in terms of surfaces and colors. We cannot
understand reality, including the interaction of DIV2 bodies of reality, without
surfaces, extension, volume, and magnitude. Without these, we do not understand
how things can contact.
Some philosophers have suggested to me that the color-experience is not the
experience of a surface, but the experience of a wavelength of light that has reflected
off of a surface. In a similar vein, some philosophers have suggested to me that heat
is not the product of the air surface, but of the quantum particles of the body of air. I
do not consider this option, however, since in considering DIV2 I am only concerned
with reality as it is experience empirically, and external empirical reality is only
experienced as a surfaces and colors. As far as I know, there are no exceptions to this
rule. For example, even perfectly clear class (i.e. glass so clean that the surface is
invisible to the ordinary empirical observer), which is apparently a colorless surface,
will nevertheless only be experienced in DIV2 conceptual reality as a surface, such
as if it is touched, tasted, if sound is altered because it bounces off the clear glass.
On a side note, I find wavelength claim made at the outset of the last paragraph
very interesting. Those who have suggested these ideas to me also claimed to be anti-
reductionists. But to maintain that the feeling of heat, seeing a color, or the hearing
of a sound is due to quantum particles would appear to be a reductionist position,
since the macroscopic DIV2 effects are apparently the result of quantum particles
according to the wavelength claim, as if the heat properties of the air are only due to
particle motion, and thus is best describable in terms of quantum particles. And to
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maintain that color is the result of the experience of photons (quantum particles of
light) is also to have a macroscopic experience that is due to quantum effects. It
seems that anti-reductionists cannot maintain that macroscopic items can be
described in terms of quantum effects lest they be susceptible to reductionism.
Stroll claims that there are surfaceless things we frequently experience, such as
shadows, lightening, and rainbows. (Stroll 1988, 32) But I am not sure I under-
stand how this can be, as these seem to be mere DIV2 surfaces. My claim above
is that we experience all of external reality as surfaces and colors, and this
certainly holds for shadows, lightening, and rainbows. Shadows are experienced as
color patches of some area that is not as bright as the color patches of the same
material—say a piece of concrete—around it. So the shadow just appears to be
the DIV2 perception of concrete (surface) under darker lighting conditions. I
don’t see how that is not a surface, when a fluctuation in the level of light is all
that is at stake. If I have a bright room, and I make the light even brighter, just
altering the level of light in my DIV2 experiencing, the ordinary empirical
DIV2-experiencer will not maintain in that case that the brightness has given rise
to an alteration of the surfaces. So why is a shadow a different circumstance? As
for lightening, it is experienced as a white or golden line suddenly appearing in
the sky, which is perceived to have some thickness, and thus is perceived as a
surface due to that thickness. So lightening experience is surface experience.
Rainbows also are perceived as surfaces with striped colors, and as the cloud
example, we will only believe they are not surfaces if we are told they are
vaporous. Stroll also maintains that things like trees and cats do not have surfaces
(33–36). I think that what Stroll means is that there is not one DIV2-perceived
color patch that is a surface of these items (assuming one is looking up close
enough—from a distance, a crow will surely appear to have a smooth, continuous
surface with no variation, but up close this is not the case, since the details of the
feathers will become noticeable). This is true of almost any surface that is
witnessed in DIV2 experience: from a distance DIV2-experineced items involve
smooth and unbroken surfaces (the black crow from a distance), whereas if one
moves closer, details will appear (such as the feathers on the crow) and what was
considered a smooth unbroken surface will closer-up will be experienced to have
clumps of color patches, but where at the closer view, the clumps themselves will
then be viewed as continuous unbroken surfaces (example: a piece of the feather
that appears to be one color). In DIV2, the closer-up to an object we move in
our experiencing, the more the smooth patches will gain more detail and cease to
be smooth. Smooth patches will be revealed to involve separate clumped patches
which, in turn, appear smooth and continuous, until the observer moves in closer.
What is perceived at one scale as smooth and unbroken will be shown to be a
false view at a larger or smaller scale. Failing to recognize this relativity of DIV2-
perception experience gives rise to countless errors in academic work.
3 A new argument for the impossibility of composite objects
In this article I give several novel arguments for the non-existence of composite
objects. These arguments show that it is not only the case that quantum science gives
evidence for mereological nihilism, and reveals the existence of the nihilistic
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quantum abstract atoms, but philosophical reasoning does also. In this section, I will
first give the simplest argument for this thesis.
Composition is typically described to be something like this:
If a and b compose whole C, then it follows that a and b compose something,
and if they do then there is an entity (C) that a and b compose.
This description makes it appear that a + b „ C since, according to the anti-
reductionist assumption in the description, C is not just its parts (a and b); rather, it is
something more than the parts, and, ipso facto, a + b „ C. Another way to put this
issue is this: a whole that is made of parts cannot be fully describable in terms of
those parts lest reductionism ensue.
Consider the following diagram of object C, which is an object that is not
reducible to its parts, a, b, c, d.
Actually, according to traditional mereological account, C can be considered to
have five proper parts, a, b, c, d and the interrelatedness (part-whole) relation among
a, b, c, d, and C (call the interconnectedness I). In order to avoid reductionism, C
cannot be describable only in terms of these proper parts, since according to the anti-
reductionist, the whole is not identical to the parts. This is a standard way to consider
wholes in non-reductive metaphysics of objects, and in the philosophy of emer-
gentism. For example, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz write: ‘‘...as we have argued, a
material object in the ordinary sense cannot be identified with... a collection or
mereological sum.’’108 Putting the matter in different words, we can consider whole,
C, is not equal to the set of parts, [a, b, c, d, I]:
C 6¼ [a, b, c, d, I]:
Considering the whole as distinct from the parts is a standard position, as Wiggins
discusses, in a passage where rather than using the symbols ‘‘C’’ and ‘‘a’’, ‘‘b’’, ‘‘c’’,
‘‘d’’, and ‘‘I’’. he uses ‘‘T ’’ and ‘‘W’’:
a b 
c d 
Whole 
C, with 
quarters 
a,b,c,d 
Region e of 
C
108 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 79–80).
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A certain tree T stands (leafless, suppose) at a certain spot at time t1 and
occupies a certain volume v1 at this time t1. All and only v1 is also occupied by
the aggregate W of the cellulose molecules which compose the tree. Indeed it is
their occupation of v1 which precisely determines that the volume which the
tree occupies is volume v1. The tree T and the cellulose molecules W are thus in
exactly the same place at exactly the same time. Are they identical? Now
T = W only if whatever is true of T is true of W (Leibniz’ Law). It follows,
I think, that T = W only if T and W have exactly the same conditions of
persistence and survival through change. But self-evidently they do not.
Suppose T is chopped down and then dismembered and cut up in such a way that
no cellulose molecule is damaged. It seems that W then survives. And there is just
as much wood in the world as there was before. But T, the tree, cannot survive
such treatment. Conversely, suppose the tree is pruned and the clippings are
burned, or that it undergoes an organic change which destroys some of the
original wood cells. Then the tree T survives but W, the aggregate defined as the
aggregate of such and such particular cellulose molecules, does not survive.109
We can consider C in ways that are different than the set [a, b, c, d, I]. (Below I will
refer to this set of C’s parts as P, so that C „ P = [a, b, c, d, I]) If the whole (C)
cannot be reduced to parts, and cannot be describable in terms of parts, then the
whole is, in some sense, partless. The crux of my argument in this section, and which
I will give below, has to do with this issue of the apparent partlessness of C, which I
will focus on next.
If C is not only its parts (i.e., if reductionism is wrong), as just discussed, then in
some sense C is not composite (it is partless). In other words, a whole is a partless
item that is distinct from the parts.
I imagine that some philosophers will object to the idea that C is partless item,
since they may assert that C cannot be a true partless item, since, to the non-
reductionist, C is intended to be a whole that is more than its parts. It is whatever is
meant by ‘‘more than’’ that I am referring to when I maintain that C is a partless
item. If C > [a, b, c, d, I], then I do not see how I can avoid the conclusion that there
Emergent and non-
reducible whole C is 
partless. 
The parts, a, b, c, d, 
and I are parts. 
109 Wiggins (1997, 4).
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is something, call it CA, about C that does not involve [a, b, c, d, I]. And I do not see
a way to avoid the conclusion that whatever it is that is ‘‘more than’’ (CA) is truly
partless. I will come back to this idea that CA is partless in a few paragraphs, and
when I do I will find that CA is an impossible item, wherein objects made of parts are
impossible.
Reductionism involves the idea that composite object C is only its parts; call this
principle SR. The only way to avoid SR is to merely maintain ~SR, the negation of the
statement ‘‘C is only its parts’’, which is ~(C is only its parts). This statement can be
written it is not the case that C is only its parts, which we are calling ~SR. (~SR leads to
the conclusion that there must be partless item CA.) It appears that SR and ~SR
exhaust all the possibilities that there can be for C. But I have noticed that many
philosophers tell us that SR and ~SR somehow do not exhaust all the possibilities that
there can be for C, as if there is a middle between SR and ~SR. Instead, below we will
see an example of how they tell us that
A. a whole is not completely distinct from is parts, and
B. a whole is in some sense distinct from its parts.110
To see an example of this, consider a passage that is a continuation of the passage
given above from Wiggins. This passage represents the way anti-reductionistic phi-
losophers attempt to maintain that SR and S~R do not exhaust all the possibilities:
None of this is to say that T is something over and above W. It precisely is not.
The ‘‘is’’ of material constitution is not the ‘‘is’’ of identity. The tree is made of
(orconstituted of orconsists of) W, but is not identical with W. And ‘‘A is
something over and above B’’ denies A is (wholly composed of) B’’ or ‘‘A is
merely (or mere consists of) B.’’ If A is something over and above B, then of
course A „ B, but the proper point of saying ‘‘over and above’’ is to make the
further denial that B fully exhausts the matter of A. But W does fully exhaust T
and so T is not something over and above W.111
I will next show how this passage shows that Wiggins is maintaining both A and B
(and I will argue in the next paragraph that to do that is a contradiction). If we look
at Wiggins’s words, we see in the first sentence the assertion that, ‘‘None of this is to
say that T [the set of parts] is something over and above W [whole];’’ this is statement
A. (In line with what I wrote above, I do not see how this ‘‘over and above’’ is not a
reference to the aforementioned CA.) Wiggins’s third sentence involves the idea that
set of parts ‘‘is not identical with’’ the whole; this is statement B. Maintaining that
the whole ‘‘[not] over and above’’ its parts appears incompatible with the position
that the parts are ‘‘not identical with’’ the whole. To see why Wiggins’s passage
involves a contradiction, we only need to put these incompatible claims together in
one statement (which we can do since both Wiggins’s statements A and B are
descriptions of one whole):
C. A whole W is ‘‘[not] over and above’’ its parts, and the set of W‘s parts ‘‘is not
identical with’’ the whole.
110 To hold both A and B—as we will see with examples that anti-reductionists attempt to do
this—is to say that both anti-reductionism and reductionism are not correct. (A is an anti-reduc-
tionist statement, and B is reductionist.) This would be to maintain that ~R and R are admitted,
which leads to this: ~RR.
111 Wiggins (1997, 4).
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The problem can even appear more prominent if I paraphrase statement C. It
appears safe to paraphrase the first half of statement C, W ‘‘[not] over and above’’ its
parts, to read, nothing about W is found outside of its parts. And it appears safe to
paraphrase the second half of statement C, set of W‘s set of parts ‘‘is not identical
with’’ the whole, to read,there is something about W found outside of its parts. If I put
together these paraphrased halves of statement C, I get statement D:
D. Nothing about W is found outside of its parts, and there is something about W is
found outside of its parts.
D is an obvious contradiction. The contradiction is generated by attempting to
maintain that there is a middle between two statements that are negations of one
another: SR and ~SR.
From Wiggins’s first passage given in this section, we find that T „ W. But from
this second Wiggins passage just given, we find that T is not over and above W. It is
very difficult to understand how Wiggins wants us to interpret ‘‘over and above.’’
(He does not define it for us, and other anti-reductionistic philosophers also do not
define how a whole is not ‘‘over and above’’ its parts without reductionism follow-
ing.) It seems that ‘‘over and above’’ is merely a way to describe, in evasive terms,
that T is its parts W, but not in a way that directly says T = W. Consider the
statement ‘‘W does fully exhaust T ’’ in the last sentence of Wiggins’s second pas-
sage. How is this not to be interpreted as being identical to this statement: ‘‘to know
W means we know T ’’? I see no reason why these are not paraphrases of one
another, and if they are, then ‘‘W does fully exhaust T ’’ is a reductionistic position. If
it is reductionistic, then ‘‘W does fully exhaust T ’’ contradicts the position that T is
not over and above W, which is in the first sentence of the second passage, and
Wiggins’s position is impossible.112
And now for the problem surrounding the partlessness of CA. As discussed above,
CA is the aspect of Composite C that cannot have anything to do with the parts,
which is the something that is ‘‘more than’’ the parts. For that reasons, CA can only
be the wholeness of C. This wholeness, CA, must encompass all of C, fully coinciding
with all of [a, b, c, d, I], for if it did not, it would not serve as the wholeness of C’s
parts since there would be parts, such as b, that are parts of C but which do not exist
in the domain of the whole of C. If CA is distinct from its parts, this indicates that CA
coincides with its parts. But the whole does this in a way where the whole does not
exactly collocate with any of its individual parts. For example, if C is a sphere, as in
the diagram above, since part b is not the same size of the whole sphere, then
the whole sphere does not perfectly coincide with quarter b. In other words, CA and
b do not perfectly coincide. All of b coincides with CA, but not all of CA coincides
with b. But if that is the case, then a serious problem with CA can be pointed out,
which I will do next.
112 There is another way that philosophers try to explain C without maintaining that it is only its
parts, but which seems to involve serious problems. If the parts (P) of C are interconnected parts (IP)
and P ? IP whereby C = IP and C „ P, this may make it appear as of C is not reducible to its parts,
where I is the difference-maker. (It seems that William Vallicella has either advocated this position
in unpublished articles.) But this is of no avail, however, for the anti-reductionist, since I see no
reason why the interconnection (I), as just described, should not be considered a constituent of C (a
part of C).
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Each of a, b, c, d, and I entirely coincide with CA; but CA does not perfectly
coincide with a, b, c, or d (I will discuss why I does below). In the following analysis, I
will also now begin also discussing part e in the above diagram (which is approxi-
mately an eighth of C, approximately a half of part c). CA can be described by the
following statements:
S1: coincides with a,
S2: coincides with b,
S3: coincides with c,
S4: coincides with d,
S5: coincides with e,
S6: coincides with I.
In the diagram above, we saw that a, b, c, and d are quarters of CA, and e is an
eighth of C. Notice that, for example, a and b do not coincide, c and d do not
coincide, and e and b do not either. Considering e and b, e and b are not in each
other’s domains. The coincidence that each e and b have with CA are different sort
of coincidence they have with CA. This leads to the conclusion that b is not coin-
ciding with CA where e is coinciding with CA. From this I can maintain that
S6: b does not coincide with CA where e is.
Here is where the problem comes in. CA is partless and cannot have different parts
coinciding in different ways with different things (such as with parts b and e). If partless
CA is discussed, then only the entirety of CA can be discussed. Thus, if S1 – S6 are
statements that describe CA, CA involves contradiction and is impossible, as I will next
show, and since that means that all of CA must be at any of the parts of C, and at the
entirety of C. If all of CA must be at e, for example, as S6 indicates, then S7 follows:
S7: CA does not coincide with b.
CA is partless, and thus any statement about it can only describe the entirety of
CA, since there is no part of CA that can be discussed. Each of S1–S7 describe the
entirety of CA. But notice that, for example, S7 contradicts S2: putting S7 together
with S2 into a compound statement (we can do this since both S2 and S7 describe all
of CA, and we can combine them in one redundant statement that describes CA), we
get the following statement that describes CA:
S8: coincides with b and does not coincide with b.
S8 shows that C involves contradiction and is thus impossible.113
4 The impossibility of relations or contact between any entities
In the previous subsection I showed that composite objects do not exist. In this
section, I will however give much more evidence for this position by specifically
attacking the ways philosophers try to describe composite objects. Mereological
113 I imagine that mereotopologists will maintain that the mereotopological idea that entities are
seamless coincidences of boundaries can get around the problems just pointed out. Mereotopology
requires that the boundaries contact (‘‘contact’’ is the actual word used by mereotopologists), but the
reasoning I present in Sect. 4 shows that there cannot be any such contacting between coinciding
boundaries.
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ideologies are so firmly established in human DIV2 consciousness that I believe it is
worthwhile to explore the specific ways philosophers, mathematicians, and some
physicists attempt to describe objects as being composite in order to attack those
positions in the interest of mereological nihilism. The metaphysical ways that
philosophers, mathematicians and some physicists go about describing structured
reality enables and promotes a mereological model of reality, and enables theorists
to ignore quantum mereological nihilism. But, as we will see, their accounts are
entirely metaphysical. For example, consider this passage from Hoffman and
Rosenkrantz:
Our analysis of the... relation that unites the parts of a mereological compound
seems to answer the monadistic [i.e., nihilistic]... arguments [against the exis-
tence of mereological wholes]..., since our analysis of the ... relation appears to
have found the appropriate middle ground between the overly restrictive
monadistic account [nihilistic account]. (1997, 90)
I discuss in detail at various places in this article that relating is not empirical in
DIV2, and I show in this section that relating is impossible between any objects.
Contacting is empirical in DIV2 experiencing, but quantum physicists widely agree
that it is an illusion,114 and I will show through several arguments in this section that
it is impossible. Showing that these accounts are impossible leads to the position that
composite objects do not exist. I will also show that action-at-a-distance (AD) might
be believed to be a way to avoid these problems I point out regarding contacting
and relating, but in Sect. 4.4 I given a novel argument for what appears to be fatal
problems for AD. But before discussing problems with contacting and interrelating
of quantum abstract atoms, I will first discuss in detail the way that philosophers,
mathematicians, and some physicists assume that there are composite items by
assuming that parts touch or fasten or link to one another to give rise to wholes, or
by assuming that there are relations or connections between parts to give rise to
wholes.
4.1 How are wholes (allegedly) constructed?
When mathematicians, philosophers, and scientists discuss what they believe are the
mereological wholes of nature, such as a lion that is a collection of cells, a proton
that is a collection of quarks and gluons, a flock of birds, a galaxy, a beach, a portion
of empty space, a collection of books on a bookshelf, or a force or field (such as the
gravitational force or an electric field), they usually unconcernedly refer to these as
single things (composite items, mereological wholes), even though they are made up
of many other things (parts). Even when entities are considered that have distinct
parts that are obviously unattached (not directly touching), as in the case of galaxies,
flocks of birds and any particles that can be indirectly detected, philosophers and
physicists (and just about anybody else) nevertheless typically discuss such objects as
if they are single objects (wholes). The idea involved in mereological nihilism is that
if it can be shown that there are no interconnections between things, just as we can
easily see that there are no connections between the birds of a flock, and if there is
114 I have given many textual examples of this, but perhaps another is worthwhile. See Ford
(2004, 4).
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no touching between items, then there is no way that composite objects can
accumulate in any universe, and there is no way any universe can exist.
Those who describe material constitution and/or mereology unconcernedly as-
sume that the idea that an item made up of other items (a whole made up of parts) is
coherent, since a whole can exist due to
1. The touching or contact between the parts of the composite material object in
question can lead them to accumulate into a whole,115 and/or
2. The relationships or interconnections among the parts of the composite material
object in question can lead them to interlink so as to give rise to a whole.116
The following diagram illustrates each of 1 and 2, where position 2 is on the left
and 1 on the right:
Of course touching or contacting (point 1) could just be a type of relating (point 2
above), but it seems that philosophers and physicists often discuss these separately in
their research, and only very rarely make a specific point to tell us that touching is a
type of relatedness.117 For that reason, I too will discuss relating and touching sep-
arately as I have in points 1 and 2. Also, while 1 may merely be a specific variety of 2,
philosophers have often argued in a way where 2 need not be a specific variety of 1,
since philosophers typically have no problem considering that things that are not
touching can be related (as seen, for example, in the Hoffman and Rosenkrantz
Atoms/particles Connections 
between 
atoms or 
particles. 
Atoms or particles 
touch directly, to 
give rise to a single 
whole object that is 
over-and-above the 
touching parts. 
115 The concept of direct touching or contacting, such as when two physical items (are believed to)
touch one another, is a very dubitable position, and it is not endorsed by many physicists or phi-
losophers of physics. Lange writes:
...action by contact is not straightforward, I have just surveyed three ways of understanding two
colliding billiard balls as sharing a point, as separated by a point, and as momentarily forming a
continuous body. Each view encountered serious difficulties—perhaps not severe enough to prove
it false, but enough to be worrisome. (Lange 2002, 10)
116 For a nice discussion of this position (particles exist in relations to one another and thus give rise
to objects, such as the objects humans perceive in their daily life), see Merricks (2001), chapter 1.
117 Hudson (2001a) specifically points out that touching is a relation (p. 120). Also, Hoffman and
Rosenkrantz (1997, 84–86) appear to also point this out.
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passage just given, where they maintain that although subatomic particles do not
touch one another, they still can account for mereological wholes), such as, for
example, if two points in the manifold of space are at a distance from one another
but (are alleged to) share a relation (such as the topological relation connectedness).
Consider the following passage from Kline and Matheson that advocates
force-interaction without touching:
[The premise,] (1) A collision between two bodies involves their touching... is
highly dubitable. It is easy to imagine a mechanism for collisions whereby they
occur as the result of some short or long-ranged force. Thus two objects could
repel each other violently without touching, in the way that electrons repel
each other. While this situation makes perfect sense, it is not a mechanistic one.
According to collision mechanics, collision requires touching... To deny (1) is
to subscribe to some sort of field theory.118
They are asserting that objects can interconnect without touching: interconnecting
and/or relating does not have to be a way that objects touch or connect. There are a
few problems with this assumption, however:
a. Don’t forces have to contact and/or touch the particles they interconnect? Kline
and Matheson provide no account for this particle-to-force interaction as being
something other than touching or contracting. (Referring to force-connections as
being the means of interaction between particles, Kline and Matheson tells us ‘‘it
is easy to imagine [this] mechanism’’ but until we know how a field interacts with
a particle, it seems almost impossibly difficult to imagine two particles inter-
acting via a field connection.)
b. We will see in Sect. 5 below that forces have been discovered by scientists not to
be metaphysical items (such as metaphysical relations between particles, as
Kline and Matheson seem to believe is the case) but rather to be streams of
particles. So discussing particle interaction via forces or fields is ultimately
particle activity only.
There is no scientific evidence that DIV1 involves either 1 or 2, and there are
scientific reasons to believe they cannot.119 We will also see philosophical reasons
which show that 1 and 2 are impossible. Before going into specific argumentation
that shows that 1 and 2 are impossible. I will give examples of how philosophers and
physicists use 1 and 2.
In an interesting passage I will give next, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz demonstrate
both 1 and 2, showing how philosophers need 1 and/or 2 for a theory of mereological
composition. In this passage Hoffman and Rosenkrantz use ‘‘monadist’’ to be
synonymous with ‘‘mereological nihilist.’’ And this is a particularly interesting passage
since in it Hoffman and Rosenkrantz emphasize that we do not yet have a philosophy
of relations, such as part-whole relations, between particles, and they discuss com-
position as if there is no satisfactory account of composition we have available to us,
and we are still waiting for one to be given. Also, in this passage Hoffman and
Rosenkrantz interestingly do not consider that this is the case because there is no
account of composition, and because mereological nihilism is correct.
118 Kline and Matheson (1987, 510).
119 For example, the electron, one of the most common particles that (allegedly) makes up empirical
reality, cannot directly touch other particles, according to scientists. Davies (1984, 107–108).
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In the absence of a clear account of the relations which are commonly thought to
unite parts of material objects, the monadist might argue that two material ob-
jects compose a third object only if they are at a zero distance from one another.
The monadist [i.e., nihilist] could then appeal to the aforementioned implication
of modern physics, and conclude that the common belief that there are non-
fundamental material objects is mistaken. Given that there are particles (which
are indivisible), it would follow that such particles are the only material objects...
As we have noted, the commonsensical view presupposes that mereological
compounds and organic living things can be created or destroyed by assembly or
disassembly. Thus, the skeptical attacks of the monadist and the collectivist upon
the commonsense view can be answered if one can provide a satisfactory analysis
of the... relations that unify or organize the parts of mereological compounds and
organic living things which is consistent with this presupposition of the com-
monsense view. In particular, skeptical attacks of these kinds are answerable if
one can provide an adequate analysis of these relations that meets [at least this]
condition......[I]t must be less strict than the monadistic [nihilistic] view that two
things are united only if they are at a zero distance from one another.120
As for scientists, the standard way for chemists and physicists to consider fundamental
reality, like the aforementioned philosophers, is to consider particles as being in an
arrangement, where their arrangement gives rise to a composite object made up of those
arranged atoms, and where if the arrangement is changed, the composite object made up
of the atoms may be changed. Any college physics or chemistry textbook illustrates this,
where particles and molecules are typically drawn in diagrams like these:
We will see in Sect. 7 below that the forces between particles and which bind
particles have been discovered to be made up of unattached particles. But notice
that the center and left diagrams show continuous (unbroken) connections/lines
between the particles. It is these sorts of erroneous connections which foster
incorrect beliefs that lead people to imagine that molecules or scientific atoms are
mereological wholes. This is because these diagrams illustrate the particles as being
120 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 78–79). Markosian also writes on what appears to be 1 and 2,
and as if they are the only these two options (Markosian 1998b, 212). For further discussion of 1 and
2, see van Inwagen (1990, chapters 1–8). Some philosophers only discuss relating, apparently
believing contact or touching to be a subset of relating. Consider what Horgan writes about van
Inwagen on this issue and on van Inwagen’s philosophy of composition from van Inwagen’s book
Material Beings: ‘‘[van Inwagen’s] theory accommodates various plausible, deep-seated, beliefs that
many or most of us have about the world—such as the belief that... whether certain objects add up to
or compose some larger objects does not depend on anything besides the spatial and causal relations
... to one another.’’ (Horgan 1993, 693)
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interconnected, where the connections, which are drawn as continuous (unbroken,
not particle-like), directly touch the particles they interconnect. There is no evidence
in any experiment of physics or chemistry that shows that the forces between
particles (which is what these lines are meant to represent) are continuous-unbroken
connections (in fact we will see that it is quite the opposite). Notice also that in the
diagrams the particles have volume and size (and thus a surface and color), as if they
are tiny balls. This is a picture of fundamental reality that is closely aligned with the
billiard-ball reality of the mechanistic philosophers of the Enlightenment, and thus is
a picture of fundamental reality that is hundreds of years out date, having literally
nothing in common with contemporary experimental physics research. From what I
can tell, contemporary philosophers are virtually unaware that forces between
particles have been discovered to merely be unattached quantum abstract atoms (to
illustrate this lack of knowledge, consider how Swinburne writes that: ‘‘there is
nothing more to large-scale material objects except the fundamental particles and
the relations they have to each other’’121).
From what I can tell, position 2 is by far the more widely held position held by
philosophers, and by the decreasing number of physicists (typically non-quantum
physicists) who still happen to discuss reality or quantum reality in terms of relations.
Often relations-talk, for example, will exist in quantum theoretical physics (as
opposed to quantum experimental physics). Consider a passage from a recent article
on quantum mechanics by Jenann Ismael, a philosopher:
The heart and soul of quantum mechanics is contained in the Hilbert spaces
that represent the state-spaces of quantum mechanical systems. The internal
relations among states and quantities, and everything this entails about the
ways quantum mechanical systems behave, are all woven into the structure of
these spaces, embodied in the relations among the mathematical objects which
represent them... This means that understanding what a system is like
according to quantum mechanics is inseparable from familiarity with the
internal structure of those spaces. Know your way around Hilbert space, and
become familiar with the dynamical laws that describe the paths that vectors
travel through it, and you know everything there is to know, in the terms
provided by the theory, about the systems that it describes.122
As mentioned in the introduction, mereotopology has been developed as an attempt
to avoid problems with topology and mereology. But mereotopology also depends on 1
and 2 (specifically, on the touching of boundary points of extended objects,123 and the
121 Swinburne (1995, 395). I am grateful to Trenton Merricks for this passage.
122 Ismael ((2004)), section 1.
123 Mereotopology is a theory of boundaries. Barry Smith writes:
We wish... to capture the commonsensical intuition to the effect that boundaries exist only as
boundaries, i.e. that boundaries are dependent particulars: entities which are such that, as a matter of
necessity, they do not exist independently of the entities they bound... This thesis—which stands
opposed to the set-theoretic conception of boundaries as, effectively, sets of points, each one of
which can exist though all around it be annihilated—has a number of possible interpretations. One
general statement of the thesis would assert that the existence of any boundary is such as to imply the
existence of some entity of higher dimension which it bounds. Here, though, we may content
ourselves with a simpler thesis, one whose formulation does not rest on the tricky notion of
dimension, to the effect that every boundary is such that we can find an entity which it bounds of
which it is a part and which is such as to have interior parts. (Smith 1996, 295.)
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relation connectedness124), and thus if 1 and 2 are impossible as I will argue, then
mereotopology is also impossible, just as mereology and topology are.
In 4.2 I will show why contacting of any sort is impossible. Then in 4.3 I will
discuss why this reveals that relations or connections of any sort are impossible.
4.2 Fatal problems involving the alleged contacting of democritean atoms
4.2.1 Introduction
In 4.2.2 I show why it is only the alleged extended philosophical atoms (philosophical
atoms that have size but no parts) that are theorized to exist by some philosophers
and by some physicists that can be considered to touch or contact each other. Then
in 4.2.3 I will give a novel argument that shows that such extended atoms are
impossible, wherein it is revealed that contacting or touching is impossible. This
shows why there are no relations or connections between any items, which I show in
4.3. And in 4.4 I show why, despite what many philosophers appear to imagine to the
contrary, quantum physics does not involve the idea that quantum abstract atoms
touch or contact each another. I will show how the way that quantum physicists
discuss their research often hides this fact. As with nearly all the issues in this article,
this last point about the impossibility of touching and/or contacting will be shown to
involve noteworthy agreement between the philosophical reasoning and the data of
quantum physics.
Of those philosophers who allow touching and contacting between items into
their philosophy of reality, they typically refer to contact and touching between
particles as relations between the objects that are allegedly touching. I find it sus-
picious that touching and contacting are given in this case via a metaphysical
description, since as I pointed out above, and as I will more below, touching or
contacting is a very dubious philosophical issue, and it is usually when empirical
explanations do not exist and/or when paradox and antinomy are being covered-up
that a metaphysical description is invented in order give a description. Regardless,
I will show in 4.3 that relations do not exist. Empiricist-oriented philosophers, and
many scientists, may not engage in such ‘‘relation-talk,’’ and may not consider
touching and contact in the terminology of being ‘‘a relation.’’ (For example, I have
never read a relativity theorist assert that objects A and B are engaged in contact
because they share a metaphysical n-adic relational property, touching.) In addition
to attacking the metaphysical accounts of touching, in this section, I also show that
non-metaphysical accounts of contacting and touching are impossible. I imagine that
many philosophers and scientists will just believe contacting and touching as being as
simple as a finger touching the table: one surface contacts another, and there really is
not much more to it than that. I will attack that sort of undeveloped and plebian
account of touching and contacting because I can prove that there are no surfaces
that touch at the quantum level (Sect. 4.2.3), and if there are not, then there is no
124 See Cohn and Varzi (2003, 362–365). Also, consider what Pratt and Schoop have to say about
this:
Mereotopological calculi vary as to which primitives they employ, and the axioms they propose.
Clarke’s calculus has a single binary relation of ‘‘connection ‘‘with the gloss that two regions are
connected if they share a common point. Randall, Cui and Cohn also use a binary connection
relation, but take two regions be connected if their closures share a common point. (Pratt and
Schoop 1998, 622.)
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touching at all since a quantum level that involves no extension and no touching at
all cannot give rise to a macroscopic level that does involve extension and touching.
In this section, I will show why there is no contact or touching between any two or
more quantum abstract atoms. I will show this by showing that quantum abstract
atoms can only be point-sized whereby they do not have a surface, and without a
surface, there is no way they can contact or touch one another (and there is no way
that quantum abstract atoms can touch any other items, such as any metaphysical
items [relations, etc.] that metaphysicians might think up). It was pointed out above
that it is very suspicious to imagine that quantum abstract atoms can touch or contact
with each other or with any other objects. I will nevertheless imagine that there are
extended quantum atoms with surfaces in order to show that, toward reductio,
absurdities arise if it is postulated that atoms touch each other or touch any other
objects, so as to accumulate. There are two options for the quantum atoms: they
either have size or they do not. (Atoms not having size is what leads to the afore-
mentioned philosophy of immaterialism.) Atoms that can touch or contact one
another or any other items are those which (somehow) might have size (extended
quantum non-abstract atoms). Atoms that cannot touch or contact one another are
those that do not have size (unextended quantum abstract atoms). Next in 4.2.2 we
will see why only extended atoms can contact or touch other atoms (but only in the
aforementioned plebian and unphilosophical rough-and-ready way), but then in 4.2.3
I show that extended atoms are impossible, and thus there is no touching or con-
tacting between quantum objects.
4.2.2 Surface contacting and touching is the only sort of contact or touching
Why is surface contact or touching the only sort of contact or touching I am con-
sidering? Here is a summary of what I will argue in this subsection. Quantum ab-
stract atoms that do not have size, and if they are going to contact or touch each
other, they must exactly coincide with one another, and if that occurred, then they
would be coinciding points. But coinciding points are merely one point, and thus
touching and contacting between points never occurs, since points can only unify
with one another rather than keep their individuality in the act of contacting or
touching.125 I will next go through these issues in detail in order to clarify why
surfaceless touching or contacting is impossible.
4.2.2.1 DIV2 conceptualizers of surface and color In this subsection I will expand
on the discussion from sections above where it was found that all DIV2 empirical-
material experiences involve surfaces and colors. In other words, if a DIV2 con-
ceptualizer believes she witnesses something in her exteriority, it will only be a
fabrication of a concept of an item that has a surface and a color. In this subsection, I
will show that if an item is surfaceless, it must be a point, which is important to issues
later in this article.
125 This is why, as discussed in other footnotes, the particles of physics—which are points—are
observed (indirectly observed) to unify and amalgamate, rather than bump or collide with one
another, when they (appear to) have any sort of interaction with one another: two points cannot
bump or tap since they do not have surfaces, they can only unify and thus give rise to an entirely new
particle.
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Surfaceless items can only be points, and thus contacting or touching between
surfaceless items can only occur via point-sized items. The only accounts I know
of where philosophers attempt to maintain that surfaceless items are extended are
in two cases: vague objects like clouds or fog, and objects with scattered and/or
discontinuous surfaces like trees and lion fur. In this subsection, I will be con-
cerned with showing that this is incorrect, and each does not affect my position
that the only surfaceless items are points. Such objects as those just listed, I will
show, really do have DIV2 experienced surfaces (the fog is experienced as a
semi-transparent body with a hazy ‘‘edge’’), and/or they involve sub-surfaces (the
tree may be surfaceless, but the leaves aren’t), and we don’t have reason to
imagine that they do not.
I can explain my case for each of these by just focusing on the second account,
which I will do starting in the next paragraph. But first, as for the vague objects,
Sorensen (1998) elegantly argues that vague objects—objects with fuzzy, unsharp
boundaries (imagine the misty ‘‘edge’’ of a body of fog)—do in fact only have sharp
boundaries. The human DIV2 observer will only experience the vague object by
witnessing what surely appears to be a color patch, and thus a surface. The misty
body of fog will appear to the human observer via a color and a semi-transparent
surface. So it is unclear as to why these items are really surfaceless. Furthermore,
vague items like fog blobs do appear to interact with other items in the way that
other DIV2 items interact with one another, such as when the fog body will reflect
light, and thus one item (light) bounces off another. Also, if the fog blob extends
over a highway and a truck drives through it, it will surely appear that the truck has
interacted with the fog body—perhaps in much the same way a racing boat interacts
with water, producing a wake, eddies and swirls through the fog. For reasons just
given, I am not sure how the vague object, such as the fog blob, does not fit into
being an object with a surface.
I am considering the experience of surfaces and objects with surfaces differently
than the way some philosophers do, such as Stroll,126 where he holds the position
that many ordinary empirical objects (trees, clouds, dogs) do not have surfaces. I will
not be overly concerned with whether or not Stroll is correct on this (although some
of what I have to say will lead to the conclusion that he is incorrect), since that issue
is not extremely relevant in an article on mereological nihilism, which rejects all
mind-independent surfaces and colors, accepting them only as conceptual DIV2
phenomenological intentionalities. What I will be concerned with is specifically
showing that regardless of what Stroll says, all experience of externality in DIV2
consciousness are experiences of surface and color: there is never any DIV2
experiencing of (what is believed to be) an exterior item that is independent of being
surface experience. This is because DIV2 surface experiencing does not involve ex-
periencing of points or any extended non-surfaces.
First, Stroll’s position leads me to discussion of the fact that there is a level of
choosiness involved in what DIV2 human observers will consider a surface and
not a surface, and accordingly a mereological whole and not a whole. Surfaces
tend to be considered smooth and contiguous: if item p is experienced as smooth
and unbroken at moment m1, if at moment m2 it is experienced as unsmooth and/
or broken, the DIV2 conceptualizer will often believe a surface has either
drastically been altered, or perhaps as ceased to exist, even if only a curving or
126 1988, chapter 2.
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bending of the surface has occurred from the DIV2 perspective, or even if only
mixing or manipulating of the existing matter has occurred from that perspective.
For example, a plain crisp white piece of paper will often be considered to be
have surfaces from the DIV2 conceptualizer’s perspective. If one crumples the
paper up into a paper-wad, the same human that unconcernedly considered the
paper to have surfaces before the crumpling may have reservations about con-
sidering it to have surfaces after the crumpling. By manipulating the paper, what
was considered a single DIV2 surface from the ordinary empirical perspective
might not be considered a surface at all after the crumpling—even though all that
has changed about the paper is that it has gained some DIV2-perceived bends
and creases which were not perceived to exist before the crumpling, and even
though the paper’s surface before-and-after involves the same level of perme-
ability and continuity (unbrokenness) from the one moment (pre-crumpling) to
the next (post-crumpling).
Other items, such as two colors (say, yellow and green) of Play-dough that
have been swirled together into a smooth ball will be considered to involve either
two surfaces touching, or one uniform surface, depending on the level of mixing
that the DIV2-experiencer witnesses. If it is mixed weakly (such as only as much
as a Yin-Yang symbol involves mixing between the black and white fish of the
symbol), the DIV2-observer will likely maintain that the yellow and green are
distinct items that involve two surfaces touching, even if the two colors form a
smooth ball from the DIV2 perspective. With only light mixing of the clumps, the
DIV2-perciever will likely report that there are two contacting surfaces, but if the
yellow and green globs are mixed to the point where the distinction between the
yellow and the green becomes more complicated or even blurred, a person will
likely report that the Play-dough clump has one surface. By manipulating the
clump, two DIV2 surfaces can be considered one DIV2 surface, even though one
blob of Play-dough is smooth in either light or heavy mixing. So on this case,
colors of a surface could influence the DIV2 experiencer to make somewhat
arbitrary choices as to if surfaces are touching (light mixing), or if there is one
surface with varied colors (heavy mixing). A magazine cover with a picture and
with many different colors, or a smooth rock with many different colors—just like
the heavily mixed Play-dough clump—will likely be considered one surface by a
DIV2 human experiencer. But a magazine cover with one color also will be
considered one surface. So the cases where a surface is considered to exist or not
exist, or are considered to be one or more than one, are somewhat dependent on
the mere choices DIV2-humans make.
These points show how many of the surfaces that a DIV2 conceptualizer
perceives, and how one organizes their external experiences of surfaces and
colors, can vary and can be rather relative. Stroll is concerned with which items
we should call surfaces and which we should not, or which items have two or
more surfaces and which items do not. Due to the arbitrariness of such a task as
that, it seems a somewhat hopeless project, and I will show below that Stroll’s
account can only lead to confusion. It is a much safer project to merely accept
the arbitrariness of the DIV2 conceptualizer’s surface constructing in her ordinary
empirical life. This surface constructing is the only thing that any DIV2 perceiver
ever constructs about her external reality, for reasons I discuss at a number of
places in this article (such as above in Sect. 2.5 when I discussed how heat and
sound are only ways in which a DIV2 perceiver generates experiences of surfaces
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in her empirical-material states of consciousness). The idea is that if humans are
going to perceive anything in what they believe to be the ‘‘external world’’ in
their DIV2 experiencing, it will only be in the form of color(s) and/or surface(s),
and whether or not it is considered to be a mereological whole, or distinct
mereological wholes, is an issue for the seemingly somewhat random DIV2
consciousness construction, and not of real perception or philosophical analysis.
Stroll127 considers some DIV2 visible items, such as trees and clouds, to not have
surfaces (this only works if DIV2 perception of a tree is quite close to the tree, such as
within 100 feet of the tree, as we will see). The leaves are perceived to have surfaces
and thus the tree is a smattering of perceived leaf-surfaces. So if Stroll is correct, and a
DIV2 perception of a tree close enough to where it does not appear at all to be one
smooth surface, the DIV2 experiencer will nevertheless still only have empirical-
material surface experiences of the leaves. Trees are not surfaceless in the sense that
they are invisible to the DIV2 consciousness; rather, it is merely the parts of the tree
apprehended in DIV2 consciousness that one experiences as surfaces and
colors—when, that is, one is close enough to the tree to have these sorts of experiences.
There are in fact a number of questionable claims Stroll makes in his discussion
about clouds and trees not having surfaces. Consider this passage:
Surface-talk is not generally applied to certain three-dimensional entities,
including some of the epistemologies of the first half of the twentieth century
would have called ‘‘physical objects,’’ or ‘‘material things.’’ Among these are
clouds, ... dogs, some planets, trees, and persons...
Clouds are constituted by layers of gas and moisture and have a top layer.
But a cloud, like haze, doesn’t have a surface. Unlike a submarine, which
can come to the surface of a body of water, an airplane does not rise to, or
even above, the surface of a cloud. We see the tops of the clouds but not
their surfaces. One explanation for the withholding of surface-talk here is
that the objects with surfaces must have a certain density or compactness
before such talk is applicable; clouds are like most gases (argon, fog, he-
lium) in being insufficiently dense for surface-talk to apply. Clouds lack a
feature that solid objects, such as marbles, possess. In general, with respect
to these latter, when we come closer to them, so that we see them better,
we are able to discriminate some of their surface features more easily...
With clouds and other wispy entitles, we cannot do this, and this may be
another reason why we withhold surface-talk from such entities.128
Van Inwagen contradicts Stroll’s claim that surface talk is not applicable to the
aforementioned DIV2 objects (‘‘clouds, dogs, some plants, trees, and persons’’):
‘‘Some philosophers are happy to call clouds and forests and galaxies material
objects and others are not.’’129 Stroll’s claim that surface-talk ‘‘is not generally
applied to’’ some of the items he mentions is questionable. Stroll is concerned
with how people refer to surfaces and how they believe them to be, but if that is
the case, I have difficulty believing that most people—being good DIV2 experi-
encers—would tell me that the sun does not have a surface. If I consult average
127 1988, 33–38.
128 Stroll (1988, 33–34).
129 1990, 17.
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persons (who are DIV2 denizens) as to if the big white cloud in the sky has a
surface, I just can’t believe even 20% of them would say ‘‘no.’’ Even worse, if
gases are not surface-creating particle systems, then, for example, the sun would
have to be considered to have no surface. The same would go with planets, like
Saturn, which in the quote above, Stroll tells us are not prone to surface talk. It
seems that the problem with Stroll’s account is that in some cases he is trying to
give an account of the surfaces of many objects (Saturn, the sun, etc.) in terms of
particles, wherein those objects are in fact surfaceless. But, as this article points
out, doing that only will lead to the conclusion that there are no surfaces at all
(which is the mereological nihilist’s conclusion). If the goal is to understand how
people refer to which items have surfaces, rather than which chemical mixtures
can be scientifically found to have solidity, the latter will likely be outside of the
average person’s knowledge and outside their DIV2 conceptualizing since the
average person is not a chemist or physicist. Even scientists will refer to the
aforementioned objects as having surfaces: the sun-spot solar astrophysicist will
probably not have much trouble carrying out entire studies on sun-spot activity
without discussion of particle activity. So Stroll, at best, can only be claiming that
‘‘[s]urface talk is not generally applied to certain three-dimensional entities,
including... clouds,... dogs,... trees...’’can only be the discussion that some philos-
ophers or scientists are having. (But if that is the case, as will be shown in the
next paragraph, things get only worse for Stroll, since referring to macro-prop-
erties [surfacelessness] due to particle activities only can show that all macro-
entities are surfaceless).
Actual surface talk among the usage of scientists and ordinary people has to
do with the perceived gaps and/or bends in the DIV2 object perceived. For
example, few DIV2 experiencers will have a problem maintaining that the
ceramic plate or the smooth ocean—both viewed relatively up-close—have a
single surface, since there are few if any perceived bends or gaps that are not
extreme enough (as was the case with the crumpled paper) where they evoke the
DIV2 perceiver to not refer to the plate or ocean as having surface. But if the
plate is shattered, the gaps created in the plate will lead people to maintain that
the plate’s surface has been destroyed; or if a storm emerges on the ocean and
large choppy waves emerge, many DIV2 experiencers will want to maintain from
the same close-up perspective that the jerky ocean is no longer a single surface,
or a surface at all, due to the countless bends and kinks in it (this is like the
paper crumpling example). Stroll maintains that a cloud is gaseous, and I take
him to mean that it does not bounce off of other objects in the way that liquids
and solids do. (As with the discussion of heat in a previous subsection, this
explanation of a cloud is a reductionistic explanation: the DIV2 macroscopic
properties of clouds are described in terms of molecular or atomic properties.
And it is interesting that this reductionistic position is the same position I argue
for in this paper: objects do not have surfaces because they are composed of
particles that do not touch or attach. Regarding Stroll’s account, the question is:
Why does Stroll choose to apply this reasoning only to the microscopic-level nature
of a cloud, but not to, for example, the submarine’s metal?) All Stroll does is
discuss differences in density—which can only mean particle density—in the case
of gas versus solid or liquid as accounting for an object’s having or not having
macroscopically perceivable surface. Stroll takes such surfaces to be explained in
terms of the penetrability of the gas or the liquid and/or the manners that the gas
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can bump against a liquid or solid item (the plane can’t float on the cloud but the
submarine can float on the ocean), where apparently it is significant that gases
might be considered more penetrable and less ‘‘bumpable’’ than solids or liquids.
(Consistent with what I claimed above, in DIV2 consciousness construction, this
however is just dependent on a certain point of view. The plane is penetrable
with respect to a bullet, but not with respect to a bird or cloud. And the cloud is
penetrable with respect to a plane, but not with respect to the light of the sun
which is reflected off of the cloud.) I do not see anything here that indicates why
the particle view has anything to do with the construction in consciousness of a
DIV2 macroscopically perceivable surface, since particles in chemistry in the
states of gas versus liquid or solid are in fact merely a product of the quantum
abstract atoms: how quickly particles are found to change positions with respect
to one another (i.e., how fast they are moving), and in either case, of gas versus
liquid or solid, there are merely just the moving particles, period. (Note, however,
that is it unknown how quantum states of matter—solid, liquid, gas, plasma—can
give rise to actual surfaces and surface experience.) So why, specifically, there is
the claim that one leads to a surface and the other does not, is irrelevant, and it
seems a feeble attempt to do what Stroll is really intending to do: merely talk
about the macro-experience of surfaces. We already saw that the case of the tree
is not a reference to surfaceless experiencing. Stroll is using the idea that, for
example, trees and clouds involve interstices, but in the former humans do not
typically see them or think of them, and will refer to a cloud’s surface. And in
the case of the tree, humans will merely refer to the surfaces of the leaves since
they can clearly see the interstices between the leaves. So it appears that how
humans are looking at things in DIV2 conceptualist experience, and if they can
see gaps between surfaces, will it be concluded that objects have surfaces or not.
If the same tree-observing human steps into a plane and looks at the forest from
10,000 feet up, she will likely refer to the forest as having a surface, associated
with her experience of the somewhat smooth green continuous earth’s surface. So
in looking at actual language usage, rather than an abstract idea, we can see that
Stroll’s claims fail. Based on what has been written here, I reject Stroll’s account
of surfaces and surfaceless visible items (trees, etc.), in favor of my simpler
account: we define surfaces by (1) actual DIV2 experiencing of them, and by (2)
how people refer to them in their actual language usage.
From what has been discussed in this subsection, I am not sure how there can
be any surfaceless extended items in DIV2 reality. If an item is surfaceless, it is
unextended: a point. The supposed surfaceless items in DIV2 reality that Stroll
mentions are either scattered objects (trees) that have surfaced parts (and thus
ultimately involve surfaces in DIV2 consciousness), or they are vague objects that
are visible with surface and color, and thus I am not sure how those are not
surfaced items. Often philosophers will maintain that items need not have sur-
faces to interact, such as with the magnet pulling the metal at-a-distance, or with
the stars in the galaxy allegedly interacting without contacting in order to give
perceived shape the galaxy. But these are clearly quantum mechanical effects
involving surfaceless particles, which do not touch, contact, or relate,. And thus
those quantum mechanical descriptions are not harmful to the reasoning of this
article. From what I have given, it appears that there are no extended unsurfaced
items in DIV2 reality, and if an item appears in DIV2 reality to the DIV2
conceptualizer, it will have a surface.
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4.2.2.2 Contacting quantum atoms can only be one atom For reasons I will explain
in the few paragraphs, quantum abstract atoms that contact or touch can only lead to
the amalgamation and identity of the quantum atoms.130 This would prevent there
from being any sort of contacting or touching between quantum atoms. There would
not be two items contacting or touching, and the quantum atoms involved would not
remain individually ‘‘themselves’’ throughout a contact/touching interaction. Point-
sized quantum atoms, call them A1 and A2, when involved in what appears to be
contact or touching, in doing so, actually coincide and compose one quantum atom.
(Any distance between A1 and A2 means there is a gap between them.)
In discovering that contacting or touching of partless point-sized quantum abstract
atoms does not occur, this will also reveal that composite point-sized quantum
abstract atoms do not exist. If A1 and A2 are partless, then touching or contact
between them involves the touching or contact of the ‘‘totalities’’ (their ‘‘entireties’’)
of each of A1 and A2. A partless point can only be considered an undifferentiated
oneness (I will consider an objection to this in the next paragraph), for lack of a
better term. Two contacting or touching undifferentiated onenesses that are con-
tinuously integrating (contacting, touching) does not reveal anything but a single
undifferentiated oneness upon that continuous integration: the contacting or touching
of A1 and A2 would not result in anything but undifferentiated oneness. The item
that comprises their continuous integration (contacting, touching) is also an undif-
ferentiated oneness. Twoness cannot emerge out of undifferentiated oneness,
difference cannot emerge out of non-difference, and thus the merging of undiffer-
entiated oneness A1 with undifferentiated oneness A2 leads to a single undifferen-
tiated oneness (A1 = A2) since the points are identical upon merging. In other
words, the touching or contacting of the entirety of two partless, unstructured,
collocated, point-sized quantum abstract atoms also gives rise to a point-sized,
unstructured, partless, point-size quantum abstract atom. For these reasons, quantum
abstract atoms that supposed touch or contact in fact do not involve a process of
touching or contacting, and instead only involve an indistinguishability.131 If that is
the case, and if the quantum atoms unify and amalgamate into just one undiffer-
entiated oneness at the moment of their supposed touching or contacting, rather
than remaining distinct individuals throughout the process, then contacting and
touching between point-sized quantum abstract atoms does not exist, and rather,
amalgamation, unification, and identity occurs instead: there was first the appear-
ance of two atoms, but then only one.
I imagine that some philosophers may assert that some sort of property mereol-
ogy could get around this issue, since with property mereology one can maintain, for
example, that point A1, although partless and unstructured (it has no pieces that are
130 Of course, the quantum abstract atoms were indistinguishable before amalgamation, for reasons
discussed in Sect. 1 about the indistinguishability of quantum abstract atoms. But as I also said in
Sect. 1, I have no choice but to discuss quantum abstract atom as if they are not one (but rather are
many), since the ordinary materially oriented human conceptualizer will be conditioned by their
language and thought development in DIV2 reality to believe that non-coinciding quantum abstract
atoms are not one, but are more than one. The point of what has been just brought up in this first
sentence of this subsection is that ‘‘touching’’ and ‘‘contacting’’ among quantum atoms does not
occur. Rather, what occurs, as explained elsewhere in this article, is first there will appear to be two
quantum atoms that are about to contact or touch, and then upon touching, there is one. Touching
and contacting is never in fact witnessed; only amalgamation is.
131 Other philosophers also come to this conclusion, such as Lange (2002, 6–7).
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not identical from the single improper part), it however has a mereological structure
and thus has an individuality (haecceitism) that is distinct from A2’s.
132 If this is the
case, the haecceitism of A1 and the haecceitism of A2 allegedly would remain dis-
tinct upon the coincidence of points A1 and A2, and thus A1 and A2 can allegedly
share a part-whole relation upon their coincidence thus giving rise to a composite
point-sized item that is ‘‘more than’’ either of the point-parts A1 or A2.
133 But this
objection is of no avail, since the haecceitism itself must contribute to the contacting
of A1 and A2: the haecceitisms of A1 and A2 are what are actually doing the con-
tacting or touching: if the points really contact, it must be that the thisnesses of these
items are that contact. Now these haecceitisms are surely without haecceitisms of
their own, lest an infinite vicious regress ensue (the steps to complete the task of
providing thisness to either A1 or A2 is never completed). Therefore, if it is alleged
that the haecceitisms of A1 and A2 remain distinct during the contacting of A1 and
A2, these haecceitisms, which are haecceitismless points, and which are partless
and unstructured, appear to involve the contacting of undifferentiating onenesses,
and thus appear to unify and become identical upon contacting, given the reasoning
in the previous paragraph about the contacting or touching of undifferentiated
onenesses.
A philosopher may wish to object and to maintain that thisness is not actually the
item doing the contacting or touching, but rather it is a property that the item has,
and thus it is not the thisnesses that contact, but rather it is the items that have the
thisnesses that contact. This account is a bare particular account, since this account
requires us to consider properties to be distinct from their property possessors.134
(If they weren’t distinct, we would again be talking about the touching or contacting
of thisnessless thisnesses.) And on such an account, then if the point-sized items
touch or contact, it would be a ‘‘touching’’ or ‘‘contacting’’ of two bare particulars.
But the touching of two bare particulars—where we are really considering only a
bare (propertyless, ineffable) item, the so-called propertyless ‘‘inner nature’’135 of a
substance—is merely the touching of two undifferentiated onenesses, which cannot
give rise to a composite since they would only amount to one undifferentiated
132 French describes thisness as follows:
Alternatively, the individuality of an object has been expressed in terms of its ‘haecceity’ or
‘primitive thisness’ (Adams 1979). As the name suggests, this is taken to be the primitive basis of
individuality, which cannot be analysed further. However, it has also been identified with the
notion of self-identity, understood as a relational property (Adams ibid.) and expressed more
formally as ‘a = a’. Each individual is understood to be identical to itself. This may seem like a
form of the property-based approach we started with, but self-identity is a rather peculiar kind of
property. (2006, section 2)
133 Only the mereological relation would make the whole more than the point-parts. But recall in
Sect. 3 how I mentioned that it is unclear how this composite is more than its parts. Only the relation
is more than the parts, but how is the relation not a constituent of the whole? It seems it is since it fits
all the criteria: contributes to the make up of the whole (just like any of the other parts), coincides
with the object in question (just like any of the other parts), and if it did not exist, the whole would
change (or go out of existence) since it would go from being W1 to W2 (just like any of the other
parts). If the relation is merely a constituent of the whole, then this leads to whole = three (and the
rejection that whole > parts), which is the eliminativist position.
134 The alternatives to this thin/bare particular account are the thick particular account or the bundle
theory, both of which I attack in Grupp (2006a).
135 Moreland (2003, 3–4).
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oneness, as discussed two paragraphs back. (These issues are discussed in much more
details in Grupp (2006a).)
The reasoning of this subsection and of 4.2.2.1 reveals that if there is to be
touching, or contacting between items, such as atoms, they have to have a surface by
with to touch other items. And in order to have a surface, they therefore must have an
extendedness (magnitude). I will next discuss atoms that are extended. At other
places in this article, and following others, I have called atoms that are extended
Democritean atoms (rather than calling them abstract [immaterial] atoms, which
would not make sense if extended objects are material objects). In order to discuss
touching between atoms we must discuss Democritean atoms. Democritus’s atoms
(somehow) have an irreducible size (an indivisible, uncuttable and partless spatial
magnitude) and thus a surface called Democritean atoms. The only way atoms can
touch is if they have magnitude and thus a surface.
4.2.3 The impossibility of atoms contacting, touching, attaching, or abutting:
an argument against democritean atoms
4.2.3.1 The impossibility of non-coinciding atoms contacting, touching, attaching, or
abutting The Democritean position for quantum atoms appears to be, from what I
can tell, less widely held than the point-particle position. But it has a reasonable
following, and it seems to be something like the position held by Planck-scale
physicists hold. To give an example of philosophers who advocate the Democritean
position, consider a passage Hoffman and Rosenkratz, who argue for this position:
...there are sufficiently strong empirical reasons to affirm the existence of
voluminous atomic particles, for example, Democritean atoms in the form of
electrons and photons. We doubt that there is at present any good empirical
evidence for the existence of point-particles.136
In this section, I will assume that there are such Democritean quantum atoms in
order to attack the position, showing that the contacting or touching between such
supposed atoms is impossible (we don’t need to worry about their interconnected-
ness given what was argued for in 4.3). I will carry out my attack by presenting a
novel attack against Democritean quantum atoms which shows that they do not exist.
4.2.3.2 Half-less spheres137 Consider the following two statements which describe a
Democritean atom:
S1: There are no pieces of the atom that are smaller than the entirety of the atom.
S2: There is only one (improper) part of the atom, and that is the atom’s entirety.
136 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 151). Hoffman and Rosenkratnz attempt to describe a Dem-
ocritean atom (extended atom) as having parts by defining a new concept of parthood, and where
they call the ‘‘parts’’ of the atom non-substances (51–52). But from what I can tell, it is merely an ad
hoc attempt to get around problems to do with extended atoms, and at any rate, if one merely
applied the reasoning given in this paper about extended atoms to their ‘‘composite atoms,’’ that
would only reveal their ‘‘non-substance’’ parts of their atoms to be in fact real parts. Also, the
reasoning in Sect. 3 of this article would do away with such ‘‘composite atoms.’’
137 The material in this first subsection (4.4.1) was developed to some degree with Christian Nal-
lenweg of Indiana University Northwest.
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Even though an observer can see with her eyes that there are sections of the atom (if
she could see extended atoms), such as a top and bottom, nevertheless there is nothing
smaller than the atom. If statements S1 and S2 are true, then there are no real items
that are referents of the following statements, ‘‘half of the atom,’’ ‘‘one quarter of the
atom,’’ ‘‘a point inside or on the surface of the atom.’’ Imagine that the atom is a
sphere (what shape the atom is, is irrelevant here, and any shape could be considered).
If it is, then it is a sphere that does not have, for example, two halves, if statements of
the sort just given (‘‘half of the atom,’’ ‘‘one quarter of the atom,’’ ‘‘a point inside or on
the surface of the atom.’’) do not have referents. If the halves or hemispheres are
merely mental concepts, and not real elements of the Democritean sphere, then we
have a sphere without halves or hemispheres. But a sphere (since we are considering
the atom to be a sphere at the moment) without real halves or hemispheres is not a
sphere at all. Another way to put the matter is as follows. We cannot think of a partless,
halfless, and hemisphereless sphere as having a radius, due to the fact that a radius is a
ray drawn from the center (which is a part that it seems any sphere must have) to the
edge of the circle, and if we are not allowed to talk about the parts of the sphere, then
we cannot mention the center of the sphere from which the radius can be considered.
So if S1 and S2 are the case, then we have a radius-less sphere, which is an absurdity.
None of these parts—center, radius, half, hemisphere, etc.—of the sphere exist and
none of them can be discussed, but if that’s the case, this is not a sphere at all, and a
spherical Democritean atom is impossible. Similar reasoning could be given for
Democritean extended atoms that have other shapes.
4.2.3.3 Sizeless Distances But is a radius, center, or hemisphere a real proper part of
the sphere? Or are these just concepts in the mind, representations of how a person
might think about a sphere, including a partless Democritean quantum atom that is
theorized to be the shape of a sphere? An observer could clearly see halves, a center,
or quarters and so on of the Democritean quantum sphere (if one could see inside the
Democritean sphere, such as if it were semi-transparent), but in the end it may be that
they are no more than the mind erroneously clumping off bits (imaginary parts) of the
atom—bits that do not exist—assuming they are parts when they are not. Another way
to put this objection is as follows: If there are partless, extended atoms, one can’t use
mathematical concepts, since (most) mathematical descriptions will involve any objects
(spheres, triangles, fractals, etc.) that are composites. (For example, in topology
extension is considered to be a continuum of interrelated points, where the points are
parts.) So radius, half, hemisphere, etc. correspond not to actual parts or the atom, but
to thoughts one might have about the imagined parts of the atom. According to this
objection, it is the use of language, using terms such as ‘‘radius’’ and ‘‘half,’’ that make
it appear that the Democritean quantum atom has segments that can be discussed, but
if we merely choose different set of statements to describe the atom, the parts talk does
not emerge, such as these statements describing the Democritean atom. Critics of the
argument against Democritean atoms just given above will therefore likely argue that
I did not discuss an actual Democritean atom since I described the atom in mathe-
matical terms. Rather, objectors may assert that I am discussing my ideas about what
the Democritean quantum atom is like, which do not denote any mind-independent
characteristics of the Democritean quantum atom; I am creating a false idea of what
the Democritean atom is like and attacking that idea. Rather, I must describe the
Democritean atom non-mathematically and in a way where no person can concep-
tualize it to be other than an undifferentiated oneness. If this objection is correct, I must
123
Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386 321
consider a Democritean atom without using the terms ‘‘radius,’’ ‘‘half,’’ ‘‘left side,’’
‘‘right side,’’ and so on.
I will next discuss serious problems with Democritean quantum atoms which do
not involve any mathematical terms whatsoever, and which can be articulated only
in terms that involve the Democritean atom as being an undifferentiated oneness.
I will only use the concepts of size and distance. Size is the hallmark of a
Democritean atom. I will consider ‘‘size’’ to not strictly be only a mathematical term.
I will consider size also to be given in terms of distance, and I will also explain why
‘‘distance’’ is a pre-philosophical term, rather than a mathematical term, and thus
one that I can use which avoids the above objection.
Before getting to these terms, and before explaining why they are not
mathematical terms, first I will explain as briefly as possible what I will do in this
section to argue that Democritean quantum atoms do not exist. Democritean atoms
have size, and I will argue that the concept of size can only be coherent if two objects
do not overlap and are at a distance from one another—call them seg1 and
seg2—but then I will show that any Democritean quantum atom cannot have seg1
and seg2 and thus cannot have size: there are no Democritean quantum atoms.
Distance is a concept apprehended in the mind regarding items that do not
perfectly coincide. The mind apprehends separate bits of matter, and by their being
non-collocated, they are then believed by the mind to involve a third element: a
relationship of distance between the bits of matter. (Metaphysical and other realists
Spheroid 
Democritean
atom
The mind conceptualizes
seg1 and seg2 of the 
Democritean atom in order 
to conceptualize a distance 
across the partless atom
Distance between seg1 and 
seg2.
Seg1 Seg2 
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will likely maintain that this relation is a real mind-independent item in reality
interrelating the non-coinciding items.) For these reasons, if a Democritean atom
involves distance—which it must since it has size—the mind must be able to con-
ceptualize bits of the undifferentiated oneness (the atom)—even if they are only
ways of thinking about the Democritean quantum atom, and not real proper parts of
the atom—in order to consider distance, and therefore size. If there are no bits of the
undifferentiated oneness that the observer can witness, and witness them as if they
are at a distance from one another, in order to perceive distance and size—i.e., if all
perceivable and conceptualized regions of the undifferentiated oneness that the
mind can consider when observing the atom, even though they are not real parts, but
are conceptual parts—then there is no distance between the ‘‘bits’’ of the undif-
ferentiated oneness. So only if there are conceptually separable bits of atom to
consider, there is no way to theorize that the undifferentiated oneness has any
distance.
Some philosophers may object to this definition of distance, since there certainly
can be distance when there are no objects present, such as in the void of space where
there are cubic meters with no particles. But this is nevertheless a definition of
distance in terms of objects, and the objects in this case are points of space. It just
happens to be empty space (space without any occupants), and is therefore distance
between objects.
Next, let’s define the concept of size as follows: any item, such as an atom, has size
if it is not a point atom, and if it has an extension that has a distance across it.
(Any definition of distance—metaphysical realist conceptions, etc.—will do for my
purposes of this argument below.)
My objectors will likely maintain that these seg1 and seg2 are concepts, and not
real physical parts of the atom, since, regardless of whether or not the mind can
conceptualize bits of the atom that appear at a distance from one another, there is
nothing real that corresponds to them, and such concepts are erroneous and cannot
generate theories about real existent items. I of course cannot object; but this only
helps my case, for the following reasons. The problem is this: if that is the case, and
there are no real mind-independently existing seg1 and seg2 parts of a Democritean
quantum atom, then it leads to the conclusion that there is no distance across the
Democritean quantum atom. Above we saw that distance requires that there be items
that actually exist in a non-collocated manner, wherein there can be spaciousness
between them. But if a Democritean atom does not have such parts existing in a non-
collocated manner, then a Democritean atom does not have distance and therein no
size: it is a point. The imagined seg1 and seg2 do not exist since there is only the
whole, which is one improper part that itself has no parts. If that is the case, then there
are no items that can be considered to be at a distance from one another, and without
those, we can only consider the distance and size to do with the atom to involve non-
existent items that are at a distance from one another, which is an absurdity—anal-
ogous to discussing the distance between two round squares. If what has been written
is correct, I will next discuss that another statement (S3) must be false:
S3: There is a real mind-independent span of size across the Democritean atom,
since size involves distance.
S3 is false is because distance, as just defined, involves bits of ‘‘stuff’’ that does
not coincide, but a Democritean atom is undifferentiated and there are no
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distinct stuffs ‘‘inside’’ of it. If that is the case, then there is nothing ‘‘within’’ the
Democritean quantum that is at any distance from anything else, and thus a
Democritean quantum atom cannot involve distance across it—hence S3 is false.
In other words, to have real distance, there must in fact be distinct bits of ‘‘stuff’’
not collocated, but a Democritean quantum atom, does not involve any distinc-
tions whatsoever. There are no differentiated ‘‘stuffs’’ that can be described as
‘‘at a distance from each other’’ in a Democritean quantum atom since the
Democritean atom is only one undifferentiated being. Since there is no way to
define distance at all with respect to a Democritean quantum atom, then the next
statement (S4) follows:
S4: There is no mind-independent distance across the Democritean quantum atom
and thus the Democritean atom has no size (and is a point)
I will next address a few more objections to the reasoning given in this subsection.
The argumentation rests on their being distinguishable items that are at a distance
from one another. Even though the Democritean atoms is supposed to be a seamless
undifferentiated oneness, perhaps there could be indistinguishable bits the Democ-
ritean atom that are at a distance from one another, just as quantum abstract atoms
can be indistinguishable but not coinciding. This objection however clearly fails since
there cannot be bits of the Democritean atom ‘‘inside’’ of the atom, whether they are
distinguishable or indistinguishable. (In the next subsection I will ignore this and
imagine that somehow Democritean atoms can have indistinguishable innards in
order to further explore this objection.)
Another objection can be goes as follows: Why must we define distance in terms
of items? Why can’t we merely define distance as the mere irreducible expanse across
the undifferentiated oneness of a Democritean atom, where its distance is just that
very oneness? On this account, distance is defined in terms of unstructured, primitive
expanse of oneness, rather than in terms of the non-coincidence of, or the expanse
between, some item p and some item q. This objection avoids reference to any ‘‘bit’’
of the Democritean atom that is not the identical to the entirety of the atom, or to
the ‘‘inside’’ of the Democritean atom, as all of the above accounts did. On this
account, a Democritean atom just has an irreducible size, no reference to innards is
made, and there is nothing more to assert than that.
This account may involve problems, however. As just maintained, the specific
point of this objection is to maintain that it is an account of distance that does not
involve distance between or among any two objects. If this is the case, then, distance
here is not distance between or among any items, which takes us back to the original
problem given above regarding the distance between seg1 and seg2 of a Democri-
tean atom: this distance is not between any two items, but since it is a distance, it is
thus is a distance between non-item and non-item—a ‘‘distance’’ between nothings.
How can nothing be at a distance from nothing? What can be said about nothing?
There is no sentence that can denote it, and thus maintaining that nothing is at a
distance form nothing is to give nothing properties, which would indicate that it is
something, not nothing—and that is a contradiction. Furthermore, nothing is no-
where, and is thus not proximate to anything, and nothing is not at any distance, or
next to, or beside, or 8 light years from, anything at all. According to this objection,
there appears to be no distance at all if the objection involves the position that
nothing is distant from nothing.
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4.2.3.4 An objection: entendedness I will next discuss an objection proponents of
Democritean atoms may convey. Consider the concept of entendedness, as defined
by Parsons:
Entended = df an object x is entended if ‘‘x is a material object that is wholly
and entirely located at a non-point-sized region, r, and for each proper sub-
region of r, r*, x is wholly located at r*.’’138
The reason I bring this up here is because some philosophers may imagine that a
Democritean atom apparently is an entended object, and if it is, it certainly would
get around the arguments above. Entendedness may be considered an attractive
philosophical principle for Democritean atomism because with it we may discuss
‘‘regions’’ of a Democritean atom, and therefore distance across a Democritean
atom, without S4 ensuing.
In what follows I will show that the concept of entendedness is impossible. Fol-
lowing Parsons’ definition of entendedness, a Democritean atom, D, can be con-
sidered to be entirely located at the topological region, T, it is located at; call the
atom from this perspective DA. Also, D can be considered to be entirely located at
any of any point-sized locations of the T; call the atom from this perspective DP.
Also, D can be considered entirely located at one quarter of T; call D from this
perspective DQ.
There are several problems here. First, notice that if we follow Parsons’ definition of
entendedness, then D = DP = DQ = DA. Now notice that DP is unextended, and DA
and DQ are extended. But if that is the case, then to maintain that DP =
DQ = DA is to maintain that a point-sized object (DP) is identical to a non-point-sized
object (DQ or DA). But if a point-sized object, in this case, D, is identical to a non-point-
sized object, then D is point sized (P) and not point-sized (~ P), and thus D is P~ P,
which is to say that an unextended atom is an extended atom, and thus is an absurdity.
Therefore, DP is not a possibility for an entended object. But in considering DA = DQ,
more problems ensue. Imagine that DQ is some length across, call that length LQ.
(Above I proved that there cannot be any atoms with length or size, but that reasoning
does not apply to entended atoms, and that is why I am considering atomic size or
length here). Now imagine that DA is some larger length across, call that length LA.
Now LQ „ LA, but DQ = DA. This leads to the conclusion that DA is both LA and is LQ
across. This means that the quarter entended Democritean atom, DQ, can travel
through a hole that is length LQ wide, but the whole entended Democritean atom, DA,
cannot travel through the hole that is length LQ. In other words, Democritean atom D
can and cannot travel through the hole in question, which is a contradiction. For
reasons such as these, I leave the concept of entendedness, considering it not to be a
viable description of any Democritean atom.139
138 These are the words of Josh Parsons. I took this definition from Hud Hudson’s forthcoming book
Hyperspace, which he presented a chapter of at Purdue University in November 2005, where Hudson’s
proof maintained that Parson’s description of ‘entendedness’ is unpublished. Parson’s online CV however
indicates that the concept of entendedness has appeared in a book chapter in an anthology.
139 Some may imagine that the new theoretical work in string theory can avoid this idea that there
are no surfaces or colors that can be composed of quantum objects, since strings are not points, but
are 1-dimentional items, and some strings theorists now theorize the existence of 2-dimensional
sheets. As mentioned in a note above, strings are basic building blocks that have a 1-or 2D extension,
and thus it appears that they are impossible, given the evidence just presented against the existence
of any items that are partless and extended (1-, 2-, 3-, ... n-dimensional).
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4.3 No relations or connections between quantum abstract atoms
The reasoning given above in this subsection also reveals that there are no
relations between quantum abstract atoms. Relations must link (to used Loux’s
word) to their relata (if they did not, they would not do the task of connecting
them to one another). In order to link, the relation and the relata, we are told by
metaphysicians, must have some sort of special contacting capacities—a contacting
that metaphysicians typically assert to be primitive and unanalyzable so as to
avoid Bradley’s regress. Whether or not this alleged primitivism allows the relata-
relation linkage to avoid the problems of Sect. 4.2 above is not clear. But that
appears to however be irrelevant when we consider what any metaphysical
relation, if it existed, can and cannot do (when we consider the capacities any
alleged metaphysical relation can and cannot have). A relation, R, either has a
surface or it does not. It if does, it is susceptible to the problems of 4.2.3, if it
does not, to the problems of 4.2.2. So the alleged primitivity does not even come
into the picture if we merely ask: What can the relation touch and not touch?
And it appears that it cannot touch anything at all—whether a bare particular, a
thick particular, and so forth—since it cannot do so with or without a surface.
Therefore, relations have no way of linking to their relata, and relations cannot
relate. (In Sect. 5.1 I will discuss many additional fatal problems to do with
relations (none of which I have presented elsewhere).)
The philosophical position that there are no relations between atoms has been
in the past a mainstream traditional atomist position. There have been specific
attacks against the existence of such relations put forward by some of the ancient
Indian Buddhists philosophers, such as Dharmakırti,140 more recently by
Grupp,141 and I suspect it is an aspect of Quine’s philosophy of propertylessness
(since relations are relational properties). If any of these attacks are correct, then
there are no mereological relations, which would mean that the only way we
know how to describe a part as being a part, or a whole as being a whole—which
is by using mereological relations—is misguided, and therein we have no way to
describe how parts and whole exist. In other words, regardless of what we think
we believe about reality from what our senses tell us, it would instead be the case
that reality contains no parts and wholes whatsoever, and there are no macro-
scopic and empirical items.
The theories of Western philosophy and of scientific theory (except the stan-
dard model of quantum mechanics, see below) ultimately describe all things
(ordinary material objects, partless fundamental particles building blocks, loca-
tions in space, etc.) as being in various relationships to one another. In other
words, all theories of science and philosophy in the Western tradition ultimately
involve, and are given in terms of, a mereological structure. For example, in
chemistry, a DNA molecule is believed to be part of a chromosome; in mathe-
matics, a number is believed to be part of its given number set or number line it
belongs to. In ordinary daily life, it is believed that one’s self is a part of society,
and that one’s thoughts are a part of their consciousness. My students are con-
sidered to be part of the university, and the sun is believed to be part of the
galaxy. In the examples of the DNA strand, the self, the students, and the sun,
140 See JHA (1990, 13 and 17).
141 Grupp (2005a, b, c, d, 2006a).
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the mereological associations and mereological relations believed to exist in those
cases involve the interrelatedness of non-collocated objects (objects that are not
directly touching). There is really no other way to describe parthood non-
metaphysically. The question is: what is it that makes one item part of another?
How is it that any item can be a part of any other item? The only way to answer
these questions is to espouse a philosophy of relationships, where relations
connect objects (parts and wholes), and where these connections give rise to
reality. If it were found that these relations are impossible, then it would be fair
to say that the best theory of reality we have is one where reality is in fact
devoid any parts and wholes. In other words, regardless of what we think we
believe about reality from what our senses tell us, it would instead be the case
that reality is wholeless, since there would be no theory (philosophical or scientific
theory) describing in a non-contradictory way how parts and wholes can exist,
and since our science (quantum mechanics) also points to the non-existence of
connections between subatomic particles. This is the conclusion I will arrive at in
this article. But first I will discuss the history of relations and the various sorts of
metaphysical connections that have been theorized to exist, but which I will show
do not exist, but which I will show do not exist.
Philosophers have long maintained that interaction between quantum abstract
atoms need not occur by touching, but rather via interrelating, or by mediating
forces. For example, Kline and Matheson writes:
Absolutely no one still believes that every physical interaction consists of
material bodies bumping into each other. Those who have tried to work out a
completely mechanistic physics have been unable to explain common phe-
nomena like liquidity, gravitation and magnetism.142
Kline and Matheson also tell us that to reject collision by touching ‘‘is to subscribe to
some sort of field theory.143 In the era of classical physics, which was roughly from
1680–1900, this framework persisted, and Herbert shows us just how important the
concepts of fields and forces are:
Classical physicists were able to account for all the world’s variety by means of only
two physical entities—matter and fields. In those innocent days it went without
saying that these entities were really there. Physicists’ reality crisis was yet to come.
Real matter. Real fields. Drop an apple from a bridge. The apple is made of
matter. It moves because the Earth’s gravitational field pulls it. Everything in
the world works the same way: matter produces force fields, which move other
matter...
Classical physics in a nutshell: The universe consists of nothing but matter and
fields—and we know the laws of both.144
Continuous (unbroken, non-particulate) fields, forces, relations, and connections
between atoms, and which act as intermediaries between atoms, keeping them from
directly touching, could be theorized to exist by philosophers in order to avoid the
problems of touching and contacting. The issue at stake is this: Is there another means
142 Kline and Matheson (1987, 509).
143 Ibid., 510.
144 Herbert (1985, 32–34).
123
Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386 327
by which atoms can interact and/or connect other than merely by touching, contacting,
and abutting directly? It appears that if there are forces, relations or connections
between atoms, acting as intermediaries between the atoms,145,146 then the atoms
145 To see why I am lumping together all these concepts—force, field, relation, connection—see
Jammer, Concepts of Force, New York: Dover, where he shows us how these concepts all perform
similar functions, and are described interchangeably at times. The history of force relations is long,
starting, unsurprisingly, with the Greeks. Jammer writes:
Force as a regulative agent in nature appears, perhaps for the first time in Greek thought, in
Empedocles’ doctrine of love and strife, and in Anaxagoras’ theory of the mind (nous). Both
doctrines aimed at an explanation of the causes of motion... These agents as causes of motion
may rightfully be interpreted as ‘‘forces’’, although they were not held as immaterial, but as
extended in space and corporeal. (Jammer 1999, 25.)
Plato interpreted Empedocles’ two agents as attraction and repulsion, stating that their oper-
ation is conceived in an alternative sequence, whereas, according to Plato, the same forces
operate simultaneously in Heraclitus’ conception of nature. (Jammer 1999, 27.)
...Aristotle recognizes two kinds of forces, the Platonic conception of force inherent in matter,
which he calls ‘‘nature’’ (physis), and force as an emanation from substance, the force of push
and pull, causing the motion in a second object, and not in itself... For his mechanics, Aristotle
confines himself solely to the concept of force as the agency involved in pulling or pushing,
and ignores the Platonic concept of force as inherent in matter or what we may call today
energy. (Jammer 1999, 35–36)
In his search for possible other phenomena in which the attractive force of the sun may
become perceptible or demonstrable, Kepler was thus left with only one possibility: Gilbert’s
magnetic forces. No wonder that Kepler, when writing his Tertius in terveniens, is convinced
beyond any shade of doubt that his astronomical computations only confirmed his previous
assumptions about the importance of magnetic forces. In article No. 51 of this short treatise
Kepler asserts emphatically: ‘‘The planets are magnets and are driven around by the sun by
magnetic force.’’...
Kepler imagined these magnetic forces, emanating from the central body such as the sun, to
be like giant arms propelling the planets on their appropriate orbits. He thought it necessary
that for this purpose the central body itself should be in rotational motion. (Jammer 1999,
89–90)
146 To my knowledge, nowadays forces and fields are described completely in terms of par-
ticles, which will be significant to the reasoning of this paper. Kane writes:
Past study has led to the establishment of the Standard Model of particle physics, a complete
description of the basic particles and forces that shape our world... The world we see is built
entirely of three particles: the electron and two particles similar to the electron called quarks...
[T]he Standard Model is not expected to be the final stage of particles physics, even though it
successfully describes phenomena and experiments... (Kane 2000, 16)
The picture of the electromagnetic force [for example,] that emerges is that electrons and any
particles that have electric charge, interact by exchanging photons. The photons carry energy
between the electrons; two electrons can scatter off one another by exchanging a photon; and an
electron and a proton bind by exchanging many photons, which provide an attractive force that
keeps the electron and proton connected in a stable objects, a hydrogen atom. All the forces
work in a similar way. The gravitational force arises from exchange of gravitons. The analogous
particles for the weak interactions are called W and Z bosons, and for the strong force they are
called gluons. In all these cases, we speak of the photon, W and Z bosons, and gravitons as
mediating the forces. (Kane 2000, 18)
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could indeed interconnect or interrelate without touching or contacting, and thus there
is a possibility that atoms can give rise to a composite object while avoiding the
problems of touching and contacting. This sort of touching, it seems, could be looked
upon favorably also by philosophers who endorse the philosophy of point-particles.
Point-particles do not have surfaces, and I know of no argument or description in
physics or philosophy that reveals how surfaceless items such as point-particles can
directly touch one another without a mediating metaphysical relation or intercon-
nection that connects them. Further, it may be hard to imagine how point-particles
could touch anything at all, due to the fact that they do not have surfaces, and it may be
hard to imagine how relations can touch anything at all, but since this sort of ‘‘touch-
ing’’ or linking could merely be a different sort of touching (often called instantiating,
or exemplifying) between relation and relata, many may endorse this position.147,148
Many philosophers and physicists reject that there is touching and direct con-
tacting between quantum abstract atoms, but freely maintain that there are instances
of direct contacting or touching between quantum abstract atoms and fields or forces,
or between quantum abstract atoms and relations or metaphysical connections,
wherein fields or forces or relations or connections are continuous (unbroken, non-
particulate) intermediaries between the quantum abstract atoms. Typically when this
move is made, no description is made as to how it is that there can be a touching
interface between these items with the quantum abstract atoms without the same
sorts of problems of contacting and touching between quantum abstract atoms
emerging.149 (The Kline and Matheson passage above is from an article that pro-
vides a good example of this.)
But no attempt to justify how these items can serve as continuous (unbroken,
non-particulate) interconnections between quantum abstract atoms would be nee-
ded since above I showed that there cannot be any composite items, and thus no
composite intermediaries connections (section 3); and that there cannot be extended
non-composites, and thus no extended non-composities intermediary connections
(subsection 4.2.3); and thus the only unextended intermediary connections would be
left to consider would be unextended intermediary connectinos, but I showed that
they cannot touch any quantum abstract atoms, since that would be alleged point-
point touching, which I showed is impossible (subsection 4.2.2). Theses findings
show that such interconnections of any sort—fields, forces, relations, topological
connections, etc.—are all impossible. The reasoning given attacks any mereological
relation, any connection between particles, and any sort of intermediary items that
allegedly bind two items together that are not directly touching.
147 Speaking specifically about the metaphysical relations that philosophers often assume exist be-
tween particles, the ‘‘touching’’—or rather the linking (to use Michael Loux’s terminology (Loux
1998, 38–41.)) of relations to the items (relata) the relations interconnect—between relation and
point-particle must be analogous to the touching of two non-physical point-items (see Grupp 2006a),
which I show is impossible if the contacting items are to keep their individuality when they are
‘‘touching.’’
148 Grupp (2003, 2004a, b, 2005b, c, 2006a) offer new arguments against the idea that any item can
instantiate and exemplify any property.
149 Typically the interfacing or continuous integration of fields to quantum abstract atoms, or forces
to quantum abstract atoms, relations to atoms, and so forth, is not discussed. This could hide the fact
that the forces, fields, and relations lead to problems in their alleged contacting or touching with the
quantum abstract atoms—if there is any such contacting and touching (quantum physicists who are
aligned with the Standard Model routinely reject any such contacting or touching, but philosophers
seem to think there is).
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4.4 Action-at-a-distance
An obvious way to avoid all the attacks against relating and contacting between
quantum abstract atoms (or between any DIV2 items that the ordinary empirical
consciousness can conjure up) given in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3 is by merely rejecting locality,
and by asserting that there is action at a distance (AD) between particles. What it
means to assert that locality can be violated is to maintain that object A, which is
located only where it is and nowhere else, can interact with another item that is not
where A is located at, and without touching or contacting the other item. This would
be to say that, for example, I can have a pen on my desk that can have an interaction
with a book in the next room, while each book and pen remain where they are, without
one going in the other’s room to interact with each other.150 In Sects. 4.2 and 4.3 above,
the assumption was made that entities can only involve interaction where they are, and
not somewhere else. In other words, this is like maintaining that a lion that is in Africa
standing near a zebra can only have interaction with the zebra if the two of them move
toward one another and coincide or touch (in the DIV2 sense), such as when the lion
attempts to eat the zebra. It seems absurd to maintain that the lion, which is in Africa,
can have interaction with the zebra where the interacting with the lion is not where the
lion is, and is instead somewhere else: only where the zebra is and not where the lion is,
or only in Chicago, or only on Alpha Centauri. On this issue, Samuel Clarke wrote:
‘‘That one body should attract another without any intermediate means is indeed... a
contradiction: for ‘tis supposing something to act where it is not.’’151 Lange mentions
that this is only true if locality is assumed.152
Although philosophers who are not familiar with quantum physics and who are
ingrained with classical concepts (discussed above) and something like a mechanistic
philosophy of DIV2 consciousness may find nonlocality antiquated and passe´, on the
contrary, following the work of the physicist John Bell, it appears that physicists have
discovered that quantum reality is irreducibly non-local,153 and it is the classical con-
cepts and the DIV2 mechanistic and causal philosophy that is passe´ and antiquated.154
Further, the impossibility of contacting and touching, which are localistic concepts, are
philosophical issues that quantum physics draws into serious question and which I
above showed apparently do not exist. In Sect. 4.3, the purpose of introducing a field,
and/or relations and connections to act as intermediaries between particles was to keep
the activity between particles local, since contiguity and contacting between fields and/
or relations/connections on the one hand, and the quantum abstract atoms, on the
other, remains. As discussed above, fields merely leads to more problems, and from the
perspective of quantum mechanics, it is the idea of continuous field connectedness that
is antiquated, not AD. (This is discussed much more in Sect. 5 below.)
150 See Lange (2002), chapter 1, especially pp. 13–15. Also, Maudlin’s work is considered a classic on
quantum non-locality.
151 In Alexander, H.G. 1956. The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Manchester: Manchester Uni-
versity Press. Page 53. Cited in Lange (2002, 95).
152 Lange (2002, 95).
153 See Nadeau and Kafatos (1999).
154 As of 2006, to my knowledge, physicists have little knowledge of this multi-decade-old revolu-
tionary discovery in quantum physics. This is a good indication of how much philosophers have
distanced themselves from the progress of quantum science.
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From what I can tell, AD avoids all the problems discussed above, which all
involve localistic descriptions. Non-locality allows for ‘‘interaction’’ of some sort,
even if at a distance, which is merely an interaction that is not contacting and/or
direct touching: interaction between objects that are not contiguous, but they are
nevertheless believed to interact. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 above put strict limitations on
how AD can occur. Philosophers and physicists who do discuss AD describe it as
some sort of a relation.155 The findings in 4.2 and 4.3 above show that AD-inter-
action cannot occur via touching, contacting, relating or connecting. Therefore, AD
would only occur by some utterly unknown and mysterious process,156 which makes
proceeding uncomfortable, but I will just so I can given an argument that appears to
show that action at a distance involves serious problems.
If quantum abstract atoms A1 and A2 are involved in AD, A1 can act where it is
not, and A2 can act where it is not, to put it in Clarke’s wording. This would mean
that A1 and A2 that are next to me, are in fact interacting eight feet away, or eight
light years away. I will refer to this proximity I have with A1 and A2, where A1 and
A2 are, as here; and I will refer to their interaction eight feet or eight light years away
as there. A1 and A2 are here, but do not interact here. A1 and A2 interact there, even
though they are not over there. The problem I see with AD for A1 and A2 is that it is
what can be called entityless interaction. A1 and A2 are here, and thus are not there,
so their interaction going on there can only be an interaction that does not involve
A1 and A2 being present where the interacting goes on (there). This merely follows
from Clarke’s comment that AD allows an entity ‘‘to act where it is not,’’ and if it
does, the action going on does not involve an item that is acting.
P1: A1 and A2 are here, and are not there.
P2: The interaction of A1 and A2 is there, and not here.
P1 and P2 reveal that while A1 and A2 are alleged to interact (via non-local
means), they however are not present where the interacting occurs. But if they are
not, then there is interaction but there are no entities that are interacting: since
interaction occurs there but A1 and A2 are not there, ipso facto, interaction is devoid
of A1 and A2, and it can be considered entityless interaction. This seems to be an
absurdity, as if such a position involves the idea that two non-entities can interact:
155 For example, see Nadeau and Kafatos (1999, 3). This is one of many that could have been given.
156 AD-interaction may be only a murky issue for AD between distinct (distinguishable) entities, or if
it involves interaction at a distance rather than mere correlation via indistinguishability at a distance.
(Distance, strictly speaking, does not exist in a mereological nihilist reality, as I discus in this article
(distance is given in terms of non-coincidence in nihilism). I merely use it in this footnote for the sake of
speaking in familiar terms, and to keep this discussion in the familiar terminology using ‘‘action-at-a-
distance.’’) In Grupp (2005a) (p. 114) I raised the issue that it could perhaps be the case that the
indistinguishable quantum abstract atoms are non-local since if I see atom here (for the sake of brevity,
just imagine that an atom can be seen) then it’s indistinguishable (literally identical) counterpart there
must also have all the same features, and changes in the atom here (such as if it goes out of existence)
can only mean there are instantaneous changes in its counterpart there. This can be considered non-
locality via indistinguishability, rather than via a metaphysical relation or some other metaphysical
idea. I call this non-locality via indistinguishability, and it is the only mechanism of nonlocality I can
think of that is not due to some sort of a metaphysical relation, which is not susceptible to the attacks I
present against metaphysics and mereology in this paper, and it is the only one I can think of that is
empiricist, since all it requires are indistinguishability of particles (which is an empirically verified for
quantum abstract atoms).
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nothing N1 can interact with nothing N2. A1 and A2 are only here, and they are not
there, then the interacting that occurs there is interaction without A1 and A2.
This sort of reasoning applies to any instance where an entity acts where it is not.
Consider, for example, a more realistic case than the one just given, where atoms A1
and A2 non-locally interact at a distance and rather than the interaction being en-
tirely not where both A1 and A2 are (as in the example in the last paragraph), instead
the interaction is fully where A1 and A2 are, and it just happens to be AD inter-
action. But it seems this would still involve entityless interacting. If A1 is acting at A2
but is not coinciding with A2, then the statement ‘‘A2 interacts with A1’’ would
involve A1 not fully being where it is interacting, which is at A2. This would give rise
to some degree of entityless interaction: A1 is non-existent at A2; A1 is not present
where the interacting occurs, but is alleged to interact at A2. This means that A2 is
interacting with a nonentity. In other words, if that is the case, then A2’s having
interaction with A1 where A2 is would be analogous to maintaining that A2 has
interaction with a nothing.157
I have apparently shown why no objects at all can touch via AD. This would mean
that AD does not occur by touching between particles, or by abutment, attaching,
contacting, or by a relation and/or connection between particles. The part-whole
relations argued in Sect. 3 to not exist was an attack on relations between items that
do not perfectly collocate, and these same sorts of arguments could be run for any
sort of relation alleged to exist between objects that are not coinciding perfectly, and
thus at the atomic level, all items of reality are unconnected and unattached,
implying that they cannot accumulate to give rise to composites of atoms and/or
empirical bodies. Therefore, relations and connections cannot account for atoms
accumulating to give rise to empirical composite items. This indicates that every-
thing can only be unconnected.158
4.5 Quantum physics does not involve quantum abstract atoms touching
Contemporary philosophers and physicists often—but certainly not always—freely
refer to particle collision as if it is not an incoherent idea. (I suspect that many
quantum physicists do this just in order to talk in terms that are familiar to the DIV2
mind that is only aware of classical concepts, such as the concept of surface touching
157 Notice that this argument against non-locality only works if A is not indistinguishable to B, and it
does not work if A is indistinguishable from B. As discussed above, quantum abstract atoms are
apparently indistinguishable. (I did not state why they are, but it is primarily because if there are no
parts and wholes in reality, as mereological nihilism endorses, then there is not way to distinguish any
two objects as not being indistinguishable. In Grupp (2006a) I give completely different argumen-
tation that shows why this is the case.) Now it is only in DIV2 that separated, not coinciding objects
are considered to be distinguishable; and in DIV1 it is widely acknowledged among physicists that
we do not have a clear way to distinguish any particles from any others (See French 2006). So while
the argument I just gave seems to show that there cannot be DIV2 non-locality, it does not seem to
show that there cannot be DIV1 non-locality. In fact, a primary thesis of physicists is that all
quantum abstract atoms may involve non-locality, and that there may not be any non-locally un-
separated particles.
158 Some of my previous publications (such as Grupp (2003, 2004a, 2005b, c) attack the philosophy
of property possession by pointing out that there are problems with the linking up of a property to a
particular. Some have suggested to me that my arguments only work if locality is assumed, and a
non-local property possession could involve a particular possesses a property not by directly con-
necting to the property, but by being involved in AD with it. The arguments against AD given in this
section would specifically attack there being any such AD property-particular linking.
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or contacting.) On the one hand, it is not uncommon to see philosophers discussing
serious problems to do with concept of touching, contacting, and/or attaching and
abutting between any two physical items159 (examples will be given below). Some
argue that there could be reasons to think it is impossible.160 But on the other hand,
many physicists and philosophers nevertheless seem to discuss particles as if they
collide, as if there is particle interaction going on in nature via touching, contacting
and colliding in the way that macroscopic DIV2 objects touch and contact. Often a
physicist or philosophers will assert in an article or book on one page that quantum
abstract atoms cannot contact or touch, and then a few pages later they will tell us
that they can. To get a taste of this dual-natured discussion, consider just one of
many examples that could be given, found in van Inwagen (1990). First, on page 34,
he maintains in a parenthetical remark that ‘‘It is in fact probably meaningless to say
of two electrons that they are in contact.’’ But then in a passage on page 19 he
appears to tell us that a prominent feature of subatomic particles (which electrons
can only be included) is that they can be in collisions with one another (I assume that
collision here means something along the lines of contact to the average DIV2-
oriented reader of van Inwagen’s book), and where it appears to go against the case
given later in his book where, at least for electrons, we are told that they cannot
contact:
...those things like elementary particles which are not clear cases of material
objects but which share many of their salient features (they are substances or
continuants; they can move about and collide with and rebound from one
another; they have masses).161
This is common among philosophers and physicists: they discuss particle collision
and/or contact, but also often inform us that it doesn’t occur, often on the very same
page or in the very same paragraph. Often philosophers or physicists do not even
mean to denote a touching and/or contacting event, but nevertheless use the words
‘‘touching’’ or ‘‘contacting’’, for example, to get their point across and describe what
is going on between particles. Consider a passage from Lange:
We found it difficult to understand how two bodies could touch: being material,
they cannot share a point, but if they do not occupy the same place at the same
time, then they must be separated by at lest one point, and so there is a gap
between them even while they are supposedly in contact. Fields can rescue
locality from this difficulty. Suppose each particle of matter surrounded by a
very short-range field of highly repulsive force... The field surrounding a given
particle then causes an immense repulsive force on any particle that comes very
near to the given particle. When two particles ‘‘collide,’’ they do not touch, but
they come near enough for each to feel a tremendous repulsive force from the
other’s field. So the two particles appear to bounce off each other. Each
interacts with the field at that moment at its own location, so locality is upheld.
Although one body excludes any other from the locations it occupies, those
locations can be occupied simultaneously by a field and matter.162
159 See Lange chapter 1.
160 Kline and Matheson (1987).
161 Van Inwagen (1990, 19).
162 Lange (2002, 35).
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Lange refers to colliding particles that do not touch. Presumably, he is using the
word ‘‘collide’’ to keep his words from becoming mysterious and hard to grasp. (This
is likely what van Inwagen is doing also, and probably is also the case with the
countless others I could cite who also do this.) But this passage provides a good
example of how philosophers and physicists will often use the talk of two particles
that ‘‘collide,’’ ‘‘touch,’’ ‘‘contact,’’ when they don’t actually mean that any of these
are really happening between or among particles.
The evidence of this article shows that particles cannot involve any of these, nor any
causal connection between one atom state to another. To understand what I mean by
‘‘atom state,’’ consider the diagram below that illustrates what is observed regarding
quantum abstract atoms. According to the diagram, since quantum abstract atoms A1
and A2 at present moment p1 cease to exist, whereby the quantum abstract atom at
present moment p2 comes into existence, there can only be a breakage between any
alleged continuity of the existence of atoms from p1 to p2, whereby what comes into
existence at p2 is in some sense ‘‘new’’ atom-stuff (quantum abstract atomistic energy).
It is ‘‘new’’ not in the sense that there has never been a quantum abstract atom that is
indistinguishable from atom A3 at present moment p2 at any earlier present moment
(i.e. at any moment ‘‘before’’ p2 which no longer exists).
163 Rather, it is new in the sense
that it is an abstract atomic instance that does not have any causal connection to the
past moment (p1) and no causal connection between atoms at p1 and atoms at p2, and
thus it ‘‘new’’ since it is completely existent in the present, not causally connected to
any past moment. This is in accord with quantum empirical evidence (i.e. quantum
randomness), and with philosophical reasoning I have given elsewhere about the non-
existence of time and continuous (unbroken) change from one moment to the
next. What I have just written is in accord with the over two thousand year old
philosophical discussion of the ‘‘problem’’ of change: if an item changes it can only
cease to exist where a new items comes into existence.164 The reason A3 is new is the
same reason that there is a breakage between moments p1 and p2: because there cannot
be any temporal relations between moments p1 and p2, the two moments cannot
causally interconnect, cannot have any sort of interplay with one another, and for that
reason, they are not causally connected, but each is ‘‘new.’’ The reason that there are no
temporal relations between moments p1 and p2 is because there is no way for the
relations to interconnect the moments and/or the atoms at those moments, for reasons
discussed in 4.3.
There are quantum abstract atoms A1 and A2 at the initial present moment, and
then there is atom A3 at another present moment, where the first moment is replaced
by the second (when the first moment ceases to exist the second one exists). It is not
as if A1 and A2, which are separate at p1, become stuck together at p2 like pieces of
163 I put the word ‘‘before’’ in quotes because, on this quantum theory of time being discussed
(which elsewhere I have named the R-theory of time, or replacement presentism, and which appears
to be the only accurate theory of time for the mereological nihilist quantum reality since it is a theory
of time that is based solely on the replacement of particles by one another) because it is the DIV2
way to refer to previous moments. Strictly speaking, according to R-theory presentism, there is no
before and after the present moment, so all I mean by ‘‘before’’ is this: present moment that once
existed but not no longer exists.
164 This is an endorsement of the philosophy of presentism, and perhaps the specific variety of
presentism I discussed in Grupp (2005a), which contains arguments for the Buddhist atomistic
philosophy of time—which, in Grupp (2005a), I renamed the R-theory of time for specific reasons
outlined in Grupp (2005a).
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putty, where at p2, A3 = A1+A2. This is likely the way the DIV2-oriented, classical
concept oriented mind will fall into believing what is going on from p1 to p2. But
noting about any philosophical or scientific evidence that could be presented sup-
ports this, whereas the thesis of ‘‘newness’’ just introduced above, where A3
unconnected to a past time, and thus is new at p2, is supported by the evidence.
‘‘Between’’ p1 and p2 the quantum abstract atoms A1 and A2 do not contact, touch
or interact in any sort of macroscopic manner, such as by bouncing off one another,
or such as by surfaces interacting in some way.165 The diagram above may make it
Quantum
abstract atom
A1
at present
moment p1
At p1, quantum
abstract atoms A1 and 
A2 are about to
“interact,” to use the 
common (and 
incorrect) description.
At p1, quantum
abstract atom A1
has properties u
and v, and A2 has
propertiesxand y.
Quantum
abstract atom A3
at present p2
Direction of
“activity” (i.e. 
present p1
will be 
replaced by
p2.)
Quantum
abstract atom
A2
at present
moment p1
At p2, quantum abstract atoms 
A1 and A2 are nowhere to be 
found, and rather there is just
quantum abstract atom A3,
which has properties a, b, c,
and d, which are all not equal
to u, v, x or y.
165 Specifically why they do not contact or ‘‘touch’’ is not just a matter of empirical confirmation
(confirmed in quantum reality). We can know through philosophical reasoning alone that if A1 and/or
A2 ‘‘touched’’, this would amount to past items (A1 and A2) contacting a present (not-past) item (A3),
and their interface would be past and not-past. I discussed at length in Grupp (2005a) why this is an
impossible interface. This hints at a pervasive problem with causation in general in Western philosophy.
In such philosophies of causation, moment t1 is supposed to somehow contribute to the generation of
moment t2, or t2 is supposed to somehow follow t1 because of its interplay with t1. If, however, t1 is past
and t2 is present, then somehow the past and present must interact, and in one way or another—either
via a temporal relation, or an abutment of moment, or something—something past and something
present will have to directly attach which is impossible (see Grupp 2005a, section 2). This was noticed by
some of the Buddhist philosophers from India, and it is one of many reasons in this article that an
endorsement of presentism is taken up, where presentism involves the avoidance of causal relations,
interactions, or processes across times, and instead a philosophy of the empirically verified non-causal
quantum randomness is espoused.
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appear that what is really happening from p1 to p2 is that A1 and A2 are combining
into one composite, A3. But this is not correct, for reasons I will give next. Although
the diagram above shows A1, A2 and A3 all to apparently involve size, in reality they
do not, and they are shown here as if they do just for the sake of illustration; in fact
each of these are to be considered point-sized quantum abstract atoms. Above we
found that there cannot be any point-sized mereological wholes, and there cannot be
any touching between point-sized items (or any items). Thus, each of the items in the
diagram, actually being point-sized, can only be atomic. To understand the reasons
why there is the aforementioned breakage between p1 and p2, imagine, contrary to
what has been asserted above, that A1 and A2 do change into A3. As the diagram
above illustrates, the properties of the atom stuff that exist at p2 (A1 and A2) are
different properties than at p2. We can define the atoms in terms of their properties:
A1 ¼ [u, v];
A2 ¼ [x, y];
A3 ¼ [a, b, c, d]:166
Notice that if we attempt to maintain that at p2 A3 = A1+A2, we can see this
equation to be incorrect if we substitute values for A3, A1, and A2:
[a, b, c, d] 6¼ [u, v] þ [x, y], or
A3 6¼ A1 þ A2
Since A3 is not equal to A1 and/or A2, then A1 and A2 must not exist at p2, and
must cease to exist when p1 no longer exists, in order for A3 to exist. In other
words, if A1 and A2 change into A3, A1 and A2 must cease to exist if they change
from being what they are at p1.In addition to the evidence that there are no
temporal connections from p1 to p2 given in 4.3 above and elsewhere, the dis-
continuity just described here—which is a discontinuity due to change (items
change and thus cease to be themselves and thus can only cease to exist, or in
other words, they pop out of existence)—from p1 to p2 indicates that contrary to
what the DIV2 mind may want to believe, A1 and A2 are not sticking together at
time p2 to give rise to A3. The DIV2-oriented mind may want to believe that A1
and A2 are really coming together to give rise to A3 at p2, much in the way in
DIV2 one can bring together two distinct snowballs at one moment together a
moment later where there seems to be no breakage between the moments, and
where it appears that the snow at the first moment is the same snow that exists in
the second. But for philosophical reasons just given, this is not what is happening
in quantum abstract atomistic reality, and it is not what happens in what is com-
166 The metaphysical realist may want to maintain that our account here is incorrect, since the items
here should not described only in terms of properties, but rather via properties and the property
possessor, or perhaps in terms of a thin particular, and so on. In other words, the metaphysical realist
will possibly find this account incomplete since there is no property possessor mentioned. But I don’t
mention it here because I found in Grupp 2005a (103–104) that such an account cannot coherently
give an account of persistence through time. And in the case of a thin particular (bare particular)
metaphysics. Also, in Grupp (2006a) I found that the other alternatives, the bundle account of non-
bundle substances, and the so-called thick particular substance theory, are inadequate to describe
persistence thorough change. Additionally, as pointed out in an above note, property possession is
attacked by the reasoning of this article, even though I do not elaborate on this.
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monly referred to as ‘‘particle interaction.’’ Rather, what is happening is that there
are two atoms that exist at p1, and one atom at p2, and the non-connectedness
between them prohibits causal interaction: p2 is not generated by p1. A3 is new:
there appears to be amalgamation of particles, but it is most precise to maintain
that A3 is distinct from A2 and A1.
167,168
Consider the case where an electron emits an photon. More precisely put, what
happens is there is an initial present moment, p1, when electron e1 has an energy
level l1. And then shortly after there is a present moment p2 where a photon that has
appeared to come from e1’s direction and where at p2 e1 no longer exists, and instead
there is a new electron present, e2, with a new energy level, l2. There is discontinuity
between p1 and p2, so it is not the case that e1 was ‘‘cut’’ apart into pieces, as if a
piece of electron was ejected or cut off. Rather, it is the case that e1 existed, then
ceased to exist whereupon e2 and the photon began to exist. So, on this example,
there are three atomic items to consider: (1) e1 at p1, (2) e2 at p2, and (3) the photon
at p2. This appears like a splitting of e1. This scenario leads the DIV2 human ob-
server—that might be tempted into believing in temporal parts, or identity through
time—to believe that e1 becomes photon and e2. But points cannot have parts, and
thus point object e1 and p1, which is one item, cannot become two, electron e2 and
the photon at p2. Rather, e1 changes cannot be a composite. Rather, e1 changes (into
e2 and the photon), and the only way this can occur for an atomic entity that does not
have parts that can mix is by ceasing to exist entirely so that new energy manifes-
tations can exist.
167 In response to the information in this section, my students often ask me: ‘‘But don’t particles
collide and smash apart in atom-smashers, sending pieces of the particles splattering all over? How is
that not a collision?’’ Here is a response to this question:
Why do physicists want to smash atoms? The simple answer—to find out what is inside them—has an
element of truth, but there is a more general reason. Atoms-smashing is really a misnomer...
It is important to understand that these many different unstable particles are not in any straight-
forward sense the constituents of protons, neutrons, or electrons. When electrons and positrons
collide at high energy they do not ‘break open and spill out a shower of subatomic debris. Even high-
speed collisions involving protons, which certainly do have objects (the quarks) inside them, do not
actually involve the protons being smashed apart in the usual sense. It is better to envisage the debris
which emerges from these collisions as being created ‘on site’ out of the energy of impact. (Davies
1984, 80–81)
This part of Davies 1984 also provides a good example of the confusing way that physicists talk about
their empirical findings, since on page 80 Davies describes the situation initially as particle collision.
He corrects himself, but often physicists will not do so. But then notice in the second to last sentence
of this paragraph, Davies refers to what is going on as ‘‘high-speed collisions,’’ but then immediately
after he maintains that the collisions ‘‘do not involve the protons being smashed apart in the usual
sense.’’ This gives the reader confusion. Since the particles observed before the new energy do not
equal the particles observed after, the particles after can only be new particles. Thus, it perhaps
would have been better to merely state that ‘‘particles appear to move toward one another, and at
the point where they should be imagined to coincide, they instead go out of existence and a plethora
of new particles come into existence.’’
168 If reality is propertyless at the quantum level, as discussed in footnotes before this one, this
account of the breakage with the replacement of p1 by p2 would be misleading since it is given in
terms of properties. But I only say it would be misleading, not wrong (and thus the property
alteration description just given is worthwhile in that it illustrates the needed conclusion), because a
propertyless reality actually also likely leads to the very same conclusion, as I showed in Grupp
2005a (Sect. 5.1).
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In what has been given in this subsection to this point, we can see why there is
only popping in and out of existence, not amalgamation or contacting. But physicists
often use the word ‘‘amalgamation’’ to describe the account of quantum abstract
atom alterations I have just described. Consider the passage from the physicist,
Gordon Kane, on these issues:
Nearly all particles are unstable and decay into others. The word decay has a
technical meaning in physics—one particle disappears, typically turning into
two or three others. A major difference between the way decay is used in
physics and its use in everyday life or biology is that the particles that char-
acterize the final state are not in any sense already in the decaying particle. The
initial particle really disappears, and the final particles appear. The photons
that make photons that make up the light we see provide an example: The
photons emitted from a light bulb when it is turned on are not particles that
were in the bulb just waiting to come out, and photons that enter our eyes... are
absorbed by the molecules in our eyes and disappear. All particles can be
created or absorbed in interactions with other particles.169
What is thought of in quantum reality as by physicists and philosophers as interac-
tion, particle collision, or quantum abstract atom interaction, is really a very mis-
leading way of describing quantum reality. These descriptions should not be used,
and instead the phrases ‘‘particle replacement,’’ or ‘‘quantum abstract atom van-
ishing and appearing’’ should be used instead. The words ‘‘interaction,’’ ‘‘touching’’
or ‘‘contacting’’ regarding quantum reality are words that appear to actually mean
momentariness (short-lived). I suspect that quantum physicists of the past began
using the erroneous descriptions in order to discuss their observations in a way that
makes sense to the DIV2-oriented empirical mind, but in fact it just leads to
significant error and misinformation.
4.6 Zeno’s Measure Paradox is not a paradox
So far I have shown that there are no relations between atoms, and atoms are point-
sized. This leads to the Measure Paradox (or Zeno’s Measure Paradox): an extended
continuum is an aggregate of unextended points. This ‘‘paradox’’ is also called the
Geometric Paradox,170 or Zeno’s Paradox of Plurality.171. But according to the
reasoning of this article, it is no paradox at all, since unextended points (or atoms)
cannot give rise to a magnitude. In other words, point-sized philosophical atoms
cannot compose empirical reality.
For over two thousand years, many philosophers have had reservations about how
a line, or a geometric entity of one or more dimension, can be extended if it is an
aggregate of unextended parts. But in recent decades, philosophers often appear at
ease with the Paradox, due to the work of Adolf Gru¨nbaum, in his alleged solution
of the Paradox, and his discussion of the interconnectedness (called the set-theoretic
union), of the points in a manifold. Before Gru¨nbaum, the Paradox often evoked the
question: If the basic constituents of an extended line, plane, volume are infinitely
169 Kane (2000, 19)
170 This is what Gru¨nbaum calls it (1955, 165).
171 Zimmerman (1996a, 1).
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many unextended points, then how can the aggregate172 of the unextended constit-
uents not also be unextended? If the basic unextended parts give rise to an extended
whole, does this not imply that (0+0+0...) ‡ 1, since the unextended entities give rise
to an extension?
Gru¨nbaum’s solution allegedly gets around this contradiction, but I will argue that
it does not. There has been little debate in the literature about Gru¨nbaum’s alleged
solution. When discussing the Measure Paradox, philosophers often merely inform
their readers that Gru¨nbaum has solved the paradox, and no further explanation
follows. An example of this lack of discussion is found in Zimmerman’s article,
‘‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts? An Argument for
‘Atomless Gunk,’’’ where Gru¨nbaum is merely mentioned at the beginning of the
article as having solved the Paradox, but no further discussion ensues:
Although Zeno’s mathematical paradoxes of plurality were long thought to
raise insurmountable difficulties for the supposition that an extended thing
could be composed of unextended simple parts, Adolf Gru¨nbaum has shown
that these paradoxes are significantly defused by Cantor’s discovery of the
distinction between denumerabily and non-denumerabily infinite numbers. If
Gru¨nbaum is right, the traditional reasons for doubting the consistency of
‘‘conceiving of an extended continuum as an aggregate of unextended ele-
ments’’ have been laid to rest...173
Gru¨nbaum’s alleged solution fails however, due to the fact that, as Edgar writes:
‘‘Gru¨nbaum proposes to solve the Measure Paradox by arguing that extended space
must be conceived as a relation among uncountably many unextended elements.’’174
Relations however are impossible, due to what was ascertained in 4.2 and 4.3.
Therefore, I do not see how Gru¨nbaum’s work is to provide a solution to the
Measure Paradox. Rather, it seems the Measure Paradox is not a paradox at all, and
merely reveals what quantum mereological nihilist reality involves: there are only
quantum abstract atoms, and they cannot give rise to magnitudes.
5 The DIV2 conceptual (non-existent) items
In the next two sections I do three things: discuss the DIV2 conceptual reality that
does not exist (Sects. 5.1–5.3), and that discussion leads to discussion of two quantum
issues: quantum atomism (Sect. 6) and what I call the philosophy of immaterialism
(5.4). I start by showing that space and time do not exist (Sects. 5.1 and 5.2). The
conclusions I draw here in Sect. 5 will be used to show in Sects. 6.2 and 6.3 that there
are no quantum paradoxes.
5.1 Space does not exist
Space and time are so ingrained in the DIV2 mind that it is very relevant to merely
point out the metaphysicality involved with space and time, in addition to showing
172 Gru¨nbaum tells us that the Zenoic Paradox arises from the Zenoic manner of considering the
points adding up, aggregating, or summing up to a magnitude.
173 Zimmerman (1996a, b), 1.
174 Edgar (1979, 324).
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that they do not exist. Space and time are considered to have parts by physicists and
philosophers (the parts of time are called temporal parts in the case of time, and in
the case of space the parts of space are called points in space, spatial locations,
topological regions, and so on), and they are items that are used justify a plethora
mereological and metaphysical theorization—including the so-called uncertainty
principle in quantum mechanics, just to give one example. In the next two subsec-
tions, I will not only show that time and space do not exist, but also I will also give a
general discussion of their aforementioned metaphysicality. Showing how space and
time are non-empirical and extrasensory adds power to my arguments that show that
they do not exist, and I need all the power I can get due to the degree of inculcation
the typical human has that the invisible items, space and time, really in fact exist.
References to space and time are embedded in our common and widespread
scientific and philosophical language. Yet if I merely ask the scientist or philosopher,
Can you describe to me what space looks like?, I get little more than this sort of a
response:
Space poses a central, intriguing and challenging question for metaphysics... On
the one hand we are drawn to make very powerful statements about it. Every-
thing that is real has some spatial position. Space is infinitely large, infinitely
penetrable and infinitely divisible. On the other hand, despite our confidence in
these strong claims, space seems elusive to the point of eeriness. It seems to be
largely without properties, apart from the few strong ones just recited. It is
imperceptible by any mode of perception. It has no material property, no causal
one, it does nothing. It seems to have no feature which we can learn about by
observation. Arguably, it has a prominent role in natural science but it is far from
obvious just what it is. Though being spatial is a mark of the real, space itself
seems, paradoxically perhaps, unreal[,] a mere nothing.175
If there is no answer to the question of what space looks like, then space is a
metaphysical item. Space plays a ‘‘fundamental role in physics and philosophy,’’176
but it is a theoretical construct of an invisible item that, according to the theoretical
and metaphysical account of it, may not even interact with any other item.
There are two dominant theories of space. Einstein discussed each of these
(notice in this passage also the way that Einstein tells us that the concept of space is a
product of imagination):
(a) space as a positional quality of the world of material objects; (b) space as
container of all material objects. In case (a), space without a material object is
inconvincible. In case (b), a material object can only be conceived as existing in
space; space then appears as a reality which in a certain sense is superior to the
material world. Both space concepts are free creations of the human imagi-
nation, means devised for easier comprehension of our sense experience.177
I will next show that there is no coherent account of space, wherein, our best account
is that space does not exist. The argument I have to attack both the substantivalist
and relationalist accounts of space attacks in one sweep: it shows that (b) the con-
tainer model (the substantivalist account), involves fatal inconsistencies, and that
175 Nerlich (1994, 1).
176 Jammer (1993, ix).
177 In Jammer (1993, xv).
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(a) the relationalist model involves inconsistencies. The reason for this is because
both of the substantivalist and relationalist accounts involve items that are interre-
lated. In the substantivalist account, the items that are interrelated are spatial points
and/or spatial regions, and the relationalist account involves DIV2 matter items that
are interconnected and interrelated, where according to relationalism, they give rise
to a spatial network.
To move toward reductio, imagine that that either of the two accounts of space
just given are correct. And imagine that there are two atoms, A1 and A2, which are
either themselves interrelated, or the spatial locations they are located at are
interrelated.
On the substantivalist account, A1 and A2 coincide with spatial points, call them
p1 and p2, and p1 and p2 are allegedly interconnected by a topological relation. On
the relationalist account, A1 and A2 are allegedly interrelated and by that interre-
latedness it is presumed that there is spatiality. Physicists and philosophers very
often consider the metaphysical relations between A1 and A2 and between p1 and p2
to be real items—as if they are real constituents of reality—and not mere tools for
thinking about spatiality. Both accounts however fail, since the argumentation in
Sect. 4 shows that there cannot be any such relations. But there are many fatal other
problems that can be pointed out, and doing so it critical for the interests of the
mereological nihilist, and thus I will describe them (even though the reasoning in 4.3
above would appear to be sufficient).
If there are complex relations (relations with parts), they would be mereological
wholes, and thus could not exist due to the reasoning of Sect. 4, so we only have
simple relations to consider. Partless relations either connect from A1 and A2 by
‘‘stretching’’ from A1 to A2 and all points between (analogous to the way a rope
connects a boat and a dock), or they do not, and they are therefore only at A1 and
A2, wherein they somehow interconnect nonlocality, as if to exhibit AD. Consid-
ering the first case, where the relation connects from where A1 and A2 are by a
continuous (unbroken) simple relation that is at A1 and A2 and at any and every
relation and location between A1 and A2 that it needs to be to give rise to the
continuous (unbroken) connection. But we saw above in 4.2.3 that there cannot be
A1: Atom 1 
A2: Atom 2 
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any extended partless items. Distance or size is the non-coincidence of distinct items.
(If they are not distinct, they are not at a distance from one another.) For there to be
distance or size within the relation, it must involve inner structure so as to have inner
parts that can be described as at a distance from one another. But that can only occur
if relations have parts.
5.2 Time does not exist
Time is described as a set of moments that are interrelated. The relations are
however susceptible to the attacks against relations given above, and thus do not
exist. The A- and B-theories of time, so widely discussed by Western philosophers,
but which depend on relations between non-identical times, are incorrect accounts of
time, due to the reasoning of this article, and the non-existence interconnections
between moments.178 Rather, what exists is only one indivisible present moment.
For time to exist, there must be past and future moments each enmeshing with the
present somehow to give rise to the idea of a series of moments. But without the
interrelatedness of moments, and without moments being able to connect or touch in
any way, there is no time flow, no time series: moments cannot be connected or
interrelated. Moments cannot be positionally distinguished form one another, and if
they cannot, they cannot be distinguished form one another at all, and there is thus
only one moment: the present. For these reasons, the concept of time—a flow of
time, or a series of time moments—is metaphysical and extrasensory, since it
requires there to be non-experiential past and future moments that are linked by
non-experiential temporal relations.
I use the word ‘‘extrasensory’’ to denote the impossibility of experience of a past or
future moment: The DIV2 empirical mind only exists presently. If the DIV2 empirical
consciousness could witness past times, where in doing so the states of DIV2 con-
sciousness would exist as past in order to experience a past moment, then con-
sciousness would be past and present, and thus could only consist of two distinct parts
(the past part, and the present part—if consciousness is partless it could not have these
opposing properties). Having two distinct parts, this distinctiveness requires that the
part in the past, Cpast, cannot have continuity with the part of consciousness in the
present, Cpresent, due to the arguments against relations—such as relations between
times—given above.179 Also, Cpast and Cpresent cannot directly contact, since if they
did, they would share a part via their overlapping, and that part would be both present
and past, which is impossible. Without continuity, the consciousness at the present
(Cpresent) cannot be the same consciousness as the one at the past (Cpast). So the same
consciousness could not experience both past and present moments, and present
experience can only occur in the irreducible instantaneous present. But since real
experience for human persons only occurs in the present and only exists presently (no
human persons have had experiences of past moments, and thus believing there are
such experience is merely metaphysical fabrication), then from what has been written
above, real experience is only atemporal. Accordingly, DIV2 consciousness of time
flow, and any feeling of time flowing that persons may believe they have, can only be an
illusion, since consciousness is locked in the unextended irreducible now—which is to
178 With different arguments than I have given in this article, I have also showed in Grupp (2005a, c)
that there cannot be temporal relations.
179 And due to the much more detailed accounts in Grupp (2005a, c).
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say that experience of time, and the experience of time flow, is impossible, and can
only be a presently generated hallucination.
In this illusory DIV2 generation of time-flow experience, somehow the present
consciousness of DIV2 conceptualizers generates the belief that they witness
surfaces and colors apparently that are moving, thus leading to the illusion of time
flow—but where in fact each moment is new, and is unconnected to any other
moment. When the DIV2 empirical experiencer somehow gains the ability, through
present memory, to compare the present states of DIV2 surfaces and colors from
present to present, the idea of movement comes about. Memory only occurs in the
present, but it can apparently be about the past (about present moments that no
longer exist), since we have illusory experiences of motion and time. The present can
only be a durationless irreducible instant, and being durationless and irreducible,
there is no movement within it.
With the experience of time, DIV2 observers are merely watching their own
conscious states of surfaces and colors which appear to be moving about. Thus we
are not measuring an item called time at all, but rather we are measuring our DIV2
consciousness of DIV2 surfaces and color rearranging in replacing presents, but
where one never ‘‘witnesses’’ anything but his own conscious experience of
arrangements of matter (surfaces and colors) rearranging; mind-independent times
are never observed. When a human believes she is measuring time she is really just
measuring her own conscious states of illusory DIV2 extended matter objects (ob-
jects with externally perceivable surface and/or color) as we witness them in DIV2
experiencing.
When one refers to temporal relations, or to spatial relations, she is referring to
her experiences of empirical objects that are distinct and separate in our con-
sciousness experiencing. When we here someone utter: ‘‘I see the lion here, and the
zebra over there,’’ the philosopher will typically assert that she is referring to spatial
relations, and more specifically she is making a claim about the fact that the lion and
the zebra are at a spatial distance form one another and are accordingly involved in
spatial relations with one another. If I ask the philosopher, Can you describe what the
spatial relations look like?, she will likely reply either that they are metaphysical and
thus cannot be observed (and thus all that is observed is conceptual matter items
with surfaces and/or colors), or that by merely seeing the lion and zebra at a distance
from one another I am therefore seeing the relationship of distance in that instance
of seeing the lion and zebra being not collocated with one another. But my DIV2
generation of matter-items experienced in consciousness only reveals surfaces and/or
colors, and not the distance relationship—an invisible, metaphysical item, which
reasoning above shows does not exist. With respect to this second account, since
what is believed to be experienced externally in DIV2 consciousness are only sur-
faces and colors seen spread out from one another, then I do not see anything but a
lion and a zebra, and there is no third mind-independent entity between then that I
can label ‘‘distance.’’ Instead of seeing distances between the lion and zebra, I only
see other matter objects of the landscape (i.e., I only see other surfaces and colors): a
few trees, a snake, and some bushes and dirt. Nowhere do I see a metaphysical
relationship, and nowhere do I see anything but varying DIV2 color patches. The
italicized word ‘‘between’’ in the statement, ‘‘... between the lion and zebra...,’’ only
refers to the DIV2 empirical surfaces and color patches (snake, trees, dirt, etc.). I do
not see why asserting that there is a mind-independent, invisible, metaphysical
relation called distance between lion and zebra could be a better way of describing
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what is between the lion and the zebra. And given the problems discussed above,
and which I have discussed elsewhere, to do with mind-independent metaphysical
relations which are believed to be real constituents of reality, it seems to remain
coherent I cannot refer to them in my DIV2 experiencing. I do not see how I can
avoid the conclusion that such an invisible relation is merely the DIV2 observer’s
way of passing over all the empirical objects between lion and zebra in order to
quickly refer to the two of the color patches (zebra and lion) without having to
arduously but precisely describe the situation as I just have. The concept of a
metaphysical relation called distance between the lion and the zebra are the result of
the quick ways that DIV2 experiencers refer to their reality, to the surfaces and
colors. If we go to the Amazon, instead of asserting discussing every cell in every leaf
and trunk of every tree, we will often just use one word, ‘‘forest’’ in order to save
mental processing. Similarly, when I look at the zebra and the lion, it is more
mentally economical to merely say they are 50 yards apart, rather than to refer to
every empirical color patch between them. But this economical approximating can
lead to the idea that there is something other than the mere color patches. We may
imagine that there are real metaphysical items interconnecting items of reality, and
this gives rise to the idea(s) that there is a thing called space.
In DIV2 consciousness, I do not witness a container, called space that the lion and
the zebra exist within. I only experience the lion and the zebra (and the empirical
objects that I perceive as being color patches assorted between the lion to the zebra).
Space is typically defined as a continuum or manifold of spatial points intercon-
nected by a topological metrical relation, and I certainly do not empirically witness
that. Rather, I empirically observe objects lined up, where no relations or manifolds
are perceived. This would imply that the word ‘‘space’’ is just a tool used to explain
DIV2 surface and color patterning, but in fact we only experience the objects (the
surfaces and colors), not the space or spatial relations, and we do not co-experience
these assortments of color patches from moment to moment. In DIV2 conscious
experiencing, all that is ever experienced are color patches of material surface, not
mysterious items such as ‘‘locations’’ (temporal or spatial locations).
5.3 A List of non-existents (if mereological nihilism is the correct theory)
We have seen that space and time are impossible metaphysical items. The use of
metaphysical relations are taken up in descriptions of DIV2 material empirical
items, and physical and material reality involve such relations. Consider Lockwood’s
definition of ‘‘materialism:’’
Materialism is the theory that everything that exists is material. I shall not
attempt to define precisely what I mean by ‘material’; but, roughly speaking,
those things are material that occupy or take place in space, and whose existence
is ultimately constituted by the properties and relations, actions and interactions
of particles and fields, or whatever basic entities physics treats of.180
In addition to time, space, and matter, also causation is discussed in terms of
metaphysical relations. A fundamental aspect of DIV2 is that academics have
ubiquitously explained it in terms of metaphysical relations—but the relational
180 Lockwood (1989, 20).
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reality only leads to a reality of paradox, antinomy, and philosophical problems, such
as those I have discussed above (and elsewhere) and such as those discussed by other
philosophers as far back as Parmenides.
I will next give a list of ‘‘commonsensical’’ and/or ordinary empirical DIV2 items
that do not exist in a mereological nihilist reality, and which are largely metaphysical
and invisible items, but which are widely assumed to exist by realist philosophers and
surprisingly by many scientists.
(1) Space.
(2) Time and Time-flow.
(3) Motion. The non-existence of motion follows from the non-existence of time,
point 2).
(4) Change. The non-existence of change follows from the non-existence of time
and motion, points (2) and (3), and from the fact that the DIV2 experiencer
only experiences an irreducible present moment, even though she will only
believe she experiences change.
(5) Extension and Surface. I showed that surface and extension cannot exist in
Sect. 4.
(6) Colors. The non-existence of colors follows from the non-existence of surface
(point 5)) since to have color there must be extended surfaces. (Colors are not
free-floating items.)
(7) Locations. This follows from 1) above: without space and time there are no
locations in space and/or time.
(8) Causation. This follows from the non-existence of time and motion. Causes and
effects are events that have some sort of interaction: one moments gives rise to,
and/or comes before, the next. Causes and effects are events. Events are mo-
ments in time. So causation can be discussed in terms of time. With no time,
there is no causation between non-identical moments. Cause and effect are just
productions of imagination.
The impossibility of each of these are discussed at various places in this article.
Only two of the DIV2 non-existents listed—namely surfaces and colors—are
among those that DIV2 experiencers believe they perceive externally. In other
words, only (5) and (6) are among the ordinary empirical experiences in DIV2
experiencing—all others are strictly metaphysical and unobservable items (why
each is metaphysical is discussed below), that cannot be explained in philosophy
without contradiction.
5.4 Immaterialism and energy
It is often assumed that the fundamental particles of reality are physical items. For
example, Schaffer writes that ‘‘the physicalist claims that microphysical theory (or
some future extension thereof) describes the fundamental level of reality on which
all else supervenes.’’181 I will argue at various places in this article, and specifically in
this subsection, that there is no reason to believe that quantum atoms (electrons,
gluons, etc.) are material items: the quantum abstract atoms are not describable
181 Schaffer (2003, 498).
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as being physical or material items, but rather only to describe them as being
immaterial items.
Although I have not seen any philosophers put forth this theory, the idea that
quantum particles are non-physical is an idea that is occasionally suggested. van
Inwagen writes:
...submicroscopic objects like quarks and protons are ... not clear cases of
material objects; nevertheless, every material object would seem pretty clearly
to have quarks and protons as parts... A ‘‘part,’’ therefore, need not be a thing
that is clearly a material object.182
According to the inferences of this article, the only items that exist are quantum
abstract atoms, and the following arguments show that they only can be considered
to be immaterial items, and thus reality is immaterial:
1. Definition of ‘‘material’’ or ‘‘matter,’’ comes from ordinary DIV2 empirical
experiences, and consists of the DIV2 descriptions given above in 2.4.
2. Quantum particles (quantum abstract atoms) are utterly different sorts of
objects than the material objects mentioned in 1: if a DIV2 item has property P,
then a DIV1 item has property ~P.
3. Conclusion 1: Quantum particles (quantum abstract atoms) are immaterial.
1. If immaterial quantum abstract atoms are reality, then reality is immaterial.
2. According to mereological nihilism, quantum abstract atoms are the only items
that exist.
3. Conclusion 2: reality is immaterial.
Since the quantum abstract atoms are immaterial, then reality is immaterial. I call
this position immaterialism (or mereological nihilist immaterialism). Immaterialism
can be defined as follows: there is no material thing that exists; if an entity exists it is
necessarily an immaterial item, and, more specifically, it is a structureless particle
(quantum abstract atom). Given conclusions 1 and 2, the reasoning given in Sect. 2.4,
and the case for mereological nihilism I present in this article, I am not sure how to
avoid the conclusion that reality is describable by the conclusion of immaterialism
(conclusion 2).
In premise 1 of the first argument, the word ‘‘material’’ in the previous sentence
(and throughout this article) denotes the objects in reality that humans ordinarily
believe exist in the world external to the DIV2 experiencer, and which are empiri-
cally perceivable items that (are believed to) exist in space (have a spatial location),
have a spatial extension (i.e., have a surface and/or a color), and endure (or perdure)
through a duration without flashing in and out of existence. van Inwagen writes:
A thing is a material object if it occupies space and endures through time and
can move about in space (literally move about, unlike a shadow or a wave or a
refection) and has a surface and has a mass and is made of creation stuff or
stuffs. Or, at any rate, to the extent that one was reluctant to say of something
that it had various of these features, to that extent one would be reluctant to
describe it as a material object. Few philosophers would be perfectly happy
182 Van Inwagen (1990, 19).
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about calling a quark or a proton or even a large organic molecule; a material
object, for one has to be very careful in ascribing any of the feature in the
above list to such things; and talk about the surfaces of submicroscopic objects,
or about the stuffs they are made of, tends to verge on nonsense... Some
philosophers are happy to call clouds and forests and galaxies material objects
and other are not. But virtually all philosophers believe that there are central,
perfectly clear cases of things that fall under the concept material object.183
Mereological nihilism shows that items that (are believed to) have these material
properties are the entities that do not exist since, as discussed above, if mereological
nihilism is correct (which depends on the reasoning in Sect. 4), all DIV2 items are
only mental concepts (not mind-independent items). Instead, we will find such
properties to be impossible, and thus we will find that if any person or being
(believes she/he has) experiences of a material world, filled with color patches and
moving surfaces, then it can only be the case that they are hallucinating the expe-
rience of the materialism: materiality is the mental generation of concepts that do
not map on to any mind-independent reality. The characteristics of matter discussed
above and discussed in the van Inwagen passage are not characteristics of the par-
ticles of quantum physics. The quantum abstract atoms have been discovered to have
no location, have no enduring existence or to involve any significant duration, they
do not have structure, they do not touch,184 they exhibit little or no movement, they
do not have spatial extension (they are not observed to have surface, and thus no
color, and quantum particles cannot be directly empirically observed at all.), and
compared to the ‘‘logic’’ ordinary empirical perspective, quantum reality appears
non-logical.185 Most philosophers who discuss quantum objects typically erroneously
claim they are not immaterial, but are the smallest physical objects.
I have been told since I was forming my earliest DIV2 memories at 2 years of age,
that what reality is, consists of the set of surfaces and colors that I (believe I)
experience outside of me. I have also been told that this DIV2 reality is material. But
183 Van Inwagen (1990, 17). In a note above I pointed out how often even metaphysical entities are
sometimes also put into the definition of ‘‘matter.’’
184 Van Inwagen discusses this (1990, 34). Also, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, in their book Substance,
discuss this issue, and how it might lead to skepticism about the existence of parts and wholes (i.e., as
evidence for mereological nihilism):
Skepticism about the intelligibility of the relations which are commonly thought to unify or organize
the parts of material objects... might be thought to provide... argument in favor of monadism
[Hoffman and Rosenkrantz are using ‘‘monadism’’ here as synonymous with ‘‘mereological nihil-
ism,’’ see page 77 of their 1997]. Such skepticism or claims of ignorance might be fueled by devel-
opments in modern science, developments which are themselves well confirmed by experimental
data. For example, the laws of physics imply that in all but extremely exceptional circumstances, no
two physical objects touch (strictly speaking) because of the presence of repulsive forces between
fundamental particles. (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997, 78)
It is interesting to note the way quantum physicists also come to the conclusion that the fundamental
particles (some of which, such as electrons or quarks, may be true philosophic atoms) apparently do
not contact, touch or interact in any sort of macroscopic manner, such as by bouncing off one
another, or such as by surfaces interacting in some way. Instead, what ‘‘interaction’’ in quantum
physics means is really a misleading word that physics use, because ‘‘interaction’’ or ‘‘touching’’ or
‘‘contacting’’ of particles at the quantum level are words that appear to all be synonymous with the
word ‘‘momentariness’’.
185 As discussed, DIV2 is in fact absurd, and DVIV1 is coherent.
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if I investigate and peer into it, if I probe these surfaces and colors, and if I try to find
out what they are made of, I arrive at a quantum reality that only involves the
aforementioned immateriality. In other words, if I study the objects of my ordinary
empirical experience enough, I come to the discovery that these objects do not exist.
The famous physicists, John Gribbin and Paul Davies, express a similar outlook in a
passage about how investigation into matter leads the way out of materialism. This
passage, which summarizes nearly all issues of quantum mereological nihilism,
indicates that the immaterialist quantum abstract atoms are invisible energy, which
will be relevant to the discussion near the end of this subsection:
It is fitting that physics—the science that gave rise to materialism—should also
signal the demise of materialism... [T]he new physics has blown apart the central
tenets of materialist doctrine... [Q]uantum theory... totally transformed our image
of matter... [One of the primary sectors] of... quantum theory, known as quantum
field theory... goes beyond even this; it paints a picture in which sold matter dis-
solves away, to be replaced by... excitations and vibrations of invisible field energy.
In this theory, little distinction remains between material substance and apparently
empty space, which itself seethes with ephemeral quantum activity.186
Due to the reasoning I presented up to this point in this article, I see now way to
avoid immaterialism. But I do see philosophers (and physicists) attempting to veer
around the thesis of immaterialism in order to claim that (somehow) quantum
abstract atoms are material objects. If immaterialism is correct, the only way such a
claim could be made, and that quantum objects could be considered to have the
aforementioned material properties, is by plainly giving false description of quantum
reality. This is in fact what I have found to be the case in the literature in philosophy
and physics, where philosophers and physicists make the conclusion that quantum
atoms are material by presenting obviously incorrect accounts of quantum objects in
order to get to that claim. An example can found by merely looking at the same page
of van Inwagen’s widely discussed book that I have already cited in this section upon
which van Inwagen claims that quantum atoms are ‘‘not clear cases of material
objects,’’ but where we can see van Inwagen non-inferentially resisting the
immaterialist thesis in this passage:
There is one relation called ‘parthood’ whose field comprises material objects
and those things like elementary particles which are not clear cases of material
objects which share many of their salient features (they are substances or
186 Davies and Gribbin (1992, 14).
Also on page 14, in response to these ideas, and right after he passage just given, they write that:
the culmination of these ideas [regarding quantum field theory] is the so-called superstring theory,
which seeks to unite space, time, and matter, and to build all of them from the vibrations of
submicroscopic loops of invisible string inhabiting a ten-dimensional imaginary universe.
As discussed in other notes of this article, string theory is a non-experimental, primarily mathematical
theory of quantum reality. But what is interesting to note is that the theory agrees with virtually
everything about the quantum mereological nihilist thesis of this article—except for one issue: the
quantum abstract atoms are not points, but rather are vibrating strings or sheets of energy. This is even
true on issues of non-contacting. From what I understand from physicists, these strings or sheets do
not contact or touch, but only amalgamate or unify, as mereological nihilism involves.
123
348 Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386
continuants; they can move about and collide with and rebound from one
another; they have masses).187
I have shown in numerous passages in this article from the experimental accounts of
physics that there is very little correct about this passage. I give textual evidence
from physics that show that quantum objects do not collide, that they do not have
any real persistence. So the mystery is: Why does van Inwagen, who is considered a
leading American philosopher, present inaccurate information? It seems to me, as
mentioned elsewhere in this article, that physicists could be partly to blame, as they
often carelessly describe their data, often in a way where they are merely trying to
carry out the nearly impossible task of explaining DIV1 logic understandable to the
DIV2 consciousness, thus giving rise to mistakes by those who interpret it.188
The philosophy of immaterialism appears to be closely linked to the concept of
energy, and to the idea that quantum abstract atoms are fleeting points of energy. For
example, the photon was discovered by Max Planck to apparently be composed of
energy and describable by the equation E = hf (f is frequency, and h is Planck’s
constant). (Interestingly, it was perhaps the discovery of this equation, and the
discontinuous ‘‘motion’’ is predicted, that more than any other equation brought out
what is called the new physics, which is the quantum-oriented physics.) Then it was
found that all particles could be fully described in terms of their energy, or, in other
words, as being energy (what Ford calls ‘‘the energy of being’’ in a passage below).
Heisenberg wrote: ‘‘[e]nergy is in fact the substance from which all elementary
particles, all atoms and therefore all things are made.’’189 Also, the very popular new
theory of quantum physics called string theory (discussed above) also involves the
idea that all basic building blocks are composed of strings of energy.
The reason that the quantum particle energy thesis, and the philosophy of
immaterialism, are closely associated—even to the point that we can maintain that
quantum abstract atoms are immaterial energy—is due to the following argument:
Quantum abstract atoms are immaterial,
Quantum abstract atoms are energy.
Conclusion 3: Quantum abstract atoms are immaterial energy.
The thesis that quantum abstract atoms are immaterial points of energy might
seem to be a similarity between DIV1 and DIV2, contrary to the idea that they are
the inverse properties of one another, since they are both are ultimately energy
(DIV2 objects are energy due to Einstein’s E = mc2, which shows that all massy
items are energy). This would contradict the principle that if a DIV1 object is P then
a DIV2 object is ~P. This however assumes that there is a macroscopic reality ‘‘out
there’’ to be called mc2—which the mereological nihilist, and the quantum physicist,
have found there is not. At any rate, the essence of being a DIV2 conceptualizer of
surface and color experiences is to not see the world as energy, but as stagnant
matter, which appears very different than energy, as is seen in the passages above,
and the one I am about to give from Professor Ford. The immaterial energy that is
187 Van Inwagen (1990, 19).
188 Interestingly, physicists even admit that their usage of terminology is imprecise, admitting it is
highly metaphorical. See Kane (2000) (39) where he discusses this (as if it is a good thing), main-
taining that ‘‘physicists have chosen to humanize [the equations and data]...‘‘
189 Heisenberg (1999 (1958)), 63.
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the quantum abstract atoms is not quite the same as the potential and kinetic
descriptions of energy given in Einstein’s relativity—due to the fact that the
‘‘behaviors’’ of quantum objects are different than those of macroscopic objects. A
passage from the physicist, Kenneth Ford, describes what the word ‘‘energy’’ means
when we are considering quantum energy:
[T]he total importance of energy springs not just from its variety of form, but
from its conservation: the total amount of energy in the cosmos remains always
the same, since the loss of one kind of energy is always being compensated by
the gain of another kind of energy... In the particle world, there are just two
significant forms of energy: kinetic energy and mass energy. Kinetic energy is
energy of motion; mass energy is energy of being.190
Ford’s passage emphasizes how the kinetic energy versus potential energy distinc-
tion, being more of a metaphysical DIV2 conception, can be given in terms of
motion and existence, as if a quantum abstract atom is an irreducible bit of existence.
6 The mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics: no space, no
metaphysics, quantum atomism, and the metaphysically generated illusion
of quantum paradoxes
In this section, I show how mereological nihilism is an alternative interpretation to
the interpretations of quantum mechanics we have been given (Bohmian, Multiple
Worlds, Copenhagen, etc.). What is most important about the mereological nihilist
interpretation of quantum physics is that there are no quantum paradoxes, which
makes the mereological nihilist interpretation diametrically opposed to the other
interpretations. Physicists have fooled the world into believing that there are para-
doxes of reality at the quantum level, and by the word ‘‘paradoxes,’’ we are asked to
believe that reality involves absurdities and impossibilities. Deriving these paradoxes
is strictly a metaphysical endeavor which has nothing to do with the I-empirical data. It
is one of the great threats to critical thinking in the contemporary world, contributing
to widespread abandonment of critical thinking by people world-wide. These meta-
physical paradoxes have led many people to, in some sense, forget that it is only
through strict non-paradoxical and straightforward statistical mathematics that led to
the quantum revolution (by Heisenberg, Dirac, etc.) and the discovery the quantum
nature of ultimate reality. The creation of quantum physics is a stunning, but
straightforward, scientific undertaking, based soundly in standard scientific inductive
analysis. To assert that there are metaphysical absurdities and paradoxes at the end of
this strictly logical, empirical, and mathematical pursuit, and to claim a logical
mathematical analysis brought about this illogical reality, seems to go against the entire
spirit of science. Scientists are famous for relishing, and delving into, mysteries. Out-
side of quantum physics, I do not know of one other scientific area that involves the
assertion that the mysteries that the scientific area turns up are not to be investigated
further, and rather, they are merely to be accepted, and no further investigation is
needed. So why does quantum physics involve the assertion that there are facts about
reality that do not need questioning and examination, and where we are asked to
believe that they are merely absurdities that reality involves, period? This would be
190 Ford (2004), 18.
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analogous to astrophysicists maintaining that since dark matter appears to be a par-
adoxical mystery, inquiry into what dark matter is, is not needed, and no further
investigation is needed, we are to just accept that it is out there without inquiring. It
would be analogous to if physicists in the late 1887 had maintained that since the ether
seemed paradoxical due to the findings of the Michelson and Morley experiment, we
should not question the ether, and just accept its existence, and accept that it is a
paradoxical entity. And this would be like demanding that research at Princeton on
telepathy191 be stopped, since we should just accept that telepathy is a fact, and no
explanation is needed. Since the cutting edge areas of science are replete with mys-
teries, if all scientists had the attitude that so many quantum physicists have exhibited,
then much of the progress of science would instantly halt.
Imagine if the dark matter astrophysicists announced that their theory of galactic
rotation is an utter paradox and mystery, since it involves the idea that there are
galaxies that have been scientifically verified to be both of mass m1 and mass m2 (m2
is significantly less than m1), and since one object cannot have two masses in this
way, nature therefore involves irreducible paradox. And then imagine that a few of
the dark matter theorists openly, publicly and frequently berated almost anybody
who happened to question them! Clearly this would be entirely opposed to the spirit
of science, but it is exactly analogous to what some of the pioneering physicists
(Feynman, etc.) have established.
The paradox-less mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics is
similar to the waveless variety of the positivistic Copenhagen Interpretation, which is
an interpretation that is closely associated with Bohr. But the paradox-less mere-
ological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics involves (at least) one signif-
icant difference with the Copenhagen Interpretation: the reasoning above about
mereological nihilism reveals that quantum reality is atomistic (unlike the afore-
mentioned version of Copenhagen). There are specific reasons that Copenhagen
does not arrive at this conclusion, but I will show that those reasons are to be
rejected. The I-empirical findings of quantum reality are of partless objects and
therefore of point objects (e.g. electrons are points; protons, which do not exist, are
really just quarks and gluons, which are points). And quantum point particles are
quantum abstract atoms, for reasons given above.
In this section, I will first give a general discussion of the aforementioned early
version of the Copenhagen Interpretation, since pointing the problem with that
version can help to vindicate the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum
mechanics. I will also discuss the quantum paradoxes, showing that they are actually
not paradoxes, and that they are the result of metaphysical concepts which can only
be absurd due to the reasoning in Sects. 3 and 4 (among other reasons), and due to
the empirical findings of the physicists themselves. Understanding that the para-
doxes are merely misguided and incongruous metaphysics also leads directly to the
mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics, as I will point out. Lastly
in this section, I will further discuss relevant issues to do with the way that the
metrological nihilist interpretation of quantum physics is an atomistic thesis, and
where the avoidance of absurdist metaphysics and the illusion that there are para-
normal quantum paradoxes leads directly to the nihilistic philosophy of quantum
abstract atomism. Due to length limitations in this article, the only quantum
191 This is being carried out by the group known as ‘‘PEAR’’: Princeton Engineering Anomalies
Group.
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paradoxes I will discuss are what seem to be the two most famous ones: wave-
particle duality (Sect. 6.2) and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (Sect. 6.3).
6.1 The Copenhagen Interpretation
In this subsection I do not give any sort of detailed analysis of the extremely popular
(among physicists) Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. My only
intention is to discuss its most basic conceptual principles, and to show that those
principles have some interesting similarities with mereological nihilism (which is
perhaps not entirely surprising, since both theories are non-metaphysical and quan-
tum-based.192) Discussing the Copenhagen Interpretation will lead to a discussion on
wave-particle duality and other alleged quantum paradoxes, where I will find that
there are no such paradoxes. The Copenhagen Interpretation is the interpretation of
quantum mechanics accepted by physicists.193 It has many varieties, where one variety
often has opposite features of another (e.g., some maintain that there are waves, some
don’t). The version of the Copenhagen Interpretation I will be discussing is an early
anti-metaphysical,194 even positivistic (or phenomenalist) interpretation of quantum
physics. The Copenhagen Interpretation comes from the great inventors of quantum
physics: ‘‘Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli laid the foundations for interpretation long ago,
and nothing that has since been discovered really undermines that groundwork.’’195 It
is an attempt to make sense of quantum reality to the DIV2 experiencer (who is partial
to DIV2 modes of experiencing): to the ordinary empirical perspective, quantum
reality appears to be a domain of intangibleness which allegedly generates a ‘‘crisis of
concepts’’ generated by it.196
At the start of Faye (2002) we find this passage: ‘‘the Copenhagen Interpretation
is mostly regarded as synonymous with indeterminism, Bohr’s correspondence
principle, Born’s statistical interpretation of the wave function, and Bohr’s com-
plementarity interpretation of certain atomic phenomena.’’ We will find that each
point raised here is very similar to the philosophy of mereological nihilism being
purported in this article. Other interesting similarities between Copenhagen and
mereological nihilism are as follows. Both theories involve a strict rejection of
determinism, and involve serious questioning of causation in general, since quantum
reality does not involve patterns that can be labeled as causal or regular. While
192 Being more precise, the Copenhagen Interpretation was non-metaphysical and positivistic at its
Bohrian outset, but this changed when varieties of the Copenhagen Interpretation arose. In this
section, I consider only the original Bohrian formulation of the Interpretation to be in line with
mereological nihilism.
193 Griffiths (1995, 3–4), Stenger (2000, 213).
194 It is very odd that the Copenhagen Interpretation gets lumped together with metaphysics. This is
not so for the Bohrian interpretation. Stenger writes that: ‘‘Bohr...tended to adopt the... extreme
positivist doctrine that an unmeasured property is too meaningless, too metaphysical, to even talk
about.’’ (Stenger 2000, 117) The Copenhagen Interpretation is used by non-philosophers often to
attempt to establish a mystical metaphysics, but this is to completely sidestep what Bohr intended,
which was to remain more-or-less positivistic, which is to say: to remain as anti-metaphysical as
possible. (Oddly, Stenger later implies that the positivistic Copenhagen Interpretation ‘‘raises deep
metaphysical issues about what constitutes reality,’’ (132) and thus appears to commit the very error
about applying metaphysics to Bohr’s philosophy, and contradicts the passage on 117.)
195 Omne´s (1999a, 3).
196 Omne´s (1999a, 3).
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Copenhagen involves the idea that there is an indeterministic quantum reality,197 for
reasons given above, it is safe to say that this indeterminism is such that it leads to an
obliteration of causation, just as is the case with mereological nihilism.
Now for the differences that the Copenhagen Interpretation has with mereolog-
ical nihilism. Surprisingly, the very first versions of the Copenhagen Interpretation
denied that a quantum reality actually exists, and rather involved the idea that only
consciousness exists.198 Herbert describes this as the position that ‘‘[t]here is no deep
reality... There is no quantum world. There is only abstract quantum description.’’199
Unless consciousness is identical to the quantum abstract atoms (which apparently,
according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, it is not), this is a major difference
between the Copenhagen Interpretation and the quantum-based mereological
nihilism. This is the primary difference I know of where there appears to be a conflict
between the claims of mereological nihilism and that of the Copenhagen Interpre-
tation. But in fact it may not be much of a conflict: I am not convinced that post-
Bohr physicists really hold to this aspect of the Copenhagen Interpretation on a
regular basis. In other words, physicists hold to the tents of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation, except for this one (and they will still consider themselves Copenhagen
since they meet the rest of the tenets of Copenhagen).200 If one listens to the way
contemporary quantum physicists talk, they maintain that there is a quantum world,
and (as seen in one of the Griffiths’ passages just given) when we are not looking it is
wavy, and when we look at it those waves collapse into I-empirical points. Therefore,
there is something there when we are not looking, and Copenhagen has changed
since the original Bohr idea that there is no quantum world. Herbert refers to this as
a principle tenet of the original formulation of the Copenhagen Interpretation, but
we can find countless instances of physicists who tell us they are part of the
Copenhagen Interpretation tradition, telling us that there is a quantum reality. In
fact, Herbert also refers to the quantum world as being real; to give one example,
consider the wording of this passage: ‘‘...new quantum facts force physicists to admit
that the world most certainly rests on some bizarre deep reality.’’201 For these
reasons, I find that we can reject the idea that there is no quantum reality as being
part of the current usage of the Copenhagen Interpretation by physicists.
From this we can see how the Copenhagen Interpretation promotes the idea that
consciousness creates reality.202 I take this to mean—in mereological nihilist
terms—that there is no DIV2 reality without consciousness creating it.203 This is in
precise agreement with mereological nihilism, at least from the perspective that both
theories involve the strict position that consciousness creates DIV2, and there is no
DIV2 when nobody is looking (generating experience).
197 Faye (2002).
198 See Herbert (1985, 16–18).
199 Herbert (1985, 16–17).
200 Gibbins writes that ‘‘there is no one Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics... [O]ne
should not think of the Copenhagen Interpretation as a single consistent Interpretation of the
theory.’’ (1987, 47)
201 Herbert (1985, 55).
202 Herbert (1985, 17).
203 John Wheeler wrote: ‘‘No elementary phenomenon is real phenomenon until it is an observed
phenomenon. (Quoted in Herbert 1985, 18)
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The rest of this section deals with quantum paradoxes and quantum atomism,
in order to lead into the next subsection. Both of these involve the wave half of
the wave-particle duality thesis, and with the discovery that such waves are en-
tirely metaphysical and can be shown to not exist. The positivistic accounts of the
Copenhagen Interpretation do not accept the wave function as real,204 but, as the
Griffiths’ passages show, physicists however often put aside this aspect of
Copenhagen in order to metaphysically theorize that, for example, ‘‘according to
quantum mechanics, every probability wave extends throughout all of space,
throughout the entire universe.’’205 This is to maintain that, although particles
appear to move in wavy patterns, the wave itself is never observed, and only
particles are observed. In other words, the wave is entirely metaphysical, and the
particles (which are points) are I-empirical. Usually physicists refer to this I-
empirical experience of the particle as measurement, and refer to the wave as what
is there when nobody is looking, and the wave undergoes a transformation from
wave-status to particle status when measurement is carried out (i.e., when an
observer attempts to view the particle). Griffiths, who wrote the primary textbook
that is used for upper level quantum mechanics classes, discusses this early in this
book in a section on the Copenhagen interpretation, and where he uses ‘‘C’’
to denote measurement (experience of a particle) and ‘‘w’’ to denote the meta-
physical wave (non-experience of the particle):
It was the act of measurements that forced the particle to ‘‘take a stand’’ (though
how and why it decided on the point C we dare not ask). Jordan said it most
starkly: ‘‘Observations not only disturb what is to be measured, they produce it...
We compel (the particle) to assume a definite position.’’206 This view [is]... the
so-called Copenhagen Interpretation... [that is] associated with Bohr and his
followers.207
Evidently... measurement radically alters the wave function... We say that the
wave function collapses upon measurement, to a spike at the point C (w soon
spreads out again...). There are, then, two entirely distinct kinds of physical
processes: ‘‘ordinary’’ ones, in which the wave function evolves in a leisurely
fashion... and ‘‘measurements’’, in which w suddenly and discontinuously
collapses.208
204 Stenger (2000, 132).
205 Greene (2004, 90). Greene does not entertain the idea that the wave is a mere mathematical
descriptive tool, and not an outcome of mere particle observations, even though, as I will cite, below
on this same page he refers to this as ‘‘[mere] description.’’ It is mysterious that the interference
patterns of the two-slit experiment arise, as if the particles interact across time. But just because it is
a mystery does not mean it leads to a contradiction in quantum mechanics, but rather a limitation
due to DIV2 experiential shortcomings.
206 Mermin, David N. ‘‘Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks?’’ Physics Today. April 1985. Page
38.
207 Griffiths (1995, 3). Notice how Griffiths’ refers to the quantum world as if it is waiting there when
we are not measuring it, waiting to be measured. This will be significant at the end of this subsection
when we discuss how Bohr originally thought there is no quantum world, only abstract measurement.
208 Griffiths (1995, 4–5). Notice how Griffiths’ uses the term ‘‘physical’’ to describe these particle
processes, which shows how physicists assume the position that particles are physical, in
disagreement with the findings above regarding the philosophy of immaterialism.
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Waves are just waves, whether they exist in sound, light, or elsewhere. But waves,
strictly speaking, do not exist. The water wave is merely H2O molecules moving up
and down, but they do not do so in the same way, and thus the appearance of a
moving wave exists. Notice how this diagram shows that the pieces of waves only
move up and down:
The same can be said for other waves in other mediums: waves are just unat-
tached particles. If water waves do not exist, why would quantum waves exist? An
important point is that the waves referred to above, being spatially extended items,
cannot exist, given the reasoning of Sect. 4 above, and since the argumentation there
showed that there can be no extended item, whether composite or non-composite.
This is one of many reasons I will find that the wave part of the wave-particle duality
equation does not exist: it is a metaphysical invention. Without waves, there is no
wave particle duality.
6.2 No quantum paradoxes: the myth of wave-particle duality and uncertainty
about location and motion
The argumentation in Sect. 4 shows that there can not be any extended objects. The
waves in wave-particle duality are not points, they are (alleged to be) extended
items. Therefore the reasoning in Sect. 4 shows that there cannot be any meta-
physical-invisible waves. There is no wave-particle duality, there are only particles
(quantum abstract atoms).
Why do some physicists go against the Copenhagen position that the wave
function does not, strictly speaking, exist? We can find the answer if we consider
what Greene—certainly one of the most famous and widely respected physicists
today—says in the very next paragraph of Greene 2004 after the passage we just
gave: ‘‘Thus, the success of quantum mechanics forces us to accept that the electron,
a constituent of matter that we normally envision as occupying a tiny, pointlike
region of space, also has a description involving a wave that, to the contrary, is
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spread through the entire universe.’’209 (My emphasis.) As mentioned above, this is
the metaphysical theory of wave-particle duality, and we can see that it is also
connected to the idea that there all particles are metaphysical (unobservable) waves,
in addition to empirical points (points on the screen). Notice the way that Greene
uses the word ‘‘thus’’ in his passage. If one looks at the page that the passages are
given, it appears that this word ‘‘thus’’ connects from the mere metaphysical
assertion that any particle, in addition to being a point, is a probability wave spread
out through the universe. Greene’s reasoning (from pages 88–90) is as follows:
(1) Born theorized that there are probability waves as the best description of the
collapse of the wave function; (2) this is the best description of quantum mechanics;
(3) this indicates that there are metaphysical wave aspects to every point-particle,
and (4) ‘‘[t]hus, the success of quantum mechanics forces us to accept that the
electron... also has a description involving a wave...’’ (page 90, my emphasis) Notice
that, using some of Greene’s own words, we see that ‘‘description’’ ‘‘forces us to
accept’’ a metaphysical wave. But there is no reason I can see why description does
this. Description can be an instrumentalist tool, of course, without denotation.
Greene goes to admit that waves are merely instrumentalist when he tells us that the
‘‘utility of quantum mechanical probability waves to predict and explain experi-
mental results has been established beyond any doubt.’’210 But then, surprisingly,
and in disagreement with what was just written, he writes:
Yet there is still no universally agreed-upon way to envision what quantum
mechanical probability waves actually are. Whether we should say that an
electron’s probability wave is the electron, or that it’s associated with the electron,
or that it’s a mathematical device for describing the electron’s motion, and that it’s
the embodiment of what we can know about the electron is still debated.211
This seems a rather shortsighted discussion, which is coming from one of the world’s
most famous physicists. I put the issue in this harsh way not to wastefully produce
slander, but rather in order to make a certain point, one which philosophers often
agree with: physicists very often do not want to do philosophy, they are uncomfortable
interpreting their work for the public, and they are more comfortable with mere data
and experimentation. These are dangerously broad generalizations, of course, but
they are worth stating it seems since they may be able to give us some indication as to
why there exist all the oddities we are going through in this article that occur when
physicists develop philosophy (such as developing the wave-particle duality paradox,
etc.). Returning to Greene, in just three pages of his book The Fabric of the Cosmos, he
tells us that quantum waves do and do not exist, and that they instrumentalist and this
instrumentalism forces us to acknowledge that they are mind-independently real (i.e.
non-instrumentalist)—two claims which are clearly contradictions in terms. But,
against Bohr, Greene’s account is the account of where wave-particle duality arises. I
see no way to avoid the conclusion that it appears that the entire ‘‘paradox’’ is not well
established as a description of how nature really is.212 It seems to me safe to assert that
we are given absolutely no reason why there are extended probability waves—which
209 Greene (2004, 90).
210 Greene (2004, 91).
211 Ibid.
212 Murdoch appears to entertain the idea that a no-nonsense empiricism that is not averse to
instrumentalism indeed ‘‘need not be troubled by wave-particle duality.’’ (Murdoch 1987, 27)
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would go against the principles of mereological nihilism—and instead we can agree
with Stenger (cited in 2.4) that there is no wave in the wave-particle duality. If there is
anything that physicists should know, it is that utility of description do not mean reality
is this or that way beyond the description, lest we forget what happened with the
blunder of the ether.213 I will discuss wave-particle duality more in the next section.
6.3 Quantum atomism
As mentioned elsewhere in this article, quantum physicists are often very eager to
distance themselves from the philosophy of atomism.214 One of the principle ways
they do so is by using the metaphysical thesis of wave-particle duality. Consider this
passage from Omne´s:
Let us look at an object,... [such as] a billiard ball... Nothing could be simpler for
us: everybody has seen such an object, and as you were reading the first sentence
of this paragraph, an image of the ball formed in your imagination. Less than a
century ago, a physicists would not have thought otherwise, except for some
additional precision... To an atomist, the ball would have appeared as a dense
pack of atoms, with each atom being imagined as another very small kind of ball.
There is nothing resembling all that in quantum physics. The physicist does not
start from the idea of the ball as an assemblage of a colossal number of atoms,
but this idea is immediately replaced by a wave function which depends on as
many variables as there are electrons and atomic nuclei in the ball.215
Omne´s only considers one variety of philosophical atomism, as if there can only be
one variety. He assumes atoms can only be classical (non-quantum) extended solids
(Democritean atomism), and he does not recognize that there are many varieties of
philosophical atomism that have emerged through the millennia, such as Buddhist
213 At many points in this article, such as was just argued, I am giving evidence for the thesis that the
quantum paradoxes do not exist: there are no paradoxes, there are only erroneous interpretations.
Some philosophers, like Quine and Putnam, put enormous importance on these quantum paradoxes,
using them to make conclusions in their philosophy, based on the literalness of the paradoxes. But if
the reasoning I am presenting is correct, and there are no quantum paradoxes, it would draw the
conclusions Quine and others made into question. For example, it would bring into question this
claim by Quine:
[N]o statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has
been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what different is there in
principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein
Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? (‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism,’’ page 43).
214 For example, consider this passage from the famous physicists, Davies and Brown:
The discoveries of the electron and of radioactivity, the success of Planck’s quantum hypothesis
and the inception of Einstein’s theory of relativity swept away the entire basis of Newtonian-
Maxwellian physics. Newton’s laws of motion and his commonsense assumptions about space and
time were abandoned. Even Democritus’ atomic hypothesis had to be replaced by a more subtle
and complex view of the microworld in which atoms could no longer be regarded as indestructible
particles with a well-defined position and motion. It became apparent that the foundations of
classical physics had collapsed.
By about 1930 their place had been taken by new theoretical schemes: quantum mechanics, the
general theory of relativity and a more elaborate model of the atom. (Davies and Brown 1988, 4)
Of course the discovery that the atoms that scientists study having parts is not threat to the
philosophy of atomism, as that merely pushes back the issue to the parts of the atoms (electrons,
etc.) (and thus show that scientists’ atoms do not exist).
215 Omne´s (1999b, 148).
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atomism, which is virtually identical to quantum atomism. Also note the other
assumptions that Omne´s makes: there is a wave to consider in the metaphysical
wave-particle duality assumption, and the wave-particle duality is also a problem
for atomism. But in this subsection I have shown that there are reasons to reject
wave-particle duality, and to only accept the I-empirical items (quantum abstract
atoms), and not the metaphysical inventions (waves) associated with the I-empirical
observation of those atoms. And these assumptions therefore, should merely be
rejected. If there is no wave to wave-particle duality, then there are only the
particles. And since we are finding physicists to be describing many of these as
partless particles, I do not see a way to avoid the conclusion that they are obviously
atoms. This is why I come to the conclusion that mereological nihilism is a theory of
quantum atomism. Although I am sure critics of this article may feel inclined to
attack the anti-metaphysical mood of the reasoning here, but the reason there is such
a mood is because metaphysics certainly appears to lead to errors in reasoning, and I
know of no better examples of this than wave-particle duality, which literally leads to
the espousal of: reality = contradiction.
The particles giving rise to a wave pattern is no more than a series of simple
events giving rise to a predictable repeatable pattern over some period of conceptual
time. More specifically, the wave-particle duality paradox came from the two-slit
experiment, which, very simply put, reveled that there were specific quantum
experiments that could be done that show quantum abstract atoms behave as fol-
lows: (1) there are unconnected events (firing electrons one-at-a-time) (2) which give
an apparently random outcome (unpredictability of where they will hit on the
screen), (3) which give rise to an overall ordered pattern when many random firings
are compared. The overall pattern in (3) has led physicists to maintain that the items
of (1) have that pattern ‘‘in’’ them somehow. But this is analogous to maintaining
that the single hydrogen atom has the whole wave’s nature ‘‘in’’ it. Even physicists’
own description of the interference patterns in wave mechanics does not allow for
this, since waves are understood to be produced when particles are ‘‘together,’’ not
when they are ‘‘alone.’’ Further, there are many instances in DIV2-experineced
reality, where we see the 1-2-3 pattern just described in nature, but where it is not
asserted that the individual items in (1) individually have the pattern observed in (3)
‘‘in’’ them. To give just one example: solar flares appear to occur (somewhat) ran-
domly (less randomly now that we are understanding them better), but their overall
activity forms an ordered pattern (reaching what are called ‘‘peaks’’).216 But
astrophysicists don’t assert that the individual solar flare has the pattern-nature ‘‘in’’
it. Countless other examples could be given.
The real mystery is why our DIV2 or DIV1 experiences regularly appear to us in
patterns at all. In any series of experience impressions—wave or otherwise—reality
presents itself through instantaneous moments that do not have any known con-
nection to the past (see Sect. 4.5), but for some reason give rise to a pattern when we
experience many of the instants. The two-slit experiment is just one account of how
seemingly random and unconnected events present themselves as patterns to DIV2
experiencers through time and via memory (see Sect. 5.2). Apparently virtually all
moments of our lives are this way, where unconnected instants create patterns in our
216 See the June 2, 1999 NASA story: ‘‘Solar Flares Show Their True Colors. New research points to
a common mechanism for spectral behavior in Solar Flares.’’ <http://science.nasa.gov/newhome/
headlines/ast02jun99_1.htm>.
123
358 Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386
memory. The mystery is why we have these patterns, whether in waves from indi-
vidual particles, or due to anything else.
In exploring the thesis of quantum abstract atomism, quantum uncertainty about
location and motion is a relevant issue to discuss. Physicists typically tell us that
quantum uncertainty about location and motion reveals that quantum objects have
some sort of extendedness (magnitude, size) due to the fact that their location is
smeared. Smearing is understood when we understand that an object only has a
precise (point-sized) location if it is unmoving, and any object in motion thus cannot
be described as being unsmeared and at a precise location. The various notions of
quantum uncertainty involve ‘‘[m]easurable physical properties like color and
hardness are said to be ‘‘incompatible’’ with one another, since measurements of one
will (so far as we know) always necessarily disrupt the other.’’ 217 Regarding motion
and location, issues to do with uncertainty lead physicists to conclude that particles
are, for example, blurry cloud-probabilities.218 The smeared, blurry, streaked par-
ticles clouds or lines are not considered by physicists to be products of erroneous
perception, but rather to be real extended objects: the point-electron (somehow)
smears to form an n-dimensional object (n > 0). How is an electron, which is a
structureless point, extended (not a point)? Also, the reasoning of Sect. 4 specifically
showed that extended partless objects do not exist. Therefore, there has to be a
problem with the conceptual analysis of imagining that quantum uncertainty leads to
the idea that an electron or any quantum abstract atom can smear to give rise to an
extended item. It is not that there is not uncertainty in measurement and quantum
physics, the specific issue the argumentation in this subsection and in Sect. 4 is that
quantum uncertainty cannot lead to the conclusion that there are extended objects in
quantum reality. For that reason, if in electron microscopy, for example, an extended
electron cloud is observed, then that must be a DIV2 illusion, somehow created by
the measuring of the electron’s instances. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle
shows us that if we want to know the velocity and location of an object simulta-
neously, that measurement will only give rise to an extended object—above referred
to a smeared object. This uncertainty specifically stems from measurement, not from
the real characteristics of a particle. This is a controversial issue, since physicists
claim that the smearing is not a product of measurement error or limitation, but
rather the electron is really extended by its being smeared. In discussion of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, consider this passage from the later chapters on
quantum physics in the fourth edition of one of the most widely used introductory
physics text books, Fundamental of Physics (Extended Version),219 by Halliday,
Resnick, and Walker, page 1169: What Feynman is saying, in effect, is: ‘‘Think in
terms of matter waves. Throw out the notion of the electron as a tiny dot. When you
want to think of electrons, do so statistically, being guided by the probability density
of the matter wave.’’ In effect, this is a plea for metaphysical analysis of quantum
wave metaphysics, since priority is given to metaphysical wave over I-empirical
particle. Physicists reject the idea that the electron is like, for example, a glowing
bullet shot through a dark room makes a line-smear. Such a line does not exist,
strictly speaking, outside of consciousness, and it is generated by the inability to see
finely enough to decipher the smaller bullet locations while it traveled. The line only
217 Albert (1992, 6–7).
218 Omne´s (1999b, 149).
219 1993 (1974). New York: John Wiley and Sons.
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exists due to the inability of the DIV2 perceiver (perceiver = mind-dependent
generator of surfaces and colors) to see the motions of the bullet on a more fine-
grained level.
There are numerous fatal problems, however, with imagining that the smear is not
like the streaking bullet (according to which, the steak is generated by consciousness,
and the real item, the bullet, is somewhat hidden behind this illusion). If we reject
the glowing bullet model of the smeared electron, we must take up the ideas that the
electron is really extended, and the extended image generated on the computer
screen in electron microscopy is a real three-dimensional solid. But the problems
with extended electrons are well-known. Firstly, extended objects have parts, as we
saw above. Not only would such a view fall under the attack of the reasoning given in
sections above, where we found that composite and extended objects do not exist,
but also there are plenty of problems with the extended electron that physicists have
pointed out for us, which are enough to toss the idea of the extended electron. First,
extended electrons are impossible since their halves would repel and the extended
electron could only explode.220 Also, being a Democritean atom, an extended
electron would be in violation of Einstein’s relativity theory.221 And the electron,
having parts due to its extension, would violate its empirical foundation of being
revealed it to be unstructured (see Kane’s quote in Section 1), and would also, as
stated, being in violation of every bit of reasoning in Sects. 3 and 4 above.222 For
these, and perhaps other reasons not even listed here, I do not see how I am sup-
posed to accept the conclusion that there can be an extended, solid, electron-smear.
If an image is generated of an electron probability cloud in a computer screen, I do
not see how I am to avoid the conclusion that there is no real solid item that is not an
illusion created by a computer screen and/or DIV2 consciousness. And I do not see
how I am to avoid the conclusion that electron smear is an illusory (mind-generated)
smear, just like the glowing bullet’s smear. I do not see how it is not the case than, as
Green writes: ‘‘[w]hen we locate an electron, we always find all of its mass and all of
its charge concentrated in one tiny, pointlike region.’’223
But there are other problems with uncertainty beyond those just listed.
Physicists are endlessly describing their theories in terms of space—which is a
metaphysical idea. If there is quantum uncertainty about location and motion,
this would be a primary motivation for physicists to find quantum reality to be
not to be atomicious: in this article, through philosophical reasoning, I have found
that quantum atomism can only involve immaterial point atoms that flash in and
out of existence, and extended cloudy quantum objects are the antithesis of such
a philosophy of quantum atomism.224 But it is not hard for us to see the fallacy
and vacuousness regarding quantum uncertainty about motion and location.
First, notice that the concept of location only has meaning if relationalist or
220 This is a widely discussed issue. For just one example of a good account of this, see Davies (1984,
107–108), who is a well-known physicist.
221 Davies (1984, 107).
222 Greene discusses problems similar to these regarding extended and/or spread-out electrons on
page 88 of 2004.
223 Greene (2004, 88).
224 The abstract atomism involved with the R-theory of time in Grupp (2005a) also involves a
complete rejection that there is quantum uncertainty at the level of ultimate particle reality, and of
the idea that uncertainty leads to extended and/or ‘‘cloudy’’ quantum objects.
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substantivalist space exists. As discussed above, labeling objects as being at
locations in space is going beyond the empirical into the paradoxically meta-
physical. Without locatedness—which no particles have, according to the con-
clusions of this article—there is no uncertainty about location and motion. The
glowing bullet is a construction of DIV2 experiencing, due to the imprecision of
empirical experience, not the way the bullet is. Similarly, there are no quantum
probability clouds without locatedness to make particle uncertain. The issue is not
whether a quantum abstract atom has definite position or not, since it has no
location at all. To get a further idea of where the metaphysicality of quantum
uncertainty about motion and location comes from, consider how it comes from
the wave notion, which we can see in a passage from Greene, ‘‘Uncertainty is
built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we
carry out some clumsy measurement.’’225 In the sentence after this on the same
page Greene mentions how quantum uncertainty is due to probability waves, the
very ones we have found above to be metaphysical fabrications. Nobody has ever
observed the particle clouds that physicists so often refer to, and if there are no
probabilities waves or spatial locations, there is no way that such extrasensory
and metaphysical quantum probability clouds can exist. And if they do not, there
is no reason to maintain that quantum uncertainty threatens quantum atomism.
I am confident that some physicists will employ a familiar ad hominem attack
against the mereological nihilist interpretation of quantum mechanics since it is a
no-collapse interpretation, since it is not so respectful to Heisenbergian smear-cloud
particles, it is waveless, there are no probability clouds, and so on. But the reasoning
above dictates that I go this route, and of course there are interpretations of
quantum mechanics that do not involve collapse,226 that do not involve respect to
waves, or to probability clouds.
In conclusion, I do not see how I am to accept the idea that there are
quantum paradoxes, when, as discussed, the paradoxes themselves appear to be
not well established. Given the empirical data, and given the logical reasoning of
this article, both of which are in agreement, I do not see how I can avoid the
conclusion that the quantum paradoxes are a hoax, and that what is really waiting
to be discovered is an answer as to why quantum reality is how it is.
7 Scientific evidence for mereological nihilism: conceptualism, nihilism, forces,
and the quantum revolution
Mereological nihilism is a remarkable philosophical position due to the fact that all of
the empirical objects that humans ordinarily perceive in their daily life (such as trees,
lions, mountains, or any of the macroscopic objects that can be perceived by their
surface and/or a color) are objects that have extension and parts, and thus do not exist,
due to the reasoning found in the above sections, and if mereological nihilism is a
correct theory. If mereological nihilism is a correct theory, it means that nearly all of
the beliefs humans ordinarily hold about reality are incorrect, and there is something
completely misleading about all of the ordinary perceptions that humans typically
225 Greene (2004, 98).
226 For example, see Albert, David Z, and Loewer, Barry. 1989. ‘‘Two No-Collapse Interpretations
of Quantum Theory. Nous 23 169–186.
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have about reality in their daily life. If mereological nihilism is a correct theory, then
nearly none of our science (except for some research areas in quantum physics) is
correct, and nearly all of our language is incorrect: scientific and ordinary language are
wrong (they do not denote) since almost always about objects that do not exist.
If we magnify the extended matter that humans ordinarily (believe that they)
perceive down to the quantum abstract atoms (electrons, quarks, etc.), we find that
the perceived extended matter does not in fact possess any continuous spatial
extendedness nor colorfulness. Also, during the indirect quantum observation of
particles that scientists routinely carry out, they do not witness any metaphysical
relations between the particles, such as those espoused by Newton, Faraday, almost
any other pre-1900s physicist, and by multitudes of contemporary metaphysical
realists. If particles do not touch or relate, then there is a failure in our only ways for
describing how particles accumulate to give rise to the extended and/or colorful
solid, liquid and gaseous objects humans experience empirically. It would seem that
the quantum reality discovered in experimental physics is in strong agreement with
mereological nihilism. For reasons given so far in this article, quantum science can be
considered evidence for mereological nihilism and for the conceptualism (mental
fabrication) of empirical experience. Petitot and Smith write:
The rise of mathematical physics has long been seen by many as dictating a
dismissal of the phenomenal world—the world of macroscopically organized in
objectual forms, shapes, secondary qualities and states of affairs—from the
realm of properly ontological concerns and as dictating a concomitant ‘psy-
chologization’ of phenomenal structures.227
The brand of extreme conceptualism that mereological nihilism leads to can be
defined as follows: all of the surfaces and colors humans experience empirically are
not objects that are out in the world, but rather they are mental constructions
created in the act of being conscious. Mereological nihilism appears to give evidence
for this variety of conceptualism, since in a mereological nihilist reality, solids, liq-
uids, or gases, and any conceivable macroscopic objects that have a surface and/or a
color do not exist. Rather, they are concepts and ideas in our imagination, where-
upon it would follow that ordinary life, and everyday empirical experience is no
more than a stream of imaginal thought-experiences. The idea that surface and color
do not exist except as mental concepts are not at all new to philosophy (even though
it is not a position widely accepted in—and to some degree it has been banished
from—philosophy in the contemporary era), which can be seen by considering a
passage from Lockwood about Hume and Hobbes on the colorfulness of objects
(one of the two ways we experience the external world—surface being the other):
Some philosophers, of whom Hobbes is one and David Hume possibly another,
adopt an error theory of colour... That is to say, they hold that our pre-
reflective, or at any rate pre-philosophical, conception of the material world is
actually mistaken, in so far as it holds that physical objects really are coloured.
According to the error theory, our tendency to believe that objects are
227 Petitot and Smith (1997, 233). In their article, Petitot and Smith goes on to argue against the
position that quantum mechanics is strongly opposed to common sense.
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coloured is a consequence of an illegitimate projection on to the external world
of things that are going on exclusively in our own minds.228
Quantum science has changed to become more and more of a mereological
nihilist endeavor due to the past 100 years of revolutionary quantum theory.
There was a revolution in science in the early 1900s, with the inverse-physics
found in the discovery of the quantum world, Physicists such as Faraday, Newton,
Einstein, and so on, before the quantum revolution, held that positions 1 and 2
referred to in Sect. 4.1 (contacting and/or relating between quantum particles and
quantum abstract atoms) were responsible for the way in which quantum particles
or philosophical atoms give rise to the empirical objects we perceive, but that is
no longer the case. Physicists, before the quantum revolution, typically asserted
that metaphysical relations (that we found to be impossible in Sects.4.3 and 5.1)
are ultimately behind the descriptions of the structure of matter, space, fields and
forces in their physics. Jammer writes:
With the rise of Newtonian dynamics and its interpretation along the lines of
Boscovich, Kant, and Spencer, the concept of force rose almost to the status of
an almighty potentate of totalitarian rule over the phenomena. And yet, since
the very beginning of its early rise to power, revolutionary forces were at work
(Keill, Berkeley, Maupertuis, Hume, d’Alembert) which in due time led to its
dethronement (Mach, Kirchhoff, Hertz). This movement in mathematical
physics, from the time of Newton onward, was essentially an attempt to explain
physical phenomena in terms of mass points and their spatial relations. For it
became increasingly clear that the concept of force, if divested of all its ex-
trascientific connotations, reveals itself as an empty scheme, a pure relation.229
After the quantum revolution, when physicists leaned away from 1 and 2 (contacting
and/or relatedness between particles), physicists still discuss atoms and particles as
involving ‘‘connections’’ (and rather strange ones) between them, and they still even
refer to them as forces and/or fields. But since the quantum revolution, now the
forces and fields are not considered to be relations or metaphysical continuous
connections between particles. Rather, the forces and fields are indirectly perceived
by scientists through their measuring apparatuses to nothing but unattached, non-
contacting, unconnected quantum abstract atoms, and no relations or connections of
any sort are anywhere to be found in the I-empirical observations of the quantum
world. Gribbin discusses this in a passage that is about the basics of what a field is
according to the quantum mechanical framework:
In classical physics, a field is something which stretches out from an object and
conveys a force (there are really only two forces in classical physics, gravity and
electromagnetism). The force can be described in terms of ripples in the field, or
waves. But in quantum mechanics we know that waves can be described in terms
of particles. So the concept of a field in the classical sense is replaced by the
concept of particles which carry forces as they are exchanged between other
quantum entities. The classic example is the photon, which mediates the
electromagnetic force...230
228 Lockwood (1989, 5).
229 Jammer (1999, 241–242).
230 Gribbin (1998, 316–317).
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From what has been discussed in this section, we can see that the idea is that reality is
composed of interrelated networks of particles, or of continuous fields and forces be-
tween particles, is antiquated, and the most progressive view (progressive in scientific
terms) appears to be one where reality is composed of unrelated and unattached
particles, which is also the mereological nihilist position. However, many philosophers
often still erroneously refer to the fields and forces of physics (e.g., gravity, electro-
magnetism, the color force, dark energy, etc.) as relations and continuous connections
and metaphysical connections or forces between particles, and they often refer to them
as if those forces, relations and connections are purely metaphysical entities.231
It is interesting to note how often philosophers still maintain that the ‘‘push-pull’’
forces between particles are describable as relations, when physicists have discovered
them to be merely unattached non-touching quantum abstract atoms, whereupon it
seems dubious to describe the forces as being in any way primarily metaphysical
relations rather than merely what we have evidence for the existence of: namely
particles! Hoffman and Rosenkrantz write:
According to currently accepted [science],... the adherence relation instantiated
by parts that compose an actual mereological compound results from an
equilibrium of attractive and repulsive forces of certain kinds among those
parts. The particular nature of such an adherence relation is an empirical
question to be decided by scientific investigation of the mereological com-
pound in question.232 (Emphasis added.)
Since science (quantum physics, specifically) appears to point toward the veracity of
mereological nihilism, we should expect there to be a movement among philoso-
phers who want to go beyond an evidential account in order to reject scientific and
philosophical evidence, and in order to fulfill their desires for, and beliefs in, the
flimsy veil of perception and, as stated in the introduction, to believe the world they
perceive is more or less the way the reality really is. If the evidence for mereological
nihilism is as strong as it appears to be in this article, we should expect to find such
philosophers, in going outside of an evidential inquiry in order to fabricate theories
that support their mere belief in the world they see, can only do so by constructing
prephilosophical and/or prescientific theories. We will see below that this is what
happens, and we know it because we will see that such philosophers admit it. In a
passage about Jay Rosenberg, Markosian maintains that we cannot use science to
aide in issues to do with composition:
The puzzling [thing]... is that Rosenberg seems to want to suggest that sciences
such as microphysics, physical chemistry, and biology can help us to answer SCQ.
This is puzzling because those sciences are, after all, empirical sciences, whereas a
correct answer to SCQ would have to express a proposition that is necessarily
true. For this reason, it is hard for me to see how exploring any of the sciences
mentioned by Rosenberg could help us to find a correct answer to SCQ.233
231 For example, Elder appears to make this error, in a passage about atomic rearrangement of an
exploding building:
The microparticles... affected by the explosion call on relations of spatial proximity and electro-
magnetic charge (or, for quarks, relations with respect to ‘colour’) for their sufficiency to produce
violent alterations in the microparticles of the second tier... (Elder 2003, 30–31).
232 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 83).
233 Markosian (1998b, 229).
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Here Markosian is admitting that science cannot tell us how atoms compose com-
posites, and that if there is a solution to this problem, it will be found in philosophy,
and it will be specifically found in metaphysical philosophy, since he is saying that it
is not in the realm of the observable (it is not empirical/scientific) to find the answer.
It is by a prescientific and prephilosophical (i.e., non-scientific and non-philo-
sophical) pursuit that one can deny mereological nihilism, given that the evidence
for it appears to come on many fronts, as this article demonstrates. I will next discuss
this prescientific and prephilosophical (non-scientific and non-philosophical) attitude
that some philosophers exhibit.
8 Attacks on mereological nihilism
The few contemporary philosophers who mention mereological nihilism typically
tend to describe it in derogatory terms, and via ad hominem and other informal
fallacies. Consider what Hudson writes (in a rather placid passage, compared to
others in cited in this article):
Nihilism [is].. roughly, the view that there are no material objects with proper
parts. Nihilism is usually mentioned (as it will be here) only to be more or less
immediately rejected. It earns a place among the popularly discussed theories
primarily because it lies at one of the extremes along the continuum of
answers... Nihilism is a non-starter.234
Hudson’s comment is surprising, in light of the what I have written in the sections
above. Perhaps Hudson is only referring to contemporary philosophers in his passage,
and when he asserts that few philosophers have espoused the nihilistic position. In
various epochs of the past mereological and compositional nihilism has been the
mainstream position (Democritus and Greek atomism, or some accounts of the pre-
classical Indian Buddhism are two good examples; others were mentioned above; and
even some physicists espouse mereological nihilism. A good example of a physicist
who appears to hold a nihilistic or somewhat nihilistic position is Stenger.235) But I
will next discuss that it is common for philosophers to misrepresent nihilism as an
outrageous and radical philosophy, that can be rejected without need for an argument
showing why it can be, and where it is demanded that it is ‘‘a non-starter’’, making it
appear to be a philosophy that has no scientific evidence behind it, no philosophical
justification, and as if it is a philosophical position that no philosophers have ever
espoused. As I show in this article, nothing could be further from the truth.
234 Hudson (2001b, 81–82).
235 This is what Victor Stenger refers to as a ‘‘particle reality’’:
The standard model offers a picture of elementary quarks and leptons, interacting by the exchange
of a set of elementary bosons... In this book I am making the unremarkable suggestion that the
quarks, leptons, and bosons of the standard model can be safely regarded as elements—perhaps the
only elements—of an objective physical reality... The alternative ontology in which continuous
fields are ‘‘more real’’ than particles was discussed in the previous chapter. First, we saw that a dual
ontology of fields and particles, as existed in the nineteenth century [physics], contradicts the one-
to-one correspondence between particle and field in modern quantum field theory. We can have
either a reality of fields or a realty of particles (or other localized objects). We cannot have both
without asserting some new physics not described by relativistic quantum mechanics. Such an
assertion is uneconomical—not required by the data... Second, we saw that any viable field
ontology based on relativistic quantum fields necessarily entails a Platonistic view of reality.
(Stenger 2000, 253–254.) (Emphasis added.)
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8.1 Two sorts of empirical experience: ordinary and scientific
Many physicists and philosophers (attempt to) reject mereological nihilism by means
that are prescientific, and in the words of a few of them, prephilosophical. Markosian
writes on pages 214–215 of 1998b that he will find in that article that the widely
discussed answers to SCQ unacceptable.236 (It is interesting that he finds the given
responses to the SCQ ‘‘unacceptable,’’ since that appears to be a claim that
mereological nihilism would so far be our best philosophical theory.) He also,
however, maintains that he finds mereological nihilism to be unacceptable
(pp. 219–221). But he only presents two objections to mereological nihilism: (i)
according to mereological nihilism, ‘‘there are far fewer objects in the world than
most of us take there to be.’’ (220) And (ii) according to mereological nihilism,
‘‘there are no physical objects composed of many parts. So nihilism seems to entail
that you and I do not exist. And we can’t have that.’’ (220) I take each of these
claims to involve the same grounding: mereological nihilism disagrees with com-
monsensical intuitions and with ordinary empirical experience. But I will never-
theless treat each of these separately. (I do not discuss ii) until Sect. 8.2.)
As for (i), it is a claim that our intuitions about the world are trustworthy enough
that we can use them to reject the scientifically oriented mereological nihilism. (This is,
of course, diametrically opposed to the scientific method which was developed for us
by Bacon and Descartes, where we are to let discovery guide intuition rather than
intuition guide discovery—the latter of which was Aristotle’s method that actually
prohibited science for millennia, just as metaphysical opposition to mereological
nihilism appears to be doing today, thousands of years after Aristotle.) This is the
standard way the philosophers attack mereological nihilism: by pleading for respect of
ordinary empirical experience, and of commonsense intuitions about reality. I will
next show that they are acting in opposition to science and to what I will discuss is a
refined empiricism. They are instead operating in accord with a non-scientific, com-
monsense empiricism (what could be called a plebeian and popular DIV2 empiricism).
For these reasons, I will show that these philosophers are not presenting evidence and
reasoning that attacks mereological nihilism. It is merely an urging to accept the
intuitive view as merely given by common everyday DIV2 experience, which
Markosian calls ‘‘pre-philosophical intuition at the start of 1998b, as if that it is a good
thing to keep hold of when creating philosophical theories, rather than accepting a
post-intuitive (scientific and logical) view. Science and reason have been much better
in the past at informing us what reality is like than intuition has. (Examples are given
below.) Intuition leads to quasi-Aristotle’s anti-scientific investigation of nature, and
science leads to an anti-Aristotelian investigation of reality. I understand Markosian’s
being troubled by the fact that ordinary empirical experience is in disagreement with
236 He does not do this in order to show that mereological nihilism is the best theory due to the fact that
compositional theories are ‘‘unacceptable.’’ Rather, he does this merely to introduce his theory of
‘‘brutal composition,’’ which is supposed to be an acceptable account of composition, but it is no more
than a demand that we not discuss composition, since ‘‘brute’’ basically means ‘‘unanalyzable.’’ This is
an attempt to block philosophical analysis of something as important as material composition. This is a
great example of how philosophers will often attempt to reject that there can be philosophical analysis
of DIV2 reality when the going gets tough. All the aforementioned paradoxes basically enjoy this status
among philosophers. This is also a great example of the dearth of philosophical theorization the
theories of mereological and compositional philosophy give us in understanding reality: they are so
vacuous that we have to resort to demanding that there is no explanation possible for composition, as if
to demand that, composition just is, and you can’t know how or why.
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the empiricism of quantum physics. But science is all about overturning (sharpening,
improving) mere ordinary commonsensical DIV2-empirical experience, which tends
to be crude and imprecise, plebeian, popular, and uninformed,237 and which tends to
believe such things such as continents don’t move (float) across the surface of the
earth, or that the cosmic background radiation is not all around us, has no idea that
neutrino particles far outnumber ordinary matter particles, has no idea that dark
matter and dark energy exist, and is unaware that elephants are talking to one another
(even though we can’t here anything, when we are around them).
This prompts us to define two sorts of empirical experience: 1. honed and scientific
empiricism, and 2. ordinary and plebeian empiricism. I will name 1 and 2 as follows:
1. Non-scientific empiricism (NS-empiricism): this is plebeian, popular, unques-
tioning DIV2 empiricism that has not be refined by the shock of scientific discovery
where the empirical experiencer tends to merely accept most of what is witnessed
in this mode of experiencing (perhaps not mirages, but definitely a blue patch on
their computer screen is not smooth, but is composed of individual lit units that
have separations between them.)
2. Scientific-oriented empiricism (S-empiricism): this is DIV2 or DIV1 oriented
empiricism that is discerning in a way that NS-empiricism is not, and which is
critical in its approach of what is believed and accepted about what is experi-
enced, and about what is to be questioned or rejected. NS-empiricism likely
believes that a marble’s surface is entirely smooth and shiny, but S-empiricists
know that sufficient magnification of the surfaces is needed to find out if it is
(and such magnification reveals that it is neither smooth nor shiny but is as
jagged as a fractal edge.) I-empirical experience is a subset of these S-empiricist
experiences (and as pointed out in 2.4, only the I-empirical experiences of
quantum abstract atoms can be experiences of real objects).
I take the metaphysical realist to appeal to 1 (even though they may attempt to try
tell us that they are aligned with 2), and I will show why below.
It seems that few scientific statements could be more obvious than this one:
science is empirical, but the way a scientist empirically experiences can only change
by the process and progress of science. For example, when one begins studying
biology, one may think that ‘‘living things’’ denotes trillions of bugs and microbes
and macroscopically visible animals (i.e., the sorts of living creatures one might be
familiar with under NS-empiricism and before S-empiricism). But after the study of
biology begins, and NS-empiricism begins to transform into S-empiricism, one will
discover that denotation of ‘‘living things’’ just given false due to its truth value of
false, and rather something like these statements may be one more in the direction
of being correct:
One doesn’t have to venture far into the underground for new discoveries. Step
out into the backyard, for example, push your thumb and index finger into the
root zone of a patch of grass, and bring up a pinch of earth. You will likely be
holding close to one billion individual living organisms, perhaps ten thousand
237 I realize that I might risk sounding haughty, in a 19th century science sort of way, by referring to
ordinary experience in this way, as plebeian, and as popular and uninformed, as compared to sci-
entific empiricism. I do not mean these comments to be haughty and cruel, but rather to merely
indicate that the greater population of the world has poor knowledge of science (and thus poor
knowledge of reality), and thus has an empirical view based on that.
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distinct species of microbes, most of them not yet named, cataloged, or under-
stood. Interwoven with the thousands of wispy root hairs of the grass would be
coils of microscopic, gossamer-like threads of fungal hyphae, the total length of
which would best be measured in miles, not inches. That’s just in a pinch of earth.
In handful of typical healthy soil there are more creatures than there are humans
on the entire planet, and hundreds of miles of fungal threads.238
This example is meant to show how S-empiricism reveals the truth values of
NS-statements to often be false (if the universe of discourse is only DIV2). In this example,
it is presumed that the observer’s concept of the quantity of living creatures on the earth
changed (became larger), and by changing, the first belief was replaced by the second.
Unfortunately, many realists (as defined above in the introduction) are not trained in the
skeptical tradition of science, which involves an extreme undermining of NS-empiricism,
and thus they are not aware of the fact that there are reasons to avoid NS-empiricism.
(Mereological nihilism may be the ultimate undermining of commonsense and of NS-
empiricism, which undermines all the rest of science, where from the perspective of
mereological nihilism, all of science except quantum physics involves statements about a
reality that does not exist.) I do not see how I cannot avoid rejecting Markosian’s (i), since
it seems to be a variety of NS-empiricism, by Markosian’s own admission at the start of,
and throughout, his 1998b, where he shows that he is just trying to appeal to prephilo-
sophical intuition, which must be some sort of commonsense, since both (i) and (ii) appear
to common sense to be the grounding, rather than an S-empiricism.
8.2 Markosian and selves or minds
In exploring Markosian’s (ii), it seems that Markosian is assuming both of the fol-
lowing: the self exists and that it is a composite item. All one needs to do is require an
argument rather than an assumption or an account of intuition for these positions, and
until they are given, we can disregard this as being an attack against mereological
nihilism. In carrying out (ii), Markosian appears to be asserting that mereological
nihilism can be disregarded since it cannot explain the ‘‘we’’ in Markosian’s (ii), which
is apparently the self or consciousness. (In a passage above we saw Hudson make a
similar sort of claim.) But of course, as I will discuss in a section below, and as I will cite
others discussing also: all of philosophy is plagued by a lack of coherence as to what
mind and self are. What other branch of philosophy can explain it adequately? I am
not clear why Markosian imagines that this is something only mereological nihilism is
plagued by, as if the rest of philosophy is not. Aren’t all philosophies stumped by the
description of mind or self? So why is it only a problem for mereological nihilism?
Markosian’s attack against mereological nihilism is analogous to telling the mathe-
matician that since nobody has a clear definition of whether or not numbers exist and/
or what the definition of an irrational number is, or what a complex number is, for
some reason only ring theory in abstract algebra is in trouble, and the rest of mathe-
matics is not—calculus and topology are amazingly unharmed. Or, as another
example, Markosian’s attack against mereological nihilism is analogous to telling the
physicist that nobody has a clear definition of what dark energy or vacuum energy is,
and nobody has clearly outlined what is really going on inside a black hole, or what the
nature of Big Bang is (all base-level areas of physics, which is defined as the study of
238 Wolfe (2001, 1). Wolfe is a biology professor, and this is the first paragraph of Wolfe’s book.
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energy), but only one small fringe area of physics, such as constructing experiments to
verify electron entanglement, is in trouble rather than the entire field of physics. From
the perspective of the DIV2 conscious experiencer, who has no idea that the surfaces
and colors experienced are just concepts, and who describes her reality in terms of
DIV2-oriented logics rather than quantum logics, Markosian’s passage involves
pointing out a problem with the whole (a DIV2 conceptual whole) but maintaining
that only a part (a tiny DIV2 part) has a problem, which seems to confuse the DIV2
concept of part and whole.
Consider again the passage from Ned Markosian in an article of his where he
discusses mereological nihilism (in this passage he uses ‘‘Nihilism’’ to be synony-
mous with ‘‘mereological nihilism’’):
But there are serious difficulties associated with Nihilism. One of them concerns
the fact that you and I are surely physical objects composed of many parts, if we
exist at all; but according to Nihilism there are no physical objects composed of
many parts. So Nihilism seems to entail that you and I do not exist. And we can’t
have that.239
Similarly, Peter van Inwagen, who some philosophers consider to be, to some
degree, a mereological nihilist, however attempts the same attack against mereolog-
ical nihilism as Hudson and Markosian when he maintains that ‘‘[n]ihilism is wrong
because we are living, thinking animals, and composite objects therefore exist.’’240
But van Inwagen, Markosian, Hudson and others do not offer us more specific
argumentation for their position than this. For example, they do not show us, as just
written, why and how we can conclude that the mereological nihilist’s difficulties in
explaining consciousness and personhood in a mereological nihilist reality reveal
that mereological nihilism should be rejected, rather than just the less aggressive
conclusion that personhood and consciousness cannot be nervous system emana-
tions—which of course the mereological nihilist will enthusiastically agree with.
The passages from Hudson, van Inwagen, and Markosian (many others could
have been mentioned regarding this issue) rest on the assumption that consciousness
and/or personhood cannot be explained by mereological nihilism, and thus mere-
ological nihilism is in trouble. Focusing just on Markosian’s passage—the first
passage we gave from the set from van Inwagen, Hudson, and Markosian—this is the
structure Markosian’s ‘‘reasoning’’ on this issue:
There is an all-important unsolved problem p at the heart of popular/important
theory tm of academic discipline d. p reveals that only theory tf of d should be
rejected, and not tm and d.
Following Markosian’s passage at involves these values of tm, p, d and tf:
tm = philosophy of mind and consciousness,
p = explanation of consciousness or mind,
d = philosophy, and
tf = mereological nihilism.
239 Markosian (1998b, 220).
240 Van Inwagen (1993, 684).
123
Axiomathes (2006) 16:245–386 369
It appears that this passage involves a number of informal logical fallacies, such
as missing the point (expected conclusion not the one given: why is only mere-
ological nihilism (tf) threatened rather than all of philosophy of mind (tm)
241 or
all of philosophy (d), since these all need a consistent theory of consciousness?),
appeal to ignorance (nobody has proven mereological nihilism can explain con-
sciousness therefore there is no mereological nihilist reality), suppressed evidence
(Markosian fails to reveal how all philosophies of mind, and all of philosophy in
general, involves p, and I cannot see how to avoid the conclusion that it is
through such suppressed evidence only that he can drawn the conclusion that he
does), false dichotomy (either mereological nihilism has an explanation now for
consciousness and mind or it is to be rejected—a third possibility, such as that
mereological nihilism may be able to explain consciousness in the future, is ig-
nored), red herring (rather than discussing the problems consciousness poses to
mereological nihilism and to philosophy, and rather than explaining how they
cannot explain consciousness and what should be done about it, we are distracted
by the insignificant and fallacious such claim that this supposed to be a specific
and fatal problem for only mereological nihilism), and, of course, begging the
question (key premise is omitted, namely, the premise showing why only p has a
connection to tf in showing tf has some sort of specific problem due to p: ‘‘only tf
specifically involves p because...’’).
(i) and (ii) are all Markosian (and the other plethora of anti-nihilists) have
presented as (alleged) evidence against mereological nihilism: mereological
nihilism disagrees with NS-empiricism, and it is not (yet) known how there can
be consciousness in a mereological nihilist reality. Since that is all that is
presented against mereological nihilism, it is safe to maintain that opponents of
mereological nihilism do not have any real means of finding mereological nihilism
‘‘unacceptable,’’ as Markosian puts it (1998b, 214–215). The analysis here from
Markosian shows us how some philosophers are willing to avoid philosophical
241 This is my understanding of the philosophy of mind: it is agreed upon that consciousness and
mind are not explained by any of the theories of mind and consciousness offered to us. Here’s how
McGinn puts the issue, in the first lines of his 1991 book (and where if one peruses the pages
surrounding this passage, it appears that McGinn is using ‘‘mind–body problem’’ as synonymous with
‘‘consciousness’’):
We have been trying for a long time to solve the mind-body problem. It has stubbornly resisted our
best efforts. The mystery persists. I think the time has come to admit candidly that we cannot
resolve the mystery... How can our technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter?...
How could the aggregation of millions of individually insentient neurons generate subjective
awareness? We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it
seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be so... Somehow, we feel, the water of the
physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a total blank on the nature of
this conversion. Neural transmissions just seem like the wrong kind of materials with which to
bring consciousness into the world... (McGinn 1991, 1–2)
Also see a passage form Chalmers given in Sect. 7 below. There are many passages that could have
been given by the famous philosophers of mind that directly indicate, or strongly imply, that
current options given to us for explaining consciousness and mind are not sufficient.
Lastly, regarding McGinn’s passage, it seems, suggest that brains do not support or generate
consciousness. Quantum abstract atoms are no better candidate, at least as far as I can tell given
the level of research and theoretical development that exists for panpsychism and quantum con-
sciousness. This quite speculative conjecture is, however, of not help, as we will see in Sect. 7, since
atoms seem to be no better candidates than neurons as producers of consciousness.
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analysis (which is based on inference and reason) in favor of their intuitions and
their trust in common sense (NS-empiricism).242 Markosian even admits that this
is what he is doing (that he is putting intuition over philosophical analysis) in a
passage where, after presenting the scant ‘‘evidence’’ against mereological nihil-
ism he writes:
I think that Nihilism remains extremely counter-intuitive. Speaking for
myself, at least, the relevant intuition... is that there really are such com-
posite objects as starts and chairs... That is, according to my intuitions, there
simply are far more composite objects in the world than Nihilism allows.
This seems to me to be a fatal objection to Nihilism, and I conclude, on the
basis of this objection, that Nihilism is not the correct answer to SCQ.243
242 This is also very common in other areas of metaphysics, which are replete with paradox, but
which are nevertheless embraced by some philosophers, especially metaphysicians. To just give one
example, in Grupp (2005a) I specifically showed how persistence through time is impossible, how
philosophers know there is no solution to this paradox that has yet been offered, and that an R-
theory of time avoids all of these issues, and an R-theory of time is needed to be in accord with
science and philosophy, instead of mere NS-empiricism, commonsense and intuition. But the point
is: it is interesting how willing some philosophers are to being friends of intuition over philosophy,
and paradox over consistency, as this example—one of many—illustrates.
Instead of mereological nihilism, contemporary philosophers (namely realists) commonly hold one
of the two widely popular metaphysical realist theories: the bundle theory or the substance theory.
Both of these also have problems of being counter-intuitive and not explaining consciousness, just as
Markosian and others claim is the case for mereological nihilism. For example, the bundle theory
describes all objects as being collections of non-physical items so it is unclear how this non-physicality
gives rise to the physical DIV2 reality (Hoffman and Rosencrantz chapter 1, section 4), and there the
properties must flash in and out of existence every time there is change, and where the properties are
to come into existence out of nothing whenever there is change (for example, if bundle B has
properties F, G, H, and I at time t1, but gains properties J at time t2, where did J come from? What
caused it to come into existence?). As for the substance theory, it involves describing all items of the
universe as involving a metaphysical, invisible, non-empirical items to be the ‘‘holder’’ or properties
(usually called a thin particular, a thick particular, or something else) that ultimately in some way is a
propertyless item that somehow is the holder of properties. Additionally, substance theory appears to
be entirely in contradiction to the empirical particulate manner in which reality is observed to be in
chemistry and physics (see Davis 2006).
243 Markosian (1998b, 220–221).
In the next section, which is on van Inwagen’s semi-nihilistic metaphysics in Material Beings,
Markosian presents the very same ‘‘objection’’ to van Inwagen’s theorization.
Insofar as this is one of my fundamental intuitions, I take the inconsistency of [van Inwagen’s
theory]... with this intuition to e the basis for a fatal objection to [van Inwagen’s theory].
(221–222)
It is as if Markosian is indicating that intuition wins over philosophical analysis, and thus intuition,
not argument, determines philosophy. I maintain this because it seems that Markosian is even
positing that pre-philosohphic intuition wins over argument, because the very ‘‘intuition’’ Markosian
is discussing on pages 220–222 of 1998b is ‘‘the intuition that there really are stars, chairs, and
bicycles.’’ (222) This is the groundwork Markosian lays at the outset of his article about pre-
philosophic intuitions. (211) So it does seem that Markosian is maintaining that intuition is stronger
than reason and argument. But obviously intuition can be ever-so-wrong (the famous Harvard
paleontologist Stephen J. Gould once said: ‘‘Science has not been kind to common sense.’’) Main-
taining Markosian’s position is analogous to maintaining that if a theory, theory x, is in disagreement
with one’s pre-philosophic intuition then theory x is fatally flawed. But there are obviously many
place-holders of ‘‘x’’ that would show Markosian’s trust in pre-philosophical intuition to be quite in
error. For example, consider that theory x = plate tectonics. Not long ago at all, geologists once
intuited so assuredly that plate tectonics was an inane theory (how could continents be moving?).
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‘‘Relevant intuition,’’ in the NS-empiricist way Markosian is using the word,
might also inform us that tables are motionless, that bricks are solid, that boiling
water is primarily chaotic rather than organized, that one stick is longer than the
other in the Mo¨ller-Franz Illusion, that holes exist (such as the holes in a sponge,
a keyhole, etc.), and that water waves involve water moving horizontally and
not only vertically. Since ‘‘relevant intuition’’ obviously varies from person to
person, and can even become inverted in a single person over time (for example,
consider how fast Einstein’s ideas radically changed the conceptions of people on
basic issues about reality and how they experienced their world), unlike the self-
checking nature of science (philosophy is also supposed to involve a self-checking
nature), intuition is quite free and malleable. Depending on who one is listening
to, and regarding the following DIV2 concepts, ‘‘relevant intuition’’ may even
inform us that humans are not animals, the universe is expanding, that some
people can walk on water, and that militaries must invade other countries. The
point of these examples is not to be fanciful and extreme or to push a biased
position, but rather to show how serious ignoring reason in favor of intuition can
be. In the case of the last example (militarism), favoring ‘‘relevant intuition’’ (to
use Markosian’s phrase, and where relevant of course means something more like
‘‘caused,’’ in the DIV2 sense of the word) and ignoring reason can lead to
unfathomable suffering for children and families, and decades or centuries of
revenge and remorse. So considering Markosian’s passage is no small issue when
we see that he is not following philosophical reasoning or scientific discovery, but
rather is following ‘‘relevant intuition,’’ in his words, and that is why I assert that
he is avoiding philosophical and inferential analysis, and instead he is promoting
a position that is non-philosophical intuitive analysis, or prephilosophical, analy-
sis. This is the mainstream ‘‘philosophical method’’ for metaphysical realists. He
even implies himself that his article is based in pre-philosophical intuition rather
than philosophical analysis, since at the beginning of his article on ‘‘brutal
composition’’ he maintains that ‘‘[a]ccording to standard, pre-philosophical intu-
itions, there are many composite objects in the physical universe. There is, for
example, my bicycle, which is composed of various parts.’’244 Throughout his
article, he only relies on this intuition to give his ‘‘philosophical’’ positions (which
appear more like religious positions, since they are based on intuition rather than
on intellection, and on preference rather than inference), such as when he pre-
sents ‘‘evidence’’ against mereological nihilism, and in this passage given in the
previous sentence he maintains that this same intuition is pre-philosophical, and
for that reason, Markosian’s attack is not an instance of philosophical reasoning,
and mereological nihilism is unharmed.
8.3 Attacks on mereological nihilism due to conflict with ordinary empirical
experience
I will next further discuss the type (i) attacks against mereological nihilism, where
it is alleged that mereological nihilism is criticized for not matching up to or-
dinary m empirical experience (NS-empiricism). Most attacks on mereological
nihilism, as can be seen in Hudson’s passage at the start of this section, is merely
due to the fact that people have sense experiences that they do not agree with
244 Markosian (1998b, 211).
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mereological nihilism. Consider another example, in a passage from Hossack, a
metaphysical realist:
...it seems there are at lest three distinct ways in which a complex might arise
from a multiplicity of more elementary things: it might arise by composition
into a mass, or by composition into a composite individual, or by collection into
a set. But atomists deny that composition or collection ever really occurs, for
they deny that there really are such particulars as masses, composite individ-
uals, or sets.
An argument from Leibniz’ Law can be used at this point against atomism.
In the case of masses, we would argue as follow. A mass of matter is made
up of particles. For example, we know that if there is some water, then it is
composed of many water molecules. Now it is surely true that this water is
wet. But of course no water molecule is wet. Hence ‘‘this water’’ must refer
to something other than the individual molecules. Conclusion: it refers to this
mass of water. Therefore, masses exist.245
In Hossack’s passage, his position rests entirely on this demand: ‘‘...surely it is
true that this water is wet.’’ (Notice, in a similar fashion as with Markosian’s and
Hudson’s passages above that Hossack gives no argument for this claim, and it
therefore takes the form of a demand, rather than a philosophical position which
involves an inference to a conclusion—the philosophy is merely based in mere
trust that all will agree that the senses are infallible on such matters, which seems
nearly shocking, since there is a long tradition of philosophers and scientists who
would disagree.) Hossack uses this demand to presume that wetness can only be
‘‘in the water,’’ rather than being a secondary quality (and thus in the mind), and
it is as if this is avowed to be enough to reject mereological nihilism. But as
implied above, once one makes this simple and seemingly harmless and even
scientific move of questioning NS-empirical experience, one can easily notice that
our sense experience is inadequate. So if, like Markosian and Hudson, only the
crude and uncritical NS-empiricism is used to challenge mereological nihilism,
then this objection does not seem to be an objection at all. Hossack’s passage
does not question his non-scientific empirical experience (NS-empiricism), and
thus it seems that ‘‘it is surely true’’ that there is wetness, rather than there being
a simple misperception, just like one has a simple misperception when they look
at a red picture in a magazine and believe it to involve areas of continuous
(unbroken) red or other colors patches rather than red or other colored pixels
that have gaps between them (merely getting a magnifier out could correct the
erroneous perception belief), or just as when one has a simple misperception
when one sees a cloud and believes it to be a continuous (unbroken) while blob
rather than detached and non-touching water droplets.
As we have seen, it is not difficult to see that the senses are plagued with inac-
curacies, and we do no need to use quantum physics to see why. When we look at a
piece of ordinary white paper with the naked eye, it appears smooth, white, spatially
extended, and whole, and it appears to have no discontinuities or interstices across of
its surface. For those reasons, and since there are no visible interstices, it appears to
245 Hossak (2000, 412–413).
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be one thing from this NS-empirical perspective. But when we look at the same
paper with a microscope, S-empiricism enters the picture since I have more expe-
riences compounding at that point and where I am no longer under the spell of
merely blindly following my NS-empirical experience, and one sees that the paper is
not smooth at all, but is composed of individual wood fibers, and thus in looking
more close-up at the piece of paper, it does not appear to be one item:246
246 It is interesting to note that Avrum Stroll, in his book Surfaces, is aware of the conflict
between empirical experiences of surfaces, depending on how close up or far back the observer is
when looking at the surface, wherein, it would seem that the perspective creates the experience
so the surface, not the surface itself creating it. Stroll first tells us that ‘‘marbles are good
examples of things that are normally said to have surfaces.’’ (1988 15) Then later Stroll tells us
that
We do not speak about the surface of the sun. It is said that the sun’s temperature at the surface is
such and such; that giant gas tendrils stretch up from its surface and extend many miles above it; and
that it is possible to calculate the distance from its center to its surface. We can say some of these
things about marbles, too—that their temperature at the surface is such and such, for example. But
there are some things we can say about marbles that we don’t, perhaps can’t, say about the sun. Is
the surface of the sun pitted, blemished, smooth, rough, scratched, bruised, damaged, chipped? If
we can’t say these things, why not? Perhaps it is because the sun is not solid or even liquid...(1988,
28)
I am not sure why Stroll considers the smooth view of the surface to be in any way the same entity as
the jagged surface. I am not sure how to avoid the conclusion here that these are experiences from
differing perspectives (one closer-up than the other), and thus the experiencing creates the surface
appearances. Stroll even maintains on page 15 that ‘‘[t]he surfaces of marbles can be described as
rough, smooth, slippery, chipped, sticky, blemished, pitted, or damaged...’’ If we take Stroll at his
word, and if we believe that he wants to consider the surface of a marble to be a single entity, not
eliminativistically reducible to a set of parts, then the surface of a marble, call it S, can described by
the statement M1
:
M1: S is both rough and smooth at present p.
If we take the word ‘‘smooth’’ to be synonymous with ‘‘rough’’, then Stroll’s position that M1 can be
both rough and smooth can be rewritten as M2:
M2: S can be both rough and not rough at present p.
This is a contradiction, and would seem to merely imply what I am arguing in this article: a surface
cannot be continuous (DIV2 perspective) and non-existence (DIV1 perspective) at the same time.
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If there was a person who had never seen a piece of paper before, and if I
showed the microscopic picture of the paper to them and told them that this was
a picture of an object that is smooth, continuous (unbroken, with no gaps be-
tween the parts), and white, I may be accused of hallucinating, and/or of not
understanding language.
When I was a child, I wondered why when I looked at the hands of the clock I
could not see them moving, only to see shortly after that they had moved. It
appeared to me that the hands were still when I looked at them, and between
long-enough times of looking at the clock hands, when I was looking away from
them, they ‘‘jumped’’ to a new position. But my parents told that there is no such
jumping. I was told that, surprisingly, the hands of the clock were mov-
ing—contrary to what my empirical experience told me—I just could not see
them moving. In other words, I was told that I should not trust my empirical
experience. Also when I was young, I was told that the earth was not flat, but
rather was a giant ball, even though the earth appeared to me to be flat, other
than minor inconsistencies such as mountains and hills. This also conflicted with
my empirical experience, but I was told by parents and teachers to ignore my
empirical experience. The sun appeared to me to be very much like the clock
hands: the sun would not be seen to be moving at any instant, but over time it
could be seen to have moved. So I imagined that, like the clock hands, the sun
moved slowly and my senses could not detect the motion. This seemed satis-
factory to me. But I was eventually told that the sun was not moving, but rather
it was the earth that was moving, even though I surely could sense throughout the
day that the sun was moving across the sky, just like I could sense that the clock
hands were moving, and I could not detect the earth to be moving. I was told,
again, that my sense information was wrong. Other examples like this which
illustrate the fallibility of sense perception and of intuitive pre-philosophical
analysis that is associated with NS-empiricism, are not difficult to find. Examples
such as these and the many other ones I have given make it clear that, although
empirical experience is the starting point of science and philosophy, under the
more refined S-empiricism, there is understanding that blind faith in any sense
experience (which is the hallmark of NS-empiricism) is not a careful sort of
empiricism.
Example after example, I was told to ignore the inaccuracies of my senses. I
grew up and got used to it, and then started to read philosophy, only to see
philosophers surprisingly basing theories on the reliability of sense information. It
seemed to me that humans forget about the inaccuracies of the senses as they
grew up. When I arrived in college, I took classes in chemistry and physics, where
I studied reality at the microscopic scale, at the microbiological level and smaller.
If this was not enough to inform me of the truly staggering way my senses
deceive me, I also studied the particles and forces of physics, and I was just told
that they compose the reality we perceive; there was virtually no discussion of
how these particles and forces, which, as we saw in above sections, did not at all
appear to be such that they could compose the world I experienced in my daily
life. Ford writes:
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When we look at the smallest specks of space and the tiniest ticks of time,
we see what can only be called fireworks. Myriad new particles pop into
existence, some long-lived, most short-lived,... and each capable of being
destroyed as well as created.247
My point in bringing up these issues is to show that Markosian’s error is merely the
standard position among humans.
9 Quantum consciousness, selves, ordinary experiencing
9.1 Overview: selves and experience
As I have discussed, many readers may find mereological nihilism to have serious
problems since it may not be currently known how consciousness (either DIV1
or DIV2 consciousness) can exist in a mereological nihilist reality, or since
mereological nihilism may seem to imply that people do not exist. For example,
Hudson appears to hold something along these lines, as seen in a passage of his
that is about persons, and where he is talking about mereological nihilism and
consciousness:
On this view the only material objects that exist are subatomic particles...
To be sure, many philosophers have advocated the view that human persons
are simples—immaterial ones—but no philosopher has seriously maintained
(or should seriously maintain) that we are material subatomic particles such
as bosons or classons or leptons. Even Roderick Chisholm who... suggested
that human persons were smallish incorruptible material objects located
somewhere in the brain, never went so far as to insist that we were material
simples.248
In the last section, we saw that this was analogous to asserting that, to give a
third example, since there is not a clear definition of ‘‘life’’ that biologists agree
on, then this is for some reason only a problem for small groups of biologists,
such as exobiologists, or perhaps those that study parasite rex,249 which, although
respectable areas of philosophy with a long tradition, are small and/or fringe
areas of biology, and the ‘‘life’’ definition problem is for some reason not than
being a problem for all of biology and philosophy of biology. Mereological
nihilism does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that persons or consciousness
do not exist. Mereological nihilism merely shows that consciousness and per-
sonhood cannot be composite entities. They are not the spatially extended
physical human body, or a spatially extended physical brain-part—since the body
and brain are composites and thus do not exist.
The inability to explain consciousness is not just a problem for mereological
nihilism, but it is a problem for all of philosophy, and for physics, chemistry,
biology, psychology, and neuroscience, since none of these theories are getting at
what conscious experiencing is, or getting at what it is that explains what our
247 Ford (2004, 2).
248 Hudson (2001b, 81–82).
249 See Parasite Rex, by Carl Zimmer. 2000. Parasite Rex: Inside the Bizarre World of Nature’s Most
Dangerous Creatures. New York: Touchstone.
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‘‘Technicolor phenomenology’’ (McGinn’s terminology). It seems to be a basic
quality of the philosophies of mind is that they really do not get at the expla-
nation of the mental.250 Others have noticed this also. Chalmers writes: ‘‘Con-
sciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is
nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is
nothing harder to explain.’’251 (A passage I will give from McGinn declared this
same position in the last section.) The many substance and bundle theorists,252
for example, who are opponents of mereological nihilism and who are opponents
the strictly empirical and scientific approach to the study of reality, do no better
job than the mereological nihilists at explaining consciousness.253
In this section, I will give a general discussion of the only two possibilities I see for
how consciousness can exist in a mereological nihilist reality. These positions depend
on two positions that can be taken fore how one believes what atoms have to do with
consciousness:
(i) it is believed that quantum abstract atoms cannot be conscious.
(ii) it is believed that quantum abstract atoms can be conscious, and
First I will discuss (i), which is a dualistic thesis (Sect. 9.2), and then I will discuss
(ii), which is a monistic thesis (Sect. 9.3). The dualist position involves what I will call
the McGinn mind, for reasons I will discuss. And the monistic position is a variety of
what can be considered panpsychistic quantum consciousness. It should be admitted
that each of these theories are unsatisfactory—at least from their current level of
development, and unless a further advancement occurs. As for the unsatisfactoriness
of the dualist position, dualism is currently largely rejected in Western philosophy
for reasons that have been widely discussed.254 As for the unsatisfactoriness of the
monistic position, it rest on the idea that partless unstructured point-particles that do
little more than flash in and out of existence can give rise to consciousness. Needless
250 I am reminded of an interesting quote here, which seems to perfectly illustrate the problem of the
mind I am discussing: ‘‘The mind is a strange and wonderful thing. I’m not sure it will ever be able to
figure itself out—everything else maybe, from the atoms to the universe, everything but itself.’’ From
Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956 version).
251 Chalmers (1995, 200).
252 This is the group of metaphysical realist theorists who explain reality in terms of the way
attributes of things (which are reducible to surfaces and colors of DIV2 experiencing) conglomerate
and connect to give rise to objects of DIV2 experiencing. It seems this group of realists comprises the
majority of American philosophers today. See Grupp (2006a, b, c) for problems with the account of
reality this group presents.
253 I have seen these critics who are bundle and substance theorists believe that they are describing
consciousness by merely labeling brains as ‘‘having mental properties,’’ as if that has explanatory
value for the problem and mystery of consciousness. I am not sure how that is, in fact, not much more
than a sentence that does very little to help understand anything at all, and which is really no more
than the common sense view that is learned in elementary school when the teacher first-grade
teacher teaches the students that ‘‘it is your brains that you use when you are thinking.’’ The
mereological nihilist also could merely label an atom of a nihilistic quantum abstract atomic reality
as having mental properties if she/he so desired. This would produce the same level of explanation as
maintaining that a set of non-mental on-off (firing-not-firing) neuron cells produce mental proper-
ties. In either case, explanation is not given as to how mental properties come out of the non-mental
base material (neurons for the typical philosopher of mind, and atom(s) for the mereological
nihilist).
254 Blackmore (2004, 13).
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to say, it is not clear how this can be.255 But as unsatisfactory as these options may
seem, they are no worse in explanatory value than the currently philosophies of mind
we have been offered by philosophers in any other area of philosophy. In fact, I will
discuss the problems of consciousness that encounter mereological nihilism are
virtually the same problems that non-nihilistic philosophers run up against, and non-
nihilistic philosophers are in the very same predicament as the nihilistic philosopher.
The basic problems involve the idea that non-mental items (atoms, neurons, etc.) do
not seem to be able to do the job of giving rise to our Technicolour phenomenology.
9.2 Option 1: McGinn minds: non-physical minds that are ineffable
I will first discuss the idea that quantum abstract atoms cannot be considered to be
conscious. Consider the following two arguments, which give an idea of the difficulty
involved with the question of consciousness and mental experience in the
mereological nihilist reality:
A. Consciousness exists.
B. There is no brain or body. (This follows from the sections above.)
C. Therefore, consciousness is not the brain and/or body activity.
As for premise A, many philosophers claim it is self-evidently true that there are
experiences, mental states, phenomenal states, etc. If it is, then DIV2 experiencing
would be consciousness that does not represent reality accurately, but it nevertheless
exists. Now consider another argument:
D. Consciousness exists.
E. It does not seem that quantum abstract atoms can be consciousness nor
experiences.
F. Therefore, it does not seem that consciousness is made up of quantum abstract
atoms.
Putting C and F together implies that if there is consciousness, it is not nervous
system activity, and it is not atomic activity, and thus there can only be a dualism in
mereological nihilism: in mereological nihilist reality, there are two kinds of items
that exist: unconnected and unattached quantum abstract atoms, and phenomenal
states of consciousness. Quantum abstract atoms can be studied through phenom-
enal states of consciousness, but phenomenal states of consciousness study them-
selves. This appears to be something like the position that Colin McGinn has
espoused in his ‘‘cognitive closure’’ position:
255 Also, I imagine that many philosophers will consider the monistic position to be questionable
since they will be associate it with a type of mysticism since it involves panpsychistic substratum of
energy (particles). But I see this as perhaps incorrect to associate this with mysticism, since Western
mysticism appears to involve oneness of some sort with God, and Hindu and Sufi mysticism also
appears to involves some sort of bond with God. Nowhere in this article does the metaphysical
concept of God fit in, whether Hindu, Sufi, or Christian, and thus I am not sure how quantum
mereological nihilism can be associated with mysticism in any way. Buddhistic accounts from India
are astonishingly close to the quantum panpsychistic idea. But I am not sure how and why those
accounts can be considered mystical, since Buddhists from India are infamously atheistic, and since
that tradition involves rigorous philosophical analysis to get to theory Buddhist atomism. So I do not
know how Buddhism from India can be considered mystical.
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The problem arises, I want to suggest, because we are cut off by our very
cognitive constitution from achieving a conception of that natural property of
the brain (or of consciousness) that accounts for the psychophysical link. This is
a kind of causal nexus that we are precluded from every understanding, given
the way we have to form our concepts and develop our theories...
Let me introduce the idea of cognitive closure. A type of mind M is cognitively
close with respect to a property P (or theory T) if and only if the concept-forming
procedures at Ms’ disposal cannot extend to a grasp of P (or an understanding of
T). Conceiving minds come in different kinds, equipped with varying powers and
limitations, biases and blindspots, so that properties (or theories) may be
accessible to some minds but not to others. What is closed to the mind of rat may
be open to the mind of a monkey, and what is open to us may be closed to the
monkey... This is particularly clear for perceptual faculties, of course: perceptual
closure is hardly to be denied... [N]o species can perceive every property things
may instantiate (without artificial instrumentation anyway). But such closure
does not reflect adversely on the reality of the properties that lie outside the
representational capacities in question; a property is no less real for not being
reachable for a certain kind of perceiving and conceive mind.256
If conscious experiencing is not particles, and if mind and conscious experiencing
exists, it seems that the following conclusion is a viable option for the mereological
nihilist: consciousness is some sort of ‘‘exotic stuff:’’ it is not the same type of stuff as
quantum abstract atoms and not made up of quantum abstract atoms. It must be
admitted that this is a dubious suggestion, since, due to the reasoning in the sections
above, McGinn minds must be partless point-atoms, and I do not understand how
they could be described in any way as being different from quantum abstract atoms.
But I will assume that somehow they can be, in order to further discuss this dualist
option more in this subsection, and I will the account of their being identical to the
quantum abstract atoms in the next section.
According to the dualist option, consciousness would be an item that is an entirely
inconceivable ‘‘stuff’’ that cannot be labeled matter, particles, or quantum abstract
atoms. With quantum abstract atoms, we can at least maintain that they are as we
have described them in this article (immaterial, partless, etc.), but the McGinn
minds, we could do little more than generate a statement the following in describing
them: they are partless, inconceivable, and ineffable.
On this account, I see no reason why I should avoid the suggestion that somehow
McGinn minds might be able to directly apprehend quantum abstract atomic
reality: if a McGinn mind ever were to experience something real, it can directly
experience quantum abstract atoms, giving rise to a DIV1 I-empirical experience.
Surely this may sound inane to many philosophers of mind, since I am suggesting
here both that a consciousness is not a brain activity, and I don’t see a reason why
that non-nervous system consciousness cannot directly (not with the aid of the
machinery and apparatuses of physics: supercolliders, atoms smashers, mathemat-
ical description, etc.) experience quantum abstract atoms. So McGinn minds in a
mereological nihilist reality are not so controversial, and they involve some of the
primary tenets of philosophy of mind. Also, other philosophers of mind do not have
an account for consciousness. The idea that McGinn minds might be able to directly
256 Ibid., 2–3.
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apprehend quantum abstract atoms would make the atoms directly empirical.
Above I referred to empirical experience as ‘‘ordinary empirical experience.’’
Witnessing quantum abstract atoms directly might need to be called something else,
such as nirvana, as Buddhist philosophers may choose. Perhaps our DIV2 oriented
minds are often susceptible to interstices of DIV1 experience.
The nihilists, Rosen and Dorr, appear to come to a very different conclusion: in a
passage where they discuss the self (so they may or may not be referring to merely
conscious experiencing, as I have above, and which does not necessarily require the
existence of a self or persisting self): rather than maintaining that there is a self, they
conclude that if premise E is true, then the self would not exist: ‘‘Since you are not one
of these particles [quantum abstract atoms] and since there are no other candidates,
the compositional nihilist maintains that strictly speaking, you do not exist.’’257 If
Rosen and Dorr mean that self is consciousness, then there might not be a self and
furthermore there might not be any consciousness. If they do, it seems they are merely
assuming the negation of my premise D. But they do not provide an argument for this,
and I therefore instead follow my immediate experience, maintaining that it neces-
sarily exists. If it did not, right now I would be a thinker that was trying to theorize that
there are no thinkers, but that is a contradiction. Premise D is an assumption, but it
seems a good one due to the fact that, so far as anyone can tell, inner/subjective mental
states, phenomenal states, etc. cannot be made of one atom, or multiple unattached/
unconnected atoms, and therefore are not made of atoms at all.
If mereological nihilism is correct, then brains do not exist, and consciousness
is in no way a brain activity. I imagine many philosophers may find this a very
strange position, but it is important to note that McGinn minds are very much
like traditional dualist accounts. For example, McGinn minds involve a charac-
teristic of the traditional and mainstream dualist philosophies of mind, where it is
held the mental properties are not reducible to brains, and thereby are not brain
activities. The idea that experience is not a brain activity, but is the activity of a
brainless mind, if you will, has been held by some of the aforementioned phi-
losophers who have been mereological nihilists or who hold positions very similar
to mereological nihilism. For example, some accounts of the pre-classical Indian
Buddhism and in Kantian transcendental idealism, there is found to be two sorts
of ‘‘stuff’’ that composes reality: phenomenal states and atoms (in Kantian ter-
minology, these would be called transcendental egos and thing-in-themselves). In
a passage about Kant and Indian Buddhism, Stcherbatsky calls the Buddhist
‘‘double reality, the ultimate reality of things by themselves and the psychologi-
cally constructed reality (i.e., unreality) of empirical things.’’258 The ‘‘double
reality,’’ to use Stcherbatsky’s term, is empirical versus atomic reality, or unreal-
257 Rosen and Dorr (2002, 152).
258 Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic. Volume 1. page 143. Stcherbatsky discusses
this in a very interesting passage where he is comparing Buddhism to the philosophy of Immanuel
Kant. Many have drawn similarities between some Europeans, such as Hume and Kant, and the
Indian Buddhists. But note that we bring up Kant only to discuss his dual reality, which is in
agreement with this article. There is however an important difference to note between this Kantian
metaphysics on the one hand and Buddhist atomism and this article on the other. Kant held that the
real (things in themselves, which apparently are philosophic atoms) do not influence or causally
impact the mind in any way. This is an assumption that I reject, and I hold the opposite assumption:
mind is impacted by atoms, but the mind misinterprets the atoms as being extended surfaces and
color patches of the empirical.
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empirical versus actual-atomic reality: the conceptual versus the real. In this
section, I will show that this double reality means that, at the present moment,
our best alterative in the philosophy of mind is to maintain that experience is
‘‘made of’’ some sort of non-atomic ‘‘exotic stuff’’ which are do not have a
theory for, and may never have a theory for.
9.3 Option 2: Quantum panpsychism
As we saw, it is very questionable as to how McGinn minds, which must be non-
physical point atoms can be considered somehow a different kind of stuff than
quantum abstract atoms. I will next explore the idea that they are not different.
This leads to a philosophy that consists of a mixture of panpsychism and perhaps
a theory of quantum consciousness.
Theories of quantum consciousness involve the theory that consciousness has
to some degree something to do not just with neurons, but also with the quantum
effects of reality. But according to mereological nihilism, there are no neurons,
and consciousness has only to do with quantum abstract atoms. Since there are
no brains, no neurons, no immaterial mental substances—since each of these are
mereological wholes, which do not exist—and since there are only quantum ab-
stract atoms, then consciousness can only be identical to, the quantum abstract
atoms themselves. I can think of no other option for consciousness other than this
if mereological nihilism is correct and the dualism of the previous section is not
correct. If that is the only option, then this is a theory of quantum conscious-
ness,259 and it is also a theory that appears to be panpsychistic: since quantum
abstract atoms are structureless (point-sized) items with no means of being dis-
tinguished from one another, and if consciousness has something to do with one
or a few of the atoms, then it can only have to do with all of them.
Since this thesis of panpsychism being suggested here in this part of this article
involves a monistic universe-less reality that is immaterial and conscious, some
may wish to assert that it is also spiritual also. The model of reality being de-
scribed in this article and especially in this section, has many similarities to, for
example, the logical epistemology of the Buddhist Dharmakirti (India, 7th cen-
tury), and perhaps to much of the Buddhism of India in general—which also
often takes the form of a theory of quantum consciousness. But nothing in the
above argumentation would lead to the inference that in addition to being all of
259 It is a quantum consciousness theory in that the only real items that consciousness can be aware
of, and/or be caused by, are Buddhist atoms (quantum abstract atoms). This is called the standard
interpretation in Indian Buddhism. In his book on Dharmakırti, Dreyfus writes:
According to the Sautrantika explanation, only infinitesimal atoms and moments of consciousness
are real. Everything else, such as a shape or a color, is real only inasmuch as it is taken as an object of
conventional practice. This view is not unlike Wilfrid Sellar’s claim that objects such as tables, ice
cubes, and colors do not really exist... Our commonsense notions of such objects are false but
cognitively useful......[A]lthough Dharmakırti never provides a detailed statement of this ontology,
we could expect him to follow th[e] Sautratika view. Several traditional and modern scholars have
explained Dharmakırti in this way, emphasizing that in his system reality is reducible to partless
atoms interacting with moments of consciousness... This... explains our perceptions of extended
objects. In reality, there is no extension but just the causal interaction of infinitesimal atoms with
partless moments of consciousness. I call this interpretation of Dharmakırti’s ontology the standard
interpretation. (Dreyfus 1997, 85)
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these, this reality is therefore also spiritual. The spiritual usually has to do with
something metaphysical, and as discussed above this article is largely about
eradication of the metaphysical.
I am not the only one to notice stark similarities between science and Buddhism
with respect to the study of consciousness. In her recent book, Consciousness,
Blackmore reserves the last chapter for an analysis of Buddhism and consciousness,
where she comes to the following point, which is in precise agreement with my
findings of this article:
One point that Buddhism and psychology both make is that our experience
is, in some sense, illusory. Since an illusion is not something that does not
exist, but something that is not what it seems, this leaves plenty of room for
different interpretations. In science we have already met the idea that the
visual world might be a grand illusion, that the stream of consciousness
might be illusory, as might both the self and free will. We can now see that
there are distinct similarities between the illusions discussed in science and
in Buddhism.260
10 Conclusion
The attacks against material composition I have discussed in this article reveal fatal
problems for composition to which I see no solution. This article also establishes
mereological nihilism as a leading interpretation of quantum physics—and perhaps
the most appealing to the anti-metaphysical crowd. My intention in this article has
been to bring these issues to the attention of philosophers and physicists since, oddly,
there have been so few cohorts of quantum mereological nihilism. If mereological
nihilism is the correct interpretation of quantum reality, then as I see it, there would
be three mysteries surrounding it:
1. How can there be consciousness in a mereological nihilist reality?
2. Why and/or how to particles emerge into existence, seemingly ‘‘from nothing’’?
3. Why do humans see patterns (interference and wave patterns, etc.) in the par-
ticle flashings (such as in the two slit experiment)?
If the reasoning I have presented in this article is correct, matter does not exist,
reality is immaterial energy, only quantum atoms exist, which are immaterial points
of energy that ‘‘vibrate’’ in and out of existence. It seems to me that this description
of reality is so similar to some of the Buddhists of pre-classical India that this article
could (and perhaps should) lead to a revolutionary upwelling of interest in Buddhist
psychology, positivism (in Comte’s sense of the word) and empiricism, pragmatic
philosophy, all in combination with a non-metaphysical interpretation of quantum
physics. To a huge extent, a Baconian-level trust in science is lacking in the denizens
the contemporary world. Such a trust in them would lead to affirming revolution.
The power and enlightenment that can be found in science is largely absent from,
and unknown to, the denizens of the world. The denizens of the world are often
taught how to perform at unfulfilling occupations that give little pay, long hours, and
shallow existence, but they are nearly never taught how to live—what Thoreau called
260 Blackmore (2004, 411).
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‘‘the art of living.’’ Buddhism is the pinnacle of study of the inner (mental) world,261
and quantum physics is the pinnacle of science. The unification of these represents
the pinnacle of the study of reality as-a-whole, which is the most worthwhile study.
The world today is replete with citizens who are in need of this study. They are in
need of a proper psychology to help them get by rationally with their daily life lest
ennui and violence cripple their lives. The citizens of the world also are in drastic
need to know that scientific thinking is not something special that is reserved for
laboratories and universities, but, rather, it must be the essence of one’s daily life,
needed in order to live properly: the proper life is the one that studies, both the inner
and the outer, and, ultimately, the blurred amalgam of the two. The improper life,
the life that consists of confusion and lostness, is the life that is devoted to distraction
only. (It is improper because it does not contribute to humanistic pursuits, but rather
only in only contributes to the pursuits and dreams of those who have enslaved that
mind and life.) To a large extent, the citizens of today’s world, it appears safe to
assert, are lost in metaphysics, entertainment, uncritical thinking, guilt, various kinds
of poverty, and an utter lack of feeling of profundity and energy. The positivistic
amalgam of quantum physics and Buddhism—which is the truest sense of what
quantum mereological nihilism involves—offers an antidote to the this pervasive and
contemporary human state of being unaware, uninformed, unintelligent, stolid,
confused, and without an inner fire that is burning. Mereological nihilism evokes a
release from concern over the sea of trivial matters that tie one to shallow existence,
and instead leads to a focus only on the immaterial energy that is reality, and which
is all human subjective vitalism—which is the essence of Buddhist ethics.262
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